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Abstract  
This report evaluates the performance of long-term care (LTC) systems in Europe, with a special emphasis on four 
countries that were selected in Work Package 1 of the ANCIEN project as representative of different LTC systems: 
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland. Based on a performance framework, we use the following four core 
criteria for the evaluation: the quality of life of LTC users, the quality of care, equity of LTC systems and the total 
burden of LTC (consisting of the financial burden and the burden of informal caregiving). The quality of life is analysed 
by studying the experience of LTC users in 13 European countries, using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Older persons with limitations living at home have the highest probability of receiving 
help (formal or informal) in Germany and the lowest in Poland. Given that help is available, the sufficiency of the help 
is best ensured in Switzerland, Italy and the Netherlands. The indirectly observed properties of the LTC system are most 
favourable in France. An older person who considers all three aspects important might be best off living in Belgium or 
Switzerland. The horizontal and vertical equity of LTC systems are analysed for the four representative countries. The 
Dutch system scores highest on overall equity, followed by the German system. The Spanish and Polish systems are 
both less equitable than the Dutch and German systems. To show how ageing may affect the financial burden of LTC, 
projections until 2060 are given for LTC expenditures for the four representative countries. Under the base scenario, for 
all four countries the proportions of GDP spent on public and private LTC are projected to more than double between 
2010 and 2060, and even treble in some cases. The projections also highlight the large differences in LTC expenditures 
between  the  four  countries.  The  Netherlands  spends  by  far  the  most  on  LTC.  Furthermore,  the  report  presents 
information for a number of European countries on quality of care, the burden of informal caregiving and other aspects 
of performance. The LTC systems for the four representative countries are evaluated using the four core criteria. The 
Dutch system has the highest scores on all four dimensions except the total burden of care, where it has the second-best 
score  after  Poland.  The  German  system  has  somewhat  lower  scores  than  the  Dutch  on  all  four  dimensions.  The 
relatively large role for informal care lowers the equity of the German system. The Polish system excels in having a low 
total burden of care, but it scores lowest on quality of care and equity. The Spanish system has few extreme scores. 
Policy implications are discussed in the last chapter of this report and in the Policy Brief based on this report.  
This report is accompanied by a separate document, published as ENEPRI Research Report No. 117A, 
containing statistical appendices. 
ENEPRI  Research  Reports  present  the  findings  and  conclusions  of  research  undertaken  in  the  context  of 
research projects carried out by a consortium of ENEPRI member institutes. This report is a contribution to 
Work Package 7 of the ANCIEN project, which  focuses on  the future of long-term care  for the  elderly in 
Europe, funded by the European Commission under the 7
th Framework Programme (FP 7 Health-2007-3.2.2, 
Grant  no.  223483).  See  back  page  for  more  information.  The  views  expressed  are  attributable  only  to  the 
authors  in  a  personal  capacity  and  not  to  any  institution  with  which  they  are  associated.  The  results  and 
conclusions of this paper are those of the authors and are not attributable to Eurostat, the European Commission 
or any of the national authorities whose data have been used. 
ISBN 978-94-6138-259-7 
 Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu) 
 and the ANCIEN website (http://www.ancien-longtermcare.eu/) 
© Copyright 2012 Esther Mot, Riemer Faber, Joanna Geerts and Peter Willemé (eds) Contents 
1.  Introduction  .................................................................................................................................  1 
2.  The performance framework 
Esther Mot (CPB) ........................................................................................................................  4 
2.1  Introduction .........................................................................................................................  4 
2.2  Relevant literature ................................................................................................................  4 
2.2.1  The WHO framework ..............................................................................................  4 
2.2.2  Open method of coordination ...................................................................................  5 
2.2.3  The Wanless report ..................................................................................................  6 
2.2.4  The AARP Scorecard...............................................................................................  6 
2.3  Description of the framework ...............................................................................................  7 
2.3.1  Outcomes for individuals and society .......................................................................  7 
2.3.2  Outcomes at the systems level  ..................................................................................  7 
2.3.3  Systems characteristics ............................................................................................  8 
2.3.4  The ANCIEN performance framework  .....................................................................  8 
3.  Individual outcome measures..................................................................................................... 10 
3.1  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 10 
3.2  Individual outcome measures ............................................................................................. 10 
3.3  Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 13 
3.3.1  What would be an appropriate measure for ANCIEN? ........................................... 13 
4.  The experience of LTC users 
Riemer Faber and Esther Mot with the cooperation of Ali Aouragh (CPB)................................. 17 
4.1  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 17 
4.1.1  Users of LTC ......................................................................................................... 17 
4.1.2  Method .................................................................................................................. 18 
4.2  Conceptual framework ....................................................................................................... 18 
4.2.1  SHARE and the performance of LTC systems  ........................................................ 18 
4.2.2  The model ............................................................................................................. 19 
4.3  Data and description  ........................................................................................................... 19 
4.4  The probability of receiving help  ........................................................................................ 26 
4.4.1  Effect of control variables ...................................................................................... 27 
4.4.2  Country effects ...................................................................................................... 30 
4.4.3  Relation with the typology of LTC systems based on use and financing of care ...... 31 
4.4.4  Relationship of country effects with systems’ characteristics .................................. 32 
4.5  Does the help meet the needs? ............................................................................................ 35 
4.5.1  Effect of control variables ...................................................................................... 36 
4.5.2  Country effects ...................................................................................................... 38 
4.5.3  Country results and systems’ characteristics ........................................................... 40 
4.6  Methodology and robustness checks  ................................................................................... 40 
4.6.1  Sample selection bias ............................................................................................. 40 
4.6.2  Heterogeneity and outliers ..................................................................................... 41 
4.6.3  Selection of explanatory variables .......................................................................... 41 
4.6.4  Correlation among explanatory variables ............................................................... 41  
4.7  Life satisfaction.................................................................................................................. 41 
4.7.1  Estimation: ordered probit with vignettes ............................................................... 43 
4.7.2  Results  ................................................................................................................... 45 
4.7.3  Results for the large sample ................................................................................... 48 
4.7.4  Explaining the unobserved properties of the LTC systems ...................................... 50 
4.7.5  Discussion ............................................................................................................. 52 
4.8  Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 53 
5.  Analysis of equity 
Adelina Comas-Herrera (LSE) .................................................................................................. 58 
5.1  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 58 
5.2  Equity and long-term care systems ..................................................................................... 58 
5.3  Equity and revenue-raising ................................................................................................. 59 
5.3.1  Informal care ......................................................................................................... 60 
5.3.2  Private income, savings and assets ......................................................................... 60 
5.3.3  Private insurance ................................................................................................... 61 
5.3.4  Social insurance  ..................................................................................................... 62 
5.3.5  Taxation ................................................................................................................ 62 
5.4  Equity and resource allocation  ............................................................................................ 63 
5.5  TheLTC systems of Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland from an equity point of 
view ................................................................................................................................... 65 
5.5.1  Germany  ................................................................................................................ 65 
5.5.2  The Netherlands..................................................................................................... 70 
5.5.3  Spain ..................................................................................................................... 72 
5.5.4  Poland ................................................................................................................... 76 
5.6  Comparative summary tables ............................................................................................. 77 
5.6.1  Summary ............................................................................................................... 78 
5.7  Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 78 
6.  Projections of LTC expenditures 
Joanna Geerts and Peter Willemé (FPB) ................................................................................... 82 
6.1  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 82 
6.2  Projection methodology and data sources ........................................................................... 82 
6.2.1  Base year unit costs ............................................................................................... 82 
6.2.2  Scenarios ............................................................................................................... 86 
6.3  Projection results  ................................................................................................................ 87 
6.3.1  Projections of long-term care expenditure under different scenarios ....................... 87 
6.3.2  Simulation results .................................................................................................. 94 
6.4  Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 95 
7.  Overall evaluation of performance 
Anikó Bíró (The University of Edinburgh)  .................................................................................. 97 
7.1  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 97 
7.2  Quality of care ................................................................................................................... 97 
7.3  Improving functional ability ............................................................................................... 99 
7.4  Accessibility .................................................................................................................... 101 
7.5  Burden of long term care .................................................................................................. 103 
7.5.1  Use of care .......................................................................................................... 104  
7.5.2  Current financial burden ...................................................................................... 105 
7.5.3  Predicted financial burden.................................................................................... 107 
7.5.4  Burden of informal caregiving ............................................................................. 108 
7.6  Support for informal caregivers ........................................................................................ 109 
7.7  Choice ............................................................................................................................. 112 
7.8  Conclusions and overall evaluation .................................................................................. 113 
8.  Review and conclusions .......................................................................................................... 118 
8.1  The concept of performance ............................................................................................. 118 
8.2  Overview of the analysis .................................................................................................. 118 
8.3  Performance in the four representative countries............................................................... 119 
8.4  Policy considerations ....................................................................................................... 121 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1  A star plot of LTC system (cluster centres)  ··································································· 2 
Figure 4.1  Conceptual framework ·························································································  19 
Figure 4.2  Percentage of individuals with difficulties regarding basic and instrumental ADL (unweighted)  ····  22 
Figure 4.3  Life satisfaction of persons over 65 years old with and without ADL and (i)ADL limitations 
(unweighted) ·····································································································  22 
Figure 4.4  Relationship between the probability of receiving help in a LTC system and a) the share of 
private funding and b) means-testing ·········································································  34 
Figure 4.5  Relationship between the probability of receiving help in a LTC system and a) satisfaction with the 
complexity of the system and b) public expenditures on LTC ············································  34 
Figure 4.6  Relationship between the probability of receiving help in an LTC system and the use of informal 
care ················································································································  35 
Figure 4.7  Life satisfaction in Denmark and the Netherlands (unweighted) ·········································  44 
Figure 4.8  Relation between the unobserved properties of the LTC system and (left panel) the public 
expenditures on LTC and (right panel) the number of informal care recipients divided by 
the number of formal care recipients ·········································································  52 
Figure 4.9  Relation between the unobserved properties of the LTC system and the value of cash benefits 
(measured in thousands of euros) ·············································································  52 
Figure 6.1  Projected public expenditure for residential care services, Germany (€ million) ·······················  88 
Figure 6.2  Projected public expenditure for home care services, Germany (€ million) ·····························  89 
Figure 6.3  Projected public LTC expenditure, the Netherlands (€ million) ··········································  90 
Figure 6.4  Projected public expenditure for residential care, Spain (€ million)  ······································  91 
Figure 6.5  Projected public expenditure for home care services, Spain (€ million) ·································  92 
Figure 6.6  Projected public expenditure for residential care services, Poland (€ million) ··························  93 
Figure 7.1  Ratio of care users and people in need of care, aged 65+ ················································ 102 
Figure 7.2  Ratio of care users and population aged 65+ ······························································ 103 
Figure 7.3  Accessibility indicator, based on means testing and entitlement  ········································ 103 
Figure 8.1  Standardised performance scores of LTC systems on 4 dimensions ··································· 119 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1  The WHO framework for performance of health systems ·················································· 5 
Table 2.2  Application of the WHO performance framework to LTC ················································· 5 
Table 2.3  Goals for systems of long-term care ··········································································· 8 
Table 3.1  The correspondence of domains of the SPRU, SCRQoL and Kane (2001) measures  ··················  13 
Table 4.1  Percentage of people (65 years and older) that receive formal care in an institution ···················  20 
Table 4.2  Percentage of older people with limitations by country (weighted) and sample size  ···················  23 
Table 4.3  Percentage of limited older persons that get help, by country (weighted) ·······························  24  
Table 4.4  Limited older persons: degree to which the help meets the needs (unweighted)························  24 
Table 4.5  Percentage of older people that uses informal care (weighted) ···········································  25 
Table 4.6  Percentage of older people that use long-term formal care at home (13 weeks or more, weighted) ·  26 
Table 4.7  Marginal effects of control factors in Germany ·····························································  28 
Table 4.8  Marginal effects of control variables on the probability of receiving help in different countries ·····  29 
Table 4.9  Countries ordered by the average marginal effect on the probability of receiving help, 
compared to Germany ··························································································  30 
Table 4.10  Pair-wise comparison of average marginal effects of living in different countries on the 
probability of receiving help ···················································································  32 
Table 4.11  The AME of country of residence on the probability of receiving help explained by 
country-specific characteristics  ················································································  33 
Table 4.12  Marginal effect of control variables on “help meets the needs all the time” in Germany··············  37 
Table 4.13  Marginal effects of control variables on “help meets the needs all the time” in different countries  ··  38 
Table 4.14  Countries ordered by the average marginal effect on the probability of “help meeting the needs 
all the time”, compared to Germany ··········································································  38 
Table 4.15  Pair-wise comparison of average marginal effects of living in different countries on the 
probability of the help meeting the needs all the time ······················································  39 
Table 4.16  The AME of country of residence on the probability of the help meeting the needs all the time 
explained by country-specific characteristics································································  40 
Table 4.17  Ranking of estimated country-specific coefficients (for the vignette sample) ··························  46 
Table 4.18  Difference between the unobserved properties of the LTC system (i.e., the additional country-
specific effect of having a limitation) for each pair of countries (for the vignette sample) ············  47 
Table 4.19  Ranking of estimated country-specific coefficients (for the large sample) ······························  48 
Table 4.20  Difference between the unobserved properties of the LTC system (i.e., the additional country-
specific effect of having a limitation) for each pair of countries (for the large sample) ···············  49 
Table 4.21  The unobserved properties of the LTC system (according to the ordered probit with vignettes 
method) explained by country-specific characteristics ·····················································  51 
Table 4.22  The experience of LTC users and ranking of countries ····················································  53 
Table 4.23  Relative experience of LTC users for groups of countries ·················································  54 
Table 4.24  Standardised average of standardised scores for three quality of life indicators, ordered by score  ···  55 
Table 4.25  Standardised average of standardised scores for three aspects of quality of life, only for the four 
selected representative countries ··············································································  55 
Table 5.1  Revenue-raising: Percentage of people providing informal care and percentage of total LTC 
expenditure by source ··························································································  65 
Table 5.2  Raising funds for LTC in Germany (1): System of Health Accounts ····································  66 
Table 5.3  Raising funds for LTC in Germany (2)·······································································  66 
Table 5.4  Total Long-Term Care Expenditure by source, Spain, 2009 ··············································  73 
Table 6.1  Base year annual unit costs (in Euro), Germany ····························································  84 
Table 6.2  Base year annual unit costs (in euro), the Netherlands ·····················································  85 
Table 6.3  Base year annual unit costs (€), Spain ········································································  86 
Table 6.4  Base year annual unit costs for residential care (€), Poland ···············································  86 
Table 6.5  Overview of the different LTC expenditure scenarios ·····················································  87 
Table 6.6  Projected public expenditure for residential care services, Germany (% of GDP) ·····················  89 
Table 6.7  Projected public expenditure for home care services, Germany (% of GDP) ···························  90 
Table 6.8  Projected public LTC expenditure, the Netherlands (% of GDP) ·········································  91 
Table 6.9  Projected public expenditure for residential care services, Spain (% of GDP)  ··························  92 
Table 6.10  Projected public expenditure for home care services, Spain (% of GDP)································  93 
Table 6.11  Projected public expenditure for residential care services, Poland (% of GDP) ························  94 
Table 6.12  Simulations of public expenditure, 2010 and 2060 (% of GDP) ··········································  94 
Table 6.13  Simulations of private expenditure, 2010 and 2060 (% of GDP) ·········································  95 
Table 7.1  Quality indicators ·······························································································  98 
Table 7.2  2040 prevalence rate within the 65+ population ·························································· 100 
Table 7.3  Growth rate of the number of disabled (aged 65+) from 2008 to 2040 ································ 101  
Table 7.4  2040 prevalence rate within the total population  ·························································· 101 
Table 7.5  2040 utilisation rate within the 65+ population (row country: demography)  ·························· 104 
Table 7.6  Growth rate of the number of users from 2010 to 2040 (row country: demography) ················ 105 
Table 7.7  2040 utilisation rate within the total population (row country: demography) ························· 105 
Table 7.8  Indicators of affordability ···················································································· 106 
Table 7.9  2040 public LTC expenditures as percentage of GDP (row country: demography) ·················· 107 
Table 7.10  2040 private LTC expenditures as percentage of GDP (row country: demography) ················· 108 
Table 7.11  Informal care hours ··························································································· 108 
Table 7.12  Predicted demand for informal caregivers in 2040 ······················································· 109 
Table 7.13  Percentage of caregivers with labour force participation problems as a consequence of 
caregiving tasks relative to the number of working caregivers  ·········································· 110 
Table 7.14  Prevalence of mental health problems and composite indicator of support···························· 111 
Table 7.15  Indicators of freedom of choice ············································································· 113 
Table 7.16  Evaluation of LTC systems based on the representative indicators····································· 115 
Table 7.17  Outranking matrix computed for representative countries: a value 1 indicates that the row 
country outranks the column country  ······································································· 116 
Table 8.1  Development of informal care gap (% changes over time) ·············································· 122 
Table 8.2  Development of formal care gap (% changes over time, 2010-2050) ·································· 123 
 
List of Boxes 
Box 5.1  Contributing to the public LTCI ··············································································  67 
Box 5.2  Assessment of needs and entitlement in Germany ··························································  69 
Box 5.3  Co-payments in the Dutch LTC system ······································································  71 
Box 5.4  Assessment of needs ····························································································  72 
Box 5.5  Assessment of needs ····························································································  74 
Box 5.6  Assigning services to different levels of need ·······························································  75 
  1 
Performance of Long-Term Care Systems in Europe 
ENEPRI Research Report No. 117, December 2012 
Esther Mot, Riemer Faber, Joanna Geerts and Peter Willemé (eds)
* 
1.  Introduction 
Older people with chronic limitations are likely to need help, especially if limitations concern basic 
activities of daily living (ADL), such as eating, washing and going to the toilet. In general, European 
countries have some system in place to help older persons with limitations. In many countries informal 
care  by  partners,  children  and  others  plays  a  large  role,  but  usually  at  least  some  formal  care  is 
available as well. In some countries, formal care is as or even more important than informal care in 
dealing with ADL limitations. The assessment of such long-term care (LTC) systems is much less 
developed than for healthcare systems; this is true both for the development of methods of evaluation 
and the availability of a literature on results. Presumably data limitations are an important reason for 
this trailing behind, but additionally LTC systems only recently seem to have drawn more attention, 
now that ageing is starting to play a larger role in European societies.  
This report aims to develop an evaluation of European long-term care systems for older persons. This 
evaluation forms the last stage of the ANCIEN project, a broad European study of LTC for older 
adults, executed within the 7th Framework Programme (FP7) of the European Union. More than 20 
partners from many different EU countries have been working together in ANCIEN. At the start of the 
project, the ANCIEN team studied the LTC systems in EU member states and made a typology with 
four classes of systems based on the use and financing of LTC (see Kraus et al., 2010). The typology 
was based on four important characteristics: 
1.  Public expenditure on LTC (related to GDP and the need for care) 
2.  The share of private expenditures on LTC 
3.  The use of informal care (number of users related to the number of persons aged 65 and older) 
4.  The  support  for  informal  caregivers  (an  indicator  that  counts  support  measures  for  informal 
caregivers) 
This typology  was used to select a representative country from  every cluster of LTC systems for 
further analysis: Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland. The characteristics  of the  different 
clusters  of  systems  are  shown  in  Figure  1.1.
1  Cluster  2,  which  includes  the  Netherlands,  is 
characterised by relatively high public spending on LTC and a relatively low use of informal care. The 
share of private funding is low, and support for informal caregivers is high despite the relatively low 
use of informal care. In the cluster 2 countries, the government takes on a lot of responsibility for 
LTC. In all other clusters, the role of informal care is much larger. In cluster 1 (including Germany) 
public spending is much lower than in cluster 2, informal care use is much higher and the support for 
informal caregivers is just as high as in cluster 2.
2 In cluster 3 (including Spain) public spending is 
relatively low and private funding is high. Both the informal care use and the support for informal 
caregivers are high. Cluster 4 is characterised by low public spending, high private spending, high 
informal care use and relatively low informal care support. In these countries the state assumes little 
responsibility for LTC; most of the responsibility rests with the family.  
                                                   
* Esther Mot is Senior Researcher in the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) and Riemer 
Faber is researcher at CPB. Joanna Geerts is researcher and Peter Willemé is health economist in the Social 
Security Research Group at the Federal Planning Bureau (FPB). 
1 The numbering of clusters has no specific meaning; it is just a label.  
2 Cluster 1 as a whole is characterised by relatively low private funding of LTC. It turned out later, when more 
data became available for Germany, that Germany has relatively high private funding of LTC.  2  MOT, FABER, GEERTS & WILLEMÉ  
 
Figure 1.1 A star plot of LTC system (cluster centres) 
 
Source: Kraus et al. (2010). 
The four selected representative countries play an important role in the evaluation of systems, because 
more  aspects  of  performance  have  been  analysed  for  them  than  for  other  countries.  For  the  four 
selected countries, empirical models were developed about the need for LTC (Work Package 2, WP2) 
and the determinants of formal and informal care use (WP3 and WP6). Projections were made of the 
future number of ADL-disabled older people (WP2) and the number of informal and formal care users 
for the four representative countries (WP6).  
This  ANCIEN  report  starts  by  describing  the  evaluation  framework  that  is  used  to  assess  the 
performance  of  the  LTC  systems.  Following  that,  we  present  analyses  of  three  aspects  that  are 
important for the assessment: the experiences of LTC users with the systems, the equity of the systems 
and the future financial burden of LTC systems. In addition, the report makes use of the results of 
previous  ANCIEN work packages and  of  external sources. Finally, all this information is used to 
produce an overall systems evaluation. 
The report is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 presents the performance framework. Chapter 
3  discusses  the  literature  on  a  subset  of  performance  criteria:  the  individual  outcome  measures. 
Chapter 4 presents analyses aimed at one specific  individual  outcome  measure that is part of the 
performance framework: the quality of life of LTC users. It describes the analysis of the experiences 
of LTC users, using the SHARE database.
3 This analysis yields indicators for the LTC-related quality 
                                                   
3 SHARE stands for the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. This paper uses data from SHARE wave 
4 release 1, as of 30 November 2012 or SHARE waves 1 and 2 release 2.5.0, as of 24 May 2011 or SHARELIFE 
release  1,  as  of  24  November  2010.  The  SHARE  data  collection  has  been  primarily  funded  by  the  European 
Commission  through  the  5th  Framework  Programme  (project  QLK6-CT-2001-00360  in  the  thematic  programme 
Quality of  Life), through the 6th Framework Programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE, 
CIT5-CT-2005-028857,  and  SHARELIFE,  CIT4-CT-2006-028812)  and  through  the  7th  Framework  Programme 
(SHARE-PREP, N° 211909, SHARE-LEAP, N° 227822 and SHARE M4, N° 261982). Additional funding from the 
US  National  Institute  on  Aging  (U01  AG09740-13S2,  P01  AG005842,  P01  AG08291,  P30  AG12815,  R21 
AG025169,  Y1-AG-4553-01,  IAG  BSR06-11  and  OGHA  04-064)  and  the  German  Ministry  of  Education  and 
Research as well as from various national sources is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org for a full list 
of funding institutions). INTRODUCTION  3 
 
of life of elderly persons with limitations in 13 countries. Chapter 5 concerns another performance 
criterion:  the  equity  of  the  system.  This  chapter  includes  an  analysis  of  equity  in  the  four 
representative countries. Chapter 6 describes a third performance aspect, namely the projections for 
future expenditure on LTC (public and private) for the four representative countries, based on the 
projection  models  of  WP6 (see  Geerts, Willemé &  Mot, 2012). This informs us about the future 
financial burden of LTC. Chapter 7 of this report describes the overall evaluation of the performance 
of LTC systems. It gives an overview of the available information for the ANCIEN countries, not just 
for  the  three  performance  aspects  described  above,  but  also  for  most  of  the  other  criteria  in  the 
performance framework. This chapter also includes a discussion of data problems. Chapter 7 also 
describes the methods for combining the information on the different scores in a final evaluation. 
Finally, chapter 8 concludes. 
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2.  The performance framework 
Esther Mot (CPB) 
2.1  Introduction 
In order to determine how well LTC systems perform, we need a set of criteria. We call this set our 
performance framework. It is important to develop a balanced set of criteria for two reasons. First, we 
want to take into account all aspects that are important to the persons for whom the system is relevant 
(people with limitations who might need LTC, informal carers, formal caregivers, residents or citizens 
who play a role in funding the system). Secondly, the scores on different criteria are unlikely to be 
independent. The way the LTC system is organised, for example the level of public spending on LTC, 
will  most  likely  affect  a  number  of  criteria.  For  example,  individual  countries  and  international 
organisations  often  use  affordability  and  accessibility  of  the  systems  and  the  quality  of  the  care 
delivered as criteria. We can expect high public expenditures to increase the accessibility of the system 
and the quality of care, while at the same time decreasing the affordability of the system. If we would 
leave out any of the relevant results affected by spending, that would bias our evaluation of a system 
that is characterised by high public spending. A comparable example is that of the importance of 
informal care. In a system with a lot of informal care, we can expect the affordability to be high, as 
spending on formal care can be relatively low. However, if we do not pay attention to the burden of 
informal caregivers, we evaluate such a system in an overly favourable way. Therefore our set of 
criteria should be complete. 
Persons and countries differ in the weight they place on the performance of different criteria of LTC 
systems, where different weights represent different preferences. Within Europe, decisions on the way 
LTC systems are organised are usually taken at the national and/or regional level. The residents of a 
country  or  a  region  will  have  to  come  to  an  agreement  about  how  the  LTC  system  should  be 
organised.  For  regions,  these  decisions  may  have  to  fit  within  national  guidelines.  In  this  Work 
Package, we want to compare the performance of different LTC systems. In order to do that, we need 
to use the same set of criteria with the same weights to assess all national systems. At the same time 
we have to keep in mind that national governments or stakeholders may have other weights in mind 
than the ones we use. This may mean that some of the drawbacks of their own system, as identified by 
our analysis, will be less important to them, or some of the advantages will be more important to them.  
In  section  2.2  we  discuss  some  literature  that  is  relevant  for  assessing  the  performance  of  LTC 
systems. In section 2.3 our performance framework is described. This concerns the set of criteria that 
we  would  ideally  use  to  assess  LTC  systems.  In  reality  it  is  not  possible  to  find  internationally 
comparable  information  for  European  countries  on  all  aspects  discussed  here.  The  actual  final 
evaluation of systems in this report follows a more modest approach (see chapter 7).  
2.2  Relevant literature 
There  is  a  relatively  limited  literature  that  concerns  the  performance  of  LTC  systems.  The 
performance of healthcare systems has been discussed more extensively and sometimes the results 
were explicitly applied to LTC systems. This is the case with the well-known performance framework 
of the WHO (2000). We start this section by discussing the WHO performance framework, followed 
by a description of some other frameworks that were developed for LTC.  
2.2.1  The WHO framework 
A  seminal  work  in  this  area  is  the  World  Health  Report  2000  of  the  WHO:  “Health  systems: 
Improving performance”. The WHO developed a performance framework and attached weights to the 
different criteria in the framework. The framework is summarised in Table 2.1. It values not only the 
overall level of criteria that is attained, but also the distribution over the population. 
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Table 2.1 The WHO framework for performance of health systems 
Goal  Weight (%) 
Health (disability-adjusted life expectancy) 
Overall  25 
Distribution  25 
Responsiveness   
Overall  12.5 
Distribution  12.5 
Fair financial contribution  25 
Source: WHO (2000). 
Larizgoitia (2003) pays specific attention to the evaluation of LTC systems in a later WHO report, 
while using the above-described performance framework. Her report cites a definition of LTC and its 
specific goals given by a group of experts convened by the WHO in 1999: 
[The goal of long-term care] is to ensure that an individual who is not fully capable of long-
term self-care can maintain the best possible quality of life, with the greatest possible degree 
of independence, autonomy,  participation,  personal  fulfilment and  human  dignity (p. 228, 
emphasis added by the current authors).  
Larizgoitia (2003) applies the general WHO performance framework specifically to LTC (see Table 
2.2). 
Table 2.2 Application of the WHO performance framework to LTC 
Principal quality outcomes of LTC   
Health dimension   
  Functional ability 
  Other health status measures specific to major conditions 
  Health-related quality of life 
Responsiveness dimension   
  Dignity and human rights 
  Autonomy, confidentiality 
  Quality of basic amenities 
  Access to social support networks 
  Choice of provider 
Source: Larizgoitia (2003). 
The goal of ‘health’ has a different meaning in the context of LTC. The emphasis is on functional 
ability and quality of life. The concept of responsiveness was detailed specifically for LTC.  
2.2.2  Open method of coordination 
Since the ANCIEN project studies the performance of LTC systems in Europe, the goals for LTC 
formulated at the level of the European Union are very relevant. Within the framework of the open 
coordination  of  social  protection  and  inclusion  policies  in  the  European  Union,  the  European 
Commission (2005) mentions the following goals specifically for health and long-term care: 
Ensuring accessible, high-quality and sustainable healthcare and long-term care: 
1.  Guarantee access for all to adequate health and long-term care and ensure that the need for care 
does not lead to poverty and financial dependency. Address inequities in access to care and in 
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2.  Promote quality in health and long-term care and adapt care to the changing needs and preferences 
of society and individuals, notably by establishing quality standards reflecting best international 
practice and by strengthening the responsibility of health professionals and of patients and care 
recipients 
3.  Ensure  that  adequate  and  high-quality  health  and  long-term  care  remains  affordable  and 
sustainable by promoting healthy and active life styles, good human resources for the care sector 
and a rational use of resources, notably through appropriate incentives for users and providers, 
good governance and coordination between care systems and institutions 
This set of goals is partly aimed at another level than those formulated by the WHO (2003). The WHO 
seems  to  be  mostly  concerned  with  outcomes  (such  as  health-related  quality  of  life),  where  the 
European Commission (2005) formulated  criteria for the  functioning  of the LTC system (such as 
accessibility  and  sustainability).  Another  difference  is  that  the  European  Commission  (2005)  also 
includes cost considerations in the picture.  
2.2.3  The Wanless report 
Wanless (2006, pp. 215-216) formulates the aims of social care systems in his review of the English 
social care system: 
For this Review, with a 20-year time horizon, the aims have been defined as: 
  To identify those needs of individuals and those who care for them that are supported (by 
the State) 
  To ensure individuals so identified can receive support, advice, etc. consistently and with 
confidence about its sustainability 
  To design and implement a system that will allocate resources to those who need them in 
a way that is clear and sustainable, which develops physical resources to meet expected 
demand, which promotes fairness, economic efficiency and choice and is consistent with 
the principles that emerge for the provision by individuals for their pension arrangements 
  To ensure the availability throughout England of sufficient diversity and quality of care 
to satisfy all those who need and choose to receive it 
On the basis of these aims, Wanless (2006) proposes a number of tests to expose the system to, noting 
that these tests can give contradictory results: 
  Fairness 
  Economic efficiency 
  Choice 
  Physical resource development 
  Clarity 
  Sustainability/acceptability 
There are at least two new aspects in the Wanless goals, compared to the goals discussed above. First, 
Wanless (2006) formulates as an explicit goal that the state should consider its own responsibility: it 
should identify those needs where support is necessary. Secondly, clarity of the system is mentioned 
as one of the goals.  
2.2.4  The AARP Scorecard 
Reinhard, Kassner, Houser & Mollica (2011) developed a framework for assessing LTC systems and 
applied that framework to states within the US. Although our study focuses on Europe, the goals and 
methods of the American Association for Retired Persons (AARP) are very relevant for our analysis. 
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  Affordability and access 
  Choice of setting and provider 
  Quality of life and quality of care 
  Support for family caregivers 
  Coordination of LTC with medical services 
The actual evaluation with the AARP State Scorecard concerns only four dimensions, because the 
dimension of coordination could not be measured with the available data. The other four dimensions 
were operationalised by selecting a number of indicators for each dimension, 25 indicators in total. For 
example, within the dimension of affordability and access, six indicators are used. The first is “median 
annual nursing home private pay cost as a percentage of median household income aged 65+” (see 
Reinhard, Kassner, Houser & Mollica, 2011, exhibit 2). Data problems  were not restricted to the 
coordination dimension. Reinhard, Kassner, Houser & Mollica (2011, p. 10) state: “one of the more 
noteworthy ‘findings’ of our work on the Scorecard is how much we are not able to compare because 
information on quality, experiences, coordination, costs, or outcomes is simply not available”. 
2.3  Description of the framework 
We used the literature described above to get an overview of relevant aims for LTC systems. Goals of 
LTC exist on different levels. We distinguish the following levels: 
1.  Ultimate goals: the desired outcomes of LTC systems for users, caregivers and society 
2.  Intermediate goals: the outcomes at the level of the LTC system that are instrumental in promoting 
the desired final outcomes for individuals and society 
3.  System characteristics: characteristics of the systems that are expected to make the system work 
and assist in achieving the outcomes 
Below we describe for each of the three levels which goals or characteristics we selected. Together 
they form the complete ANCIEN performance framework that is summarised in section 2.3.4. 
2.3.1  Outcomes for individuals and society 
We think that the most relevant outcome for LTC users or potential LTC users is the LTC-related 
quality of life, that part of the quality of life that is affected by long-term care. Chapter 3 explains why 
we select this concept. As stated above, the LTC system does not just affect potential users but also 
others  in  society,  such  as  informal  or  formal  caregivers. To  some  extent  it  affects  everyone  in  a 
society. LTC systems are usually at least in part publicly funded, so all citizens are affected by the 
financing of the system. In addition, non-LTC users may be affected because of altruistic reasons (they 
want elderly persons with limitations to receive good care) or because of their own future interests in 
case they might come to need LTC themselves. We formulate the aims for others than the LTC users 
as “an appropriate balance between LTC and other societal needs”.  
2.3.2  Outcomes at the systems level 
The goals at the level of the LTC system are quality of care, accessibility of care, equity, a manageable 
total burden of care and improving functional ability and minimising the need for LTC. To improve 
the LTC-related quality of life, the system has to deliver care of good quality. Persons who need care 
should have access to it, at the right time, in the right place and without having to become poor to pay 
for their care. The funding and delivery of care should be organised in an equitable way. The total 
burden of care consists of two parts: the financial burden of public and private expenditures on LTC 
and the burden of informal care, the time spent and efforts made by informal caregivers. This total 
burden, as well as the two parts, should be manageable. For given outcomes, the total burden of care 
should be minimised, implying that the system is organised as efficiently as possible. The LTC system 
should support users’ functional ability to the degree possible. Efforts should be made to enable people 
to manage without LTC if possible (e.g. by suitable housing, domotics, medical devices). However, 
the severity of limitations can only be affected by the LTC system itself in a limited way. Lifestyle, 8  ESTHER MOT 
 
prevention and the performance of the healthcare system are probably more important influences on 
functional ability. 
2.3.3  Systems characteristics 
In this section we describe four characteristics that are often mentioned as useful features to make the 
LTC system perform well:  
1.  Support for informal caregivers 
2.  Choice of setting and providers  
3.  Integration with healthcare and social services and coordination 
4.  Simplicity of the system and information 
In many countries informal care plays an important role in the LTC system. Support for informal 
caregivers has several purposes. It can help them to maintain their own well-being. It can also be a 
help  in providing informal  care (for example by providing training) and  it can  help  caregivers  in 
combining care and labour market participation. It is to be expected that the quality of life of LTC 
users can be improved by having choices and being able to organise LTC the way they want. Some 
choices may also increase efficiency, for example the choice to stay at home in cases where that is 
more cost-effective. LTC systems function better with proper coordination within the LTC system and 
between LTC, healthcare and social services. Potential LTC users need information and advice to help 
them find their way around the care and support system. Information about supply and the quality of 
care is especially important in consumer-directed systems where competition for clients is supposed to 
be an important incentive for providers. The LTC system should be designed in a logical way and 
(potential) users should be clearly informed about funding and their (future) rights.  
2.3.4  The ANCIEN performance framework 
Table  2.3  summarises  the  performance  framework  described  above.  We  distinguish  10  criteria  at 
different levels. Chapter 7 concerns the actual evaluation of LTC systems in Europe, that is to say the 
application of the criteria to existing LTC systems. In principle, the framework of Table 2.3 is used in 
the evaluation, but for some criteria or sub-criteria no internationally comparable data could be found. 
This is especially the case for the assessment of European systems in all ANCIEN countries. A more 
detailed  assessment  could  be  made  for  the  systems  of  the  four  selected  representative  countries. 
Criterion 10, simplicity of the system and information, is not used in the overall evaluation because of 
a lack of data. Criterion 6, improving functional ability and minimising the need for LTC, is discussed 
in detail in chapter 7, but was excluded from the final evaluation. The reason is that the extent of 
limitations by itself is not sufficiently representative for the performance of the LTC systems. Further 
details of the method of evaluation can be found in chapter 7. 
Table 2.3 Goals for systems of long-term care 
  Goals  Level 
1 
 
Quality of life and an appropriate balance  
between LTC and other societal needs 
Outcomes for users and society 
 
2  Quality of care  Outcome at system level 
3  Accessibility of care  Outcome at system level 
4  Total burden of LTC  Outcome at system level 
5  Equity   Outcome at system level 
6  Improving functional ability  
and minimising the need for LTC 
Outcome at system level 
 
7  Support for informal caregivers  System characteristic 
8  Choice of setting and providers   System characteristic 
9  Integration with healthcare and  
social services and coordination 
System characteristic 
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Chapter 2 described the performance framework for long-term care (LTC) systems. This framework 
includes  individual  outcome  measures,  outcomes  at  systems  level  (like  the  degree  of  equity)  and 
systems characteristics (e.g. support for informal caregivers). This chapter focuses on the first aspect 
of the framework. It provides a short survey of individual outcome measures in the LTC literature. 
Individual outcome measures are indicators that evaluate the LTC system via the consequences of the 
system for individual persons with care needs. The survey discusses several of these measures and 
their advantages and disadvantages. Moreover, it briefly discusses which measures are available for 
use within ANCIEN. The survey covers both academic and policy documents. 
The focus of this survey is on the outcome of LTC systems. Hence, it considers all aspects of the 
system and not just the quality of the provided care. Examples of studies that evaluate LTC systems 
are  Wanless,  Forder,  Fernandez,  Poole,  Beesley,  Henwood  &  Moscone  (2006),  Australian 
Government Productivity Commission (2011) and Dilnot, Warner & Williams (2011). 
The survey only covers outcome measures for individuals with care needs. First, since the survey only 
covers outcome measures, it does not describe measures about the structure or process of the LTC 
system. Measures about the structure or process provide information such as the number of available 
beds per 1,000 citizens, the presence of specific equipment and whether caregivers follow specific 
guidelines. The focus on outcome measures finds broad support in the literature since it is the outcome 
that  ultimately  matters  (see  e.g.  Qureshi,  Patmore,  Nicholas  &  Bamford,  1998;  Wanless,  Forder, 
Fernandez, Poole, Beesley, Henwood & Moscone, 2006; the Dutch Stuurgroep Verantwoorde Zorg, 
2007 and the  UK Department  of  Health, 2011). However, structure and process  measures can be 
useful if they influence outcomes.
5 A disadvantage of outcome measures is that they are often more 
difficult to collect than structure and process measures. Second, since the survey only covers measures 
of the consequences of the LTC system for individuals with care needs, it does not discuss measures 
that describe the consequences for other individuals (like caregivers and taxpayers). 
The organisation of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the individual 
outcome  measures  that  exist  in  the  literature.  Section  3.3  contains  a  brief  discussion  of  general 
advantages  and  disadvantages  of  these  measures.  It  also  briefly  discusses  which  measures  are 
appropriate for ANCIEN. 
3.2  Individual outcome measures 
This section describes eight individual outcome measures that researchers and policy-makers use. 
a)  Health status (also known as functional ability) 
Health status of individuals is the classic outcome measure. It is usually put into practice as the ability 
to perform (instrumental) activities of daily living ((i)ADL) and therefore called ‘functional ability’. 
The (i)ADL scales were devised by Lawton & Brody (1969) and Katz, Downs, Cash & Grotz (1970). 
For applications, see e.g. Mitchell (1978) and Rosen, Berlowitz, Anderson, Ash, Kazis & Moskowitz 
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(the Netherlands), August. 
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(1999). Health status has also been put into practice as the Sickness Impact Profile (Bergner, Bobbitt, 
Carter & Gilson, 1981). Early studies often use health status as an outcome measure of LTC (see 
Cotter, Salvage, Meyer & Bridges, 1998, for a discussion). However, many researchers criticise health 
status as an outcome measure as the LTC system does not exclusively determine the health status of 
individuals. Other factors, like initial health status and lifestyle, impact health status as well (see, for 
example, Royal College of Physicians of London and British Geriatrics Society, 1992). Therefore, 
many recent studies that assess LTC systems use health status as a control variable instead of an 
outcome variable (see e.g. Avlund, Kreiner & Schultz-Larsen, 1993).  
b)  Capability 
Capability measures whether an individual has the opportunity to do something. It does not matter 
whether the individual chooses to do that thing, it only matters that the individual can choose to do the 
thing (Sen, 1985). An example would be whether an individual has the opportunity to be healthy. It 
could be that an individual prefers not to spend time on health or that the individual does not consider 
health  important.  The  capabilities  framework  values  whether  the  individual  has  the  choice  to  be 
healthy.  An  advantage  of  capability  as  a  measurement  indicator  is  that  it  allows  for  variation  in 
preferences. The capabilities framework differs from other measures because it does not presuppose 
that certain outcome measures are always appropriate. 
c)  Unmet needs 
Unmet  needs  measures  often  indicate  whether  an  individual  currently  requires  additional  help  to 
perform (i)ADL (Manton, 1988). The quality of LTC is higher when a care recipient reports fewer 
unmet needs. Allen & Mor (1997) use a set of questions to determine whether a care recipient has 
unmet needs. They ask whether an individual needs help with a particular activity and if so, whether 
there was any time recently when the individual did not receive help with that activity. A disadvantage 
of the unmet needs measure may be that older people are often easily satisfied with the care they 
receive. Often, policy-makers and society have a higher standard (Netten, Burge, Malley, Potoglou, 
Brazier, Flynn & Forder, 2009). Another potential disadvantage is that the measure sometimes does 
not take into account how much additional help is required (Jackson, 1991). Examples of studies that 
apply unmet needs as an outcome measure are Greene, Lovely & Ondrich (1993), Benjamin, Matthias 
&  Franke  (2000)  and  Elkan,  Kendrick,  Dewey,  Hewitt,  Robinson,  Blair,  Williams  &  Brummell 
(2001). Some studies do  not focus solely  on (I)ADL, but measure all types  of unmet  needs in a 
particular domain, like physical and psychological needs (see Fernández & Forder, 2010). 
d)  Functioning status 
Functioning  status  measures  whether  an  individual  has  the  minimum  level  of  functioning  that 
researchers believe society wants (potential) LTC recipients to attain (Qureshi, Patmore, Nicholas & 
Bamford, 1998 and Netten, Ryan, Smith, Skatun, Healey, Knapp & Wykes, 2002). This measure has a 
subjective component because it requires a judgment about the minimum level of functioning that 
society wants. The outcomes of a functioning status measure are usually descriptive accounts of the 
results  of  (not)  performing  ADL.  For  instance,  the  ADL  eating  and  cooking  correspond  to  the 
functioning  status  ‘being  well-fed’.  Functioning  status  differs  from  functional  ability.  The  former 
refers to the condition of a care recipient (for example, whether the recipient is well-fed and clean), the 
latter refers to the ability to perform specific tasks (such as cooking and toileting). 
e)  Subjective well-being 
Subjective  well-being  measures  whether  (potential)  LTC  recipients  are  happy.  Veenhoven  (2002) 
argues that it can supplement other, more objective measures. A disadvantage of these measures is that 
the reporting style of respondents may differ substantially between individuals, countries and aged 
(see e.g. Bowling, 2005). Another disadvantage is that both the LTC system and many other factors 
impact subjective well-being. 
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f)  Activities of Daily Living Adjusted Year 
Researchers use the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) measure to weigh expected life years by 
level of sickness. Years lived without sickness are more valuable. The QALY measure is not suitable 
for measuring the impact of LTC because changes are strongly influenced by factors other than LTC 
(Donaldson,  Atkinson,  Bond  &  Wright,  1988).  The  Activities  of  Daily  Living  Adjusted  Year 
(ADLAY) measure is an adjustment of the standard QALY measure for use within LTC. It provides 
the gain that a person with ADL limitations lives for one year without unmet needs instead of with 
unmet needs. See Wanless, Forder, Fernandez, Poole, Beesley, Henwood & Moscone (2006) for an 
application. 
g)  Perception of quality of care 
Kane & Kane (2001) use the perception of care quality as an outcome variable. Forder, Netten, Caiels, 
Smith & Malley (2007) argue that it is more accurate to ask care recipients about the quality of life 
since quality of care is an intermediate outcome. Even if care meets all medical standards, a care 
recipient can still have a low quality of life (and vice versa). 
h)  LTC-related quality of life 
The Quality Of Life Scale (QOLS) measures the quality of life of healthcare recipients (Flanagan, 
1978 and 1982). LTC-related quality of life is a similar measure that focuses on LTC and emphasises 
care  for  the  elderly.  The  measure  contains  domains  of  the  quality  of  life  that  the  LTC  system 
influences. These domains consist of several individual outcome measures. As such, the LTC-related 
quality  of  life  measure combines a selection  of the  aforementioned  individual  outcome  measures. 
Although  difficult  to  define  and  measure,  LTC-related  quality  of  life  is  broadly  accepted  as  an 
appropriate measure of LTC outcomes (see e.g. Bowling, 2005). 
There exist several versions of the LTC-related quality of life measure. Examples are the Social Policy 
Research  Unit (SRPU)  measure (Qureshi, Patmore,  Nicholas & Bamford, 1998), the Social Care-
Related Quality of Life (SCRQoL) measure (also called the ASCOT measure; see Forder, Netten, 
Caiels, Smith & Malley, 2007 and the measure of Kane, 2001).
6 Table 3.1 contains the domains of 
these three versions. It shows that there exists a strong overlap between them. The domains contain 
both functioning status measures and capability measures since these two types are complementary 
(Netten, Burge, Malley, Potoglou, Brazier, Flynn & Forder, 2009). Functioning states are a minimum 
level of functioning and are therefore useful on the low end of scores in each domain. Capabilities are 
more than what is strictly needed and therefore used to describe the higher scores in each domain. The 
domains also contain unmet needs measures and subjective well-being measures. 
Often researchers use weights that reflect preferences (of care recipients) to combine several measures 
into a single domain and several domains into a single overall value (see, for example, Netten, Ryan, 
Smith,  Skatun,  Healey,  Knapp  &  Wykes,  2002;  Darton,  Forder,  Bebbington,  Netten,  Towers  & 
Williams,  2006  and  Burge,  Potoglou,  Kim  &  Hess,  2010).  In  general,  the  preferences  of  LTC 
recipients differ widely (Degenholtz, Kane & Kivnick, 1997; Kane & Kane, 2001 and Netten, Burge, 
Malley, Potoglou, Brazier, Flynn & Forder, 2009). Netten, Burge, Malley, Potoglou, Brazier, Flynn & 
Forder (2009) argue that it  is also possible to  include  weights chosen by researchers and policy-
makers. Researchers can also use factor analysis to combine the individual parts (Bowling, 2005). 
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Table 3.1 The correspondence of domains of the SPRU, SCRQoL and Kane (2001) measures 
SPRU domain  Corresponding SCRQoL domain  Corresponding domain in Kane 
(2001) 
Clean and comfortable  Personal cleanliness and comfort  Physical comfort 
Presentable  -  Physical comfort 
Well-fed  Food & nutrition  Physical comfort 
Personal safety  Safety  Sense of safety, security & order 
Clean environment  Accommodation cleanliness & 
comfort 
Physical comfort 
Keeping active  Occupation  Meaningful activity 
Social contact  Social participation & involvement  Relationships 
Being in control of your 
life 
Control over daily life  Autonomy/choice 
-  Dignity  Dignity 
    Enjoyment 
    Functional competence 
    Privacy 
    Individuality 
    Spiritual well-being 
 
3.3  Discussion 
This literature review describes individual outcome measures that researchers and policy-makers use 
and  their  advantages  and  disadvantages.  An  important  general  advantage  of  individual  outcome 
measures is that they capture the ultimate goal of a LTC system: improving the life of people with 
limitations.  
In general, a disadvantage of many individual outcome measures is that the performance of an LTC 
system does not determine them exclusively. Other elements of society (like the healthcare system) 
and characteristics of individuals also play a role. This disadvantage is most prominent for measures 
like health status and subjective well-being. Therefore, researchers and policy-makers have to search 
for individual outcome measures that most accurately represent the contribution of LTC – that is, the 
difference  between  the  actual  outcome  and  the  expected  outcome  in  the  absence  of  LTC.  An 
alternative strategy is to correct a specific measure as well as possible for all other observed factors 
that play a role. 
A second general  disadvantage is that  many individual outcome  measures require some  kind of a 
subjective judgment of either the researcher or the person in need of care. For example, in case of the 
unmet needs measure and subjective well-being measure, the reporting style of the respondent (what is 
the reference point of the respondent and is the respondent optimistic or pessimistic?) seems to play an 
important role. 
Finally, a general disadvantage of a number of individual outcome measures is that they focus on just 
one aspect of the performance of a LTC system. The unmet needs measure, for instance, relies only on 
the need for care to assist with limitations. An example of a measure that provides a broader picture is 
LTC-related quality of life. 
3.3.1  What would be an appropriate measure for ANCIEN? 
The outcome of a LTC system for individual persons with care needs is an important part of the 
performance framework. LTC-related quality of life seems an appropriate measure for this outcome. It 
is suitable for all (potential) LTC users and it evaluates all aspects of a LTC system. Furthermore, it 
emphasises the contribution of the system and is, compared to other measures, relatively insensitive to 14   
 
others  factors.  However,  this  measure  is  currently  not  available  for  a  set  of  European  countries. 
Therefore, the best alternative is to use individual outcome measures that are related to domains of the 
LTC-related quality of life measure. The use of several individual outcome measures can mitigate the 
disadvantages of a single measure and might also provide a broader picture than a single measure 
would provide. 
The Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) contains a couple of individual 
outcome measures for people in need of care from different European countries. It contains for a wide 
set of persons that need care, among others, their life satisfaction, their health status, their ability to 
perform ADL, their unmet needs regarding these ADL (these questions are almost identical to those of 
Allen & Mor, 1997) and the  degree to which the  help they receive fulfils their needs. Moreover, 
SHARE also asks respondents about their social interactions and daily activities, which are part of the 
domains of the LTC-related quality of life measure. Hence, it is possible to study different aspects of 
an LTC system via SHARE. Moreover, it is also possible to address the other two aforementioned 
general  disadvantages  of  individual  outcome  measures.  First,  SHARE  contains  many  observed 
characteristics of individuals and therefore it is possible to correct individual outcome measures for 
these characteristics. Second, SHARE contains for some measures so-called ‘vignettes’, which make it 
possible to correct the individual outcome measure for the subjective judgments of respondents. 
 
References 
Akkies, P. (2011), “Literature review of outcome measures to compare the performance of various 
long-term care systems”, CPB Memo, Central Planning Bureau (the Netherlands), August. 
Allen, S.M. and V. Mor (1997), “The prevalence and consequences of unmet need. Contrasts between 
older and younger adults with disability”, Med Care, Vol. 35, No. 11, pp. 1132-1148. 
Australian Government Productivity Commission (2011), Caring for older Australians. 
Avlund, K., S. Kreiner and K. Schultz-Larsen (1993), “Construct validation and the Rasch model: 
functional ability of healthy elderly people”, Scand J Soc Med, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 233-246. 
Benjamin,  A.E., R. Matthias and T.M. Franke  (2000), “Comparing  consumer-directed and agency 
models for providing supportive services at home”, Health Serv Res, Vol. 35, No.1 Pt 2, pp. 
351-366. 
Bergner,  M.,  R.A.  Bobbitt,  W.B.  Carter  and  B.S.  Gilson  (1981),  “The  sickness  impact  profile: 
development and final revision of a health status measure”, Medical Care, Vol. 19, No. 8, pp. 
787-805. 
Bowling, A. (2005), Measuring health: A review of quality of life measurement scales, Berkshire, 
England: Open University Press. 
Burckhardt, C.S. and K.L. Anderson (2003), “The Quality of Life Scale (QOLS): Reliability, validity, 
and utilization”, Health Qual Life Outcomes, 1, 60. 
Burge, P., D. Potoglou, C.W. Kim and S. Hess (2010), “How do the public value different outcomes of 
social care? Estimation of preference weights for ASCOT”, RAND Europe. 
Cotter, A.J.E., A.V. Salvage, J.E. Meyer and J. Bridges (1998), “Measuring outcomes of long-term 
care for older people”, Reviews in Clinical Gerontology, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 257-268. 
Darton, R., J. Forder, A. Bebbington, A. Netten, A.M. Towers and J. Williams (2006), “Analysis to 
support  the  development  of  the  relative  needs  formula:  Final  report”,  University  of  Kent, 
Canterbury. INDIVIDUAL OUTCOME MEASURES  15 
 
Degenholtz, H., R.A. Kane and H.Q. Kivnick (1997), “Care-related preferences and values of elderly 
community-based  LTC  consumers:  Can  case  managers  learn  what's  important  to  clients?”, 
Gerontologist, Vol. 37, No. 6, pp. 767-776. 
Dilnot, A., N. Warner and D.J. Williams (2011), Fairer Care Funding: The Report of the Commission 
on Funding of Care and Support (Vol. I), UK Government, July. 
Donaldson,  C.,  A.  Atkinson,  J.  Bond  and  K.  Wright  (1988),  “Should  QALYs  be  programme-
specific?”, Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 239-257. 
Elkan, R., D. Kendrick, M, Dewey, M. Hewitt, J. Robinson, M. Blair, D. Williams and K. Brummell 
(2001), “Effectiveness of home based support for older people: systematic review and meta-
analysis”, BMJ, Vol. 323, No. 7315, pp. 719-725. 
Fernández,  J.-L.  and  J.  Forder  (2010),  “Equity,  efficiency,  and  financial  risk  of  alternative 
arrangements  for  funding  long-term  care  systems  in  an  ageing  society”,  Oxford  Review  of 
Economic Policy, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 713-733. 
Flanagan, J.C. (1978), “A research approach to improving our quality of life“, American Psychologist, 
Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 138-147. 
Flanagan, J.C. (1982), “Measurement  of  quality  of  life: Current state of the art”,  Arch Phys Med 
Rehabil, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 56-59. 
Forder, J., A. Netten, J. Caiels, J. Smith and J. Malley (2007), “Measuring outcomes in social care: 
conceptual development and empirical design”, PSSRU Discussion Paper 2422, Personal Social 
Services Research Unit, October. 
Greene, V.L., M.E. Lovely and J.I. Ondrich (1993), “The cost-effectiveness of community services in 
a frail elderly population”, Gerontologist, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 177-189. 
Jackson,  M.E.  (1991),  Prevalence  and  correlates  of  unmet  need  among  the  elderly  with  ADL 
disabilities, US Department of Health and Human Services. 
Kane,  R.A.  (2001),  “Long-term  care  and  a  good  quality  of  life:  Bringing  them  closer  together”, 
Gerontologist, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 293-304. 
Kane, R.L. and R.A. Kane (2001), “What older people want from long-term care, and how they can 
get it”, Health Aff (Millwood), Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 114-127. 
Katz, S., T.D. Downs, H.R. Cash and R.C. Grotz (1970), “Progress in development of the index of 
ADL”, Gerontologist, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 20-30. 
Lawton,  M.P.  and  E.M.  Brody  (1969),  “Assessment  of  older  people:  Self-maintaining  and 
instrumental activities of daily living”, Gerontologist, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 179-186. 
Manton, K.G. (1988), “Epidemiological, demographic, and social correlates of disability among the 
elderly”, Duke University, Center for Demographic Studies, Durham, N.C. 
Mitchell, J.B. (1978), “Patient outcomes in alternative long-term care settings”, Med Care, Vol. 16, 
No. 6, pp. 439-452. 
Netten, A., P. Burge, J. Malley, D. Potoglou, J. Brazier, T. Flynn and J. Forder (2009), “Outcomes of 
social care for adults”, Personal Social Services Research Unit. 
Netten,  A.,  M.  Ryan,  P.  Smith,  D.  Skatun,  A.  Healey,  M.  Knapp  and  T.  Wykes  (2002),  “The 
development  of  a  measure  for  social  care  outcome  for  older  people”,  University  of  Kent, 
Canterbury. 
Qureshi, H., C. Patmore, E. Nicholas and C. Bamford (1998), “Overview: outcomes of social care for 
older people and carers, Outcomes in community care practice”, University of York, Social 
Policy Research Unit, York. 16   
 
Rosen,  A.K.,  D.R.  Berlowitz,  J.J.  Anderson,  A.S.  Ash,  L.E.  Kazis  and  M.A.  Moskowitz  (1999), 
“Functional status outcomes for assessment of quality in long-term care”, Int J Qual Health 
care, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 37-46. 
Royal College of Physicians of London and British Geriatrics Society (1992), High quality long-term 
care for elderly people: Guidelines and audit measures, London. 
Sen, A.K. (1985), Commodities and capabilities, North-Holland. 
Sorenson, C. and E. Mossialos (2007), “Measuring quality and standards of long-term care for older 
people”, London School of Economics, London. 
Stuurgroep Verantwoorde zorg (2007), Kwaliteitskader verantwoorde zorg. 
UK Department of Health (2011), “Transparency in outcomes: A framework for adult social care”. 
Veenhoven, R. (2002), “Why social policy needs subjective indicators”, Social Indicators Research, 
Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 33-46. 
Wanless, D., J. Forder, J.-L. Fernandez, T. Poole, L. Beesley, M. Henwood and F. Moscone (2006), 
Securing good care for older people: Taking a long-term view, London: King’s Fund.  17 
4.  The experience of LTC users 
Riemer Faber and Esther Mot 
with the cooperation of Ali Aouragh (CPB) 
4.1  Introduction 
4.1.1  Users of LTC 
This chapter is about the experience of older individuals with limitations that live at home and might 
be in need of long-term care (LTC). Their experience is important, because a very important goal of 
LTC systems is to protect or improve the quality of life. We are interested in those aspects of quality 
of life that can be influenced by long-term care, also called social care related quality of life (SCRQL). 
Netten, Burge, Malley, Potoglou, Brazier, Flynn & Forder (2009) distinguish the following aspects of 
SCRQL: 
  personal cleanliness and comfort 
  food and nutrition 
  safety 
  accommodation cleanliness and comfort 
  occupation 
  social participation and involvement 
  control over daily life 
  dignity 
This overview shows that SCRQL includes basic aspects such as being clean and fed, as well as higher 
level goals like having dignity and autonomy. Ideally, we would study the impact of LTC systems in 
different European countries on the SCRQL. However, since internationally comparable information 
on this indicator is not available, we make use of less targeted but still interesting information from the 
Survey  of Health, Ageing and Retirement  in Europe (SHARE). SHARE is a large panel of  older 
Europeans  that  contains  detailed  information  on  their  limitations,  health  problems  and  LTC  use. 
Several aspects of SHARE are relevant for our analysis: 
1.  The probability of receiving help for older persons with limitations 
2.  The degree to which that help meets their needs 
3.  The life satisfaction (LS) of older people with and without limitations 
All three aspects are discussed in this chapter. Section 4.2 discusses our conceptual framework. The 
data are described in section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents the analyses of the probability of receiving help 
for older persons. The degree to which that help meets the needs of older persons is discussed in 
section 4.5. Section 4.6 briefly discusses some methodological aspects. Section 4.7 is about the LS of 
older people with and without limitations. Section 4.8 concludes. 
The part of the performance analysis that is described  in this chapter, concerns the  experience  of 
individual persons with mobility limitations or limitations in instrumental or basic activities of daily 
living ((i)ADL limitations). Within the performance framework, this is included in the goal of quality 
of life for LTC users. In this way, we concentrate on the experience of potential users of long-term 
care, either informal or formal. In this context, by LTC system we mean not just the formal provision 
and financing of care, but we also include informal care. Since we use SHARE data for our analysis, 
we have to restrict ourselves almost exclusively to care given at home. The SHARE dataset hardly 
covers people that live in an institution.
7 As stated above, in the current analysis of the experience of 
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LTC users we study a rather broad group of limitations. In some of the other parts of the ANCIEN 
project, projections were made for persons with the more severe ADL limitations who can be expected 
to need personal care.  
4.1.2  Method 
The three different aspects of the experience of LTC users were studied through micro-econometric 
analysis  of  the  SHARE  data.  We  also  developed  a  questionnaire  to  ask  the  national  partners  for 
structured  feedback  on  our  draft  results.  This  feedback  concerned  the  results  in  general  and  in 
particular  the  results  for  their  own  country.  Apart  from  commenting  on  the  results  and  trying  to 
explain some of them, the partners also answered general questions about the satisfaction with aspects 
of the performance of their system. These questions concerned satisfaction with the role of informal 
care, with the role of private funding, with the role of residential care and with the complexity of the 
system.  The  partners  based  their  answers  on  research  to  the  degree  possible.  Since  appropriate 
research is not always available, they also used their own expertise. Therefore their answers contain a 
subjective element.  
4.2  Conceptual framework 
4.2.1  SHARE and the performance of LTC systems 
4.2.1.1  Indicators for the quality of life in SHARE 
We  are  interested  in  the  impact  of  the  LTC  system  on  the  quality  of  life  of  older  persons  with 
limitations, as that is a very important goal in the performance framework. The information in SHARE 
is not very precisely attuned to this research question. On the one hand we know whether people get 
help and to  which  extent it  meets their needs. This can be seen as a very basic  indicator for the 
functioning of the system: people have difficulties with for example walking, cooking, housekeeping 
or washing themselves, and someone helps them with these difficulties. This seems to fit in with the 
more  basic  aspects  of  SCRQL,  such  as  personal  cleanliness  and  comfort,  food  and  nutrition  and 
accommodation cleanliness and comfort. It does not tell us much about the higher level aspects safety, 
occupation, social participation and involvement, control over daily life and dignity. SHARE includes 
questions about life satisfaction that do take such aspects implicitly into account. However, we have to 
keep in mind that life satisfaction, even for persons with limitations, depends on many other aspects 
than just the LTC system. So an analysis of life satisfaction can only tell us something about the 
impact of the LTC system if we have sufficient control variables. By using information from SHARE 
about help and about LS, we can approach the impact of the LTC system on SCRQL from two sides, 
the side that covers the basic aspects and the side involving higher level aspects. 
4.2.1.2  Information about (i)ADL limitations in SHARE 
SHARE is not very restrictive in its definition of (i)ADL limitations. The following question is asked 
in wave 2: 
Please look at card 12. Here are a few more everyday activities. Please tell me if you have any 
difficulty with these because of a physical, mental, emotional or memory problem. Again 
exclude any difficulties you expect to last less than three months. 
The question mentions having any difficulty with the instrumental or basic activities of daily living. 
Using this criterion, persons who can do these activities independently but with difficulty, are also 
seen as suffering from (i)ADL limitations. For some of these people not getting any help does not have 
to be a big problem. We have to keep this in mind in interpreting the estimation results. 
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4.2.2  The model 
In  this  section,  we  describe  the  conceptual  framework  that  we  use  in  our  analysis.  This  model 
determines our hypotheses regarding the impact of the LTC system on the quality of life of older 
people with limitations. It also shows the relation between personal characteristics, the country of 
residence,  the  LTC  system  and  our  variables  of  interest:  the  probability  of  receiving  help,  the 
sufficiency of the help (together the met or unmet needs) and the LS (see Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework 
 
The figure shows that the unmet needs of older adults with limitations (elders with limitations have 
unmet needs if they do not get help or if they get insufficient help) are relatively easy to explain: they 
only  depend  on the personal and family characteristics of the person and the LTC system  of the 
country.  Relevant  personal  characteristics  to  include  in  the  model  are  socio-economic  factors, 
information about limitations, chronic disorders and other health problems, and information about the 
possible availability of informal help (e.g. living with others and having children). 
Explaining the LS is  more complicated, as that does not  only  depend  on personal characteristics, 
family and possibly the LTC system (mostly for those with limitations), but also on (un)met needs and 
the other characteristics of the country of residence. To complicate things further, it is likely that there 
are response scale differences among respondents on the LS question. This aspect will be discussed in 
section 4.7. In making a model for the LS, we have to keep in mind that limitations and the health 
situation may directly affect the LS: it is to be expected that someone with many limitations feels less 
happy than someone  without limitations. But the LTC system can  interact with this  effect:  it can 
mitigate the negative effect of limitations in two ways: 
1.  Making sure that persons have few/no unmet needs; 
2.  Contributing to social participation, dignity and autonomy. 
In Figure 4.1, the LTC system impacts life satisfaction directly, but also through the unmet needs. 
Thus we could expect persons with limitations to be less satisfied with life, but the better the LTC 
system in a country functions, the better their loss of LS will be compensated. Apart from limitations 
and the LTC system, LS will also depend on personal characteristics like income, age, education and 
the country of residence. Countries differ not just in LTC systems but also in factors such as GDP per 
capita, income distribution, social structure and cohesion and culture.  
4.3  Data and description 
We use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) from 2006-07 
(the  so-called  second  wave).  Data  are  collected  via  “face-to-face  computer-aided  interviews, 
supplemented  by  self-completion  paper  and  pencil  questionnaires”  (www.share-project.org).  Over 20  RIEMER FABER & ESTHER MOT WITH THE COOPERATION OF ALI AOURAGH 
 
34,000  people  older  than  50  years  from  all  over  Europe  were  surveyed.  The  survey  includes 
respondents from Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. SHARE contains questions on a wide 
range of topics. It contains questions on, for example, physical health, psychological health, well-
being, economic status, housing, demographic characteristics, and social interactions. A special feature 
of SHARE is that it contains vignettes to correct some questions for the reporting style of respondents. 
For more information on SHARE, see e.g. Börsch-Supan, Brugiavini, Jürges, Kapteyn, Mackenbach, 
Siegrist & Weber (2008) and the website of SHARE.
8 
Since we are only interested in older persons, we select from the SHARE sample all people that are 65 
or older (about 16,000 persons). Moreover, we do not use information on people from Ireland as we 
cannot  use  some  important  variables  for  them.  Our  basic  sample  contains  45%  of  the  SHARE 
respondents. Finally, the interviews took place before the (partial) implementation of a new Spanish 
LTC system. Therefore, our analysis considers the previous LTC system of Spain.  
An important disadvantage of using SHARE data is that people in nursing homes and residential care 
are not included in the survey. Therefore, our study almost exclusively focuses on the part of the LTC 
that is provided at home. Table 4.1 shows per country the percentage of older people that receive 
formal care in an institution (data are not available for all countries). There exist differences between 
countries. The percentage is relatively high in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. It is 
relatively low in Italy and Spain. It is unlikely that these differences are fully caused by differences in 
national health status. Hence, it is likely that the group of persons that receive home-based care (that 
is, the part of the population that we study) is not the same in each country. We correct as well as we 
can for this possible sample selection via the ample individual-specific characteristics that SHARE 
contains. Although it is beyond the scope of this analysis, institutional care is an important part of the 
LTC system. 
Table 4.1 Percentage of people (65 years and older) that receive formal care in an institution  
  Percentage 
Austria  5 
Belgium  6 
Czech Republic  4 
Denmark  5 
France  7 
Germany  4 
Italy  2 
Netherlands  6 
Spain  3 
Sweden  6 
Source: ANCIEN Work Package 1. 
Our Polish partners have some doubts about the representativeness of SHARE for the Polish older 
adults. Golinowska & Sowa (2012a) state: “SHARE data for Poland tend to over-represent the rural 
population. Thus interpreting results one should keep in mind that economic situation, health status 
and  availability  of  long-term  care  facilities  differ  between  rural  and  urban  population.  These 
differences might be multidimensional as i.e. female longevity is higher in rural areas while male 
longevity is higher in urban areas. At the same time health status of rural population is poorer on 
average than health status of urban population. This could have an impact on various results: mobility 
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limitations’ of the population could be overestimated, access to formal care could be underestimated 
and use of informal care could be overestimated.” 
One part of the survey that is of particular importance for our study is the part that contains questions 
on limitations. If a person has limitations, we consider this as an indication that a person could use 
LTC  (i.e.,  that  the  LTC  system  is  relevant  for  this  person).  The  survey  contains  three  types  of 
limitations. First, it contains limitations regarding ‘activities of daily living’ (ADL). This category 
covers basic activities. The survey asks whether a person  has difficulties  with dressing (including 
putting on shoes and socks), walking across a room or getting in/out of bed (these are two separate 
questions in the survey, but we combine the answers in order to be consistent with other WPs in the 
ANCIEN  project),  bathing  or  showering,  eating  (such  as  cutting  up  food),  and  using  the  toilet 
(including  getting  up  or  down).  Figure  4.2  contains  for  each  ADL  the  percentage  of  people  that 
indicate  that  they  have  problems  with  it.  Second,  the  survey  contains  limitations  regarding 
‘instrumental  activities  of  daily  living’  (iADL).  People  are  asked  to  indicate  whether  they  have 
problems with using a map (to figure out how to get around in a strange place), preparing a hot meal, 
shopping for groceries, making telephone calls, taking medications, doing work around the house or 
garden, and managing money (such as paying bills and keeping track of expenses). Figure 4.2 also 
contains the percentage  of people that  have problems with a specific  iADL  limitation. Third, the 
survey  contains  questions  on  limitations  of  respondents  regarding  their  mobility.  The  mobility 
question asks after the following limitations: walking 100 meters; sitting for about two hours; getting 
up  from  a  chair  after  sitting  for  long  periods;  climbing  several  flights  of  stairs  without  resting; 
climbing one flight of stairs without resting; stooping, kneeling, or crouching; reaching or extending 
your arms above shoulder level; pulling or pushing large objects like a living room chair; lifting or 
carrying weights over 10 pounds/5 kilos, like a heavy bag of groceries; picking up a small coin from a 
table. 
Another important question from the survey is whether a person receives help to overcome his or her 
limitation(s). This help could be from anyone, so it includes help from a partner or children. The 
question is formulated as follows: “Thinking about the activities that you have problems with, does 
anyone ever help you with these activities?” This question refers to activities that have been mentioned 
in  previous  questions  and  where  difficulties  should  be  expected  to  last  three  months  or  more, 
concerning mobility, iADL and ADL. The question about help is only asked of respondents who state 
that they have one or more of these limitations. Exactly 50% of the persons in the sample with at least 
one limitation indicate that they receive help. We use this question as an indicator for whether a person 
receives LTC. Interestingly, we also know to what extent the received help meets the needs of the 
person. We use this information as an indicator for the sufficiency of the provided LTC. Help always 
meets  the  needs  for  65%  of  the  care  recipients,  it  usually  meets  the  needs  for  28%  of  the  care 
recipients,  and  it  sometimes  or  hardly  ever  meets  the  needs  for  8%  of  the  care  recipients  (the 
categories sometimes meets the needs and hardly ever meets the needs are two separate categories, but 
we combine them here since very few people receive help that hardly ever meets their needs). SHARE 
contains, next to the indicator that we use, also other indicators for help. The questionnaire contains 
questions on different forms of formal home care, institutional care and informal care from inside and 
outside the household.
9 However, the choice of the help variable does not seem to impact our results 
much. Moreover, the alternative indicators are less attractive for us because they do not explicitly 
measure help that is provided to overcome limitations. A potential pitfall of the reported extent to 
which the help meets the needs is that the answers of people may depend upon personal judgments and 
therefore may not be directly comparable across persons. For example, it could be that expectations of 
people about LTC differ across countries and therefore persons may judge a certain level of help 
sufficient in some countries, but insufficient in other countries. 
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Figure 4.2 Percentage of individuals with difficulties regarding basic and instrumental ADL 
(unweighted) 
 
Source: SHARE, wave 2. 
 
Figure 4.3 Life satisfaction of persons over 65 years old with and without ADL and (i)ADL limitations 
(unweighted) 
 
Source: SHARE, wave 2. 
The final question that we mention in this section because of its particular importance to our study, is 
the question on self-reported life satisfaction. We use this question to derive a part of the effect of the 
LTC system  on  individuals. Although this  is an imperfect  measure for our purpose, it is the best 
























































































without limitation with one or more limitationTHE EXPERIENCE OF LTC USERS  23 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of the self-reported life satisfaction for people in the sample with and 
without ADL and (i)ADL limitations. The light-coloured bars of this figure show the distribution for 
people with at least one limitation. The panels show that people without limitations report on average 
a higher life satisfaction. The average own assessment of people without limitations is ‘satisfied’ (i.e., 
4 on the scale 1-5), while for people with limitations the average assessment is between ‘satisfied’ and 
‘neither  satisfied  nor  dissatisfied’  (i.e.,  3.5  on  the  scale  1-5).  However,  these  results  should  be 
interpreted carefully as there might be differences in the reporting style of people with and without 
limitations. We will further elaborate on this issue (and correct for differences in reporting style) in 
section 4.7. 
Below we present data for some of the variables of interest by country. On average two thirds of the 
older people have difficulties with some activities, ranging from almost half in Switzerland to more 
than 80% in Poland (see Table 4.2). The table shows which percentage of the elders suffers from 
different types of limitations (mobility, iADL, ADL). For each limitation, we calculate how many 
persons suffer from it by country without paying attention to the other limitations, meaning that for 
example persons with mobility limitations may also suffer from iADL- or ADL-limitations. Especially 
mobility is difficult for many people. Limitations in instrumental and basic activities of daily living are 
less common, but still observed rather frequently. Compared to other countries the level of all types of 
limitations is high in Poland and low in Switzerland. Other data sources (like the European health 
interview survey of Eurostat) confirm that the percentage of older people with limitations is higher in 
Poland  than  in  other  countries  (see  Golinowska  &  Sowa,  2012b,  for  an  extensive  discussion  of 
disability in Poland). However, the SHARE percentage may be somewhat higher than the percentages 
from other sources as the Polish SHARE sample may contain relatively many people from rural areas 
(as  explained  above).  In  all  our  estimates,  we  include  the  location  of  the  main  residence  of  a 
respondent as a control variable to correct for a possible selection effect. Moreover, we estimate all 
specifications once for all countries and once for all countries except Poland. In all cases, the results of 
these two estimates do not differ much. 
Table 4.2 Percentage of older people with limitations by country (weighted) and sample size
 
Country  Mobility (%)  iADL (%)  ADL (%)  Some limitation (%)  Sample size 
Austria  63.7  29.3  15.3  64.4  726 
Belgium  60.5  28.0  20.4  62.6  1405 
Czech Republic  66.3  24.6  12.7  66.8  1123 
Denmark  52.1  24.3  14.7  54.2  1067 
France  62.7  29.9  19.4  63.7  1305 
Germany  64.5  23.3  18.6  65.1  1225 
Greece  74.9  34.0  12.4  76.9  1387 
Italy  70.5  31.5  18.6  71.6  1479 
Netherlands  51.1  23.4  13.6  53.6  1055 
Poland  82.6  45.0  35.1  83.5  1019 
Spain  64.1  29.4  18.9  65.1  1178 
Sweden  58.9  21.9  14.6  60.6  1354 
Switzerland  46.5  15.5  9.4  48.5  623 
Source: SHARE, wave 2. 
On average, more than half of the older people with some sort of limitation get help from someone 
(including people in the same household, see Table 4.3). The share of limited older people with help is 
relatively low in Greece and Italy and relatively high in Germany and Belgium. Of the group of people 
with limitations concerning instrumental or basic activities of daily living, more people get help than 
from the group of people with mobility limitations. Of course these groups overlap. Only one third of 
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Table 4.3 Percentage of limited older persons that get help, by country (weighted) 
Country  All limitations (%)  Mobility lim.  iADL  ADL 
Austria  57.8   57.9   81.6   90.0  
Belgium  60.3   60.5   86.8   84.9  
Czech Republic  56.9   56.9   84.9   83.6  
Denmark  51.7   50.3   87.3   86.3  
France  54.5   54.3   85.7   84.9  
Germany  67.7   67.5   90.0   85.9  
Greece  35.6   36.3   57.9   74.4  
Italy  42.2   42.3   72.3   85.5  
Netherlands  57.1   56.7   83.3   81.8  
Poland  46.1   46.0   69.1   68.9  
Spain  46.0   45.9   72.5   78.1  
Sweden  49.6   48.9   85.3   77.0  
Switzerland  52.5   53.7   80.3   75.3  
Source: SHARE, wave 2. 
Table 4.4 Limited older persons: degree to which the help meets the needs (unweighted) 
Country  All the time  Usually  Sometimes  Hardly ever  Total 
Austria  66.5  25.9  6.8  0.8  100 
Belgium  65.6  28.2  5.5  0.8  100 
Czech Republic  62.2  32.8  4.8  0.2  100 
Denmark  63.5  24.7  9.0  2.8  100 
France  59.3  31.0  7.4  2.3  100 
Germany  67.7  27.7  4.2  0.4  100 
Greece  58.1  32.3  9.6  0.0  100 
Italy  75.3  19.5  4.7  0.5  100 
Netherlands  68.9  27.1  2.9  1.1  100 
Poland  62.2  26.3  10.7  0.8  100 
Spain  58.9  30.6  8.4  2.1  100 
Sweden  64.6  25.6  8.7  1.1  100 
Switzerland  78.8  18.5  2.7  0.0  100 
Total  64.7  27.6  6.7  1.0  100 
Source: SHARE, wave 2. 
Table 4.4 shows that if older persons receive help, this help almost always meets their needs all the 
time or usually (together these categories cover more than 90%). In Switzerland there are very few 
older people for whom the help sometimes or hardly ever meets the need (less than 3%). This less 
satisfactory help is found for about 10% of the persons with help in Denmark, France, Greece, Poland, 
Spain and Sweden. In Greece the situation of older people with limitations seems rather unfavourable 
as the probability to get help is relatively low, and even people with help relatively often do not find 
the help sufficient.  
Table 4.5 shows the use of informal care of older people by country.
10 The table shows two aspects: 
the share of older persons who receive informal help with personal care (either from inside or outside 
the  household)  and  the  share  of  persons  who  receive  informal  practical  help  from  outside  the 
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household  (e.g.  help  with  shopping,  household  chores  or  paperwork).  SHARE  does  not  include 
questions on practical help from inside the household. The question about receiving personal care 
from outside the household is only answered by the family respondent within the household without a 
question about who exactly receives this help. We assumed that all persons within the household with 
ADL-limitations received this help in cases where informal help with personal care from outside the 
household was given. 
Table 4.5 Percentage of older people that uses informal care (weighted) 
Country  Practical help, from outside household (%)  Personal care (%) 
Austria  27.0  9.6 
Belgium  30.8  7.0 
Czech Republic  46.7  10.6 
Denmark  29.2  4.3 
France  22.5  7.3 
Germany  37.1  9.0 
Greece  28.5  10.1 
Italy  21.8  14.6 
Netherlands  28.8  3.2 
Poland  28.2  16.3 
Spain  17.8  14.7 
Sweden  31.1  3.1 
Switzerland  19.8  3.4 
Source: SHARE, wave 2. 
The use of practical help from outside the household is especially high in the Czech Republic (almost 
47%). It is relatively low in Spain and Switzerland (less than 20%). For many countries the share is 
around 30%. Informal help with personal care is less frequent than practical informal help, as may be 
expected. Its use is highest in Poland (16%) and lowest in Sweden, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
(around 3%).  
Table 4.6 shows the use of formal care of older people living at home. We only included care use for a 
period of 13 weeks or more in order to exclude temporary care not aimed at long-term problems. The 
use of formal personal and nursing care at home is highest in Belgium and lowest in Greece and the 
Czech Republic. The use of this care is relatively low in Sweden, Of course we have to keep in mind 
that the probability of institutionalisation for persons who need personal or nursing care may differ a 
lot among countries (see also Table 4.1). It is possible that less personal and nursing care at home is 
used in Sweden because many people who need such care live in an institution. 
The  use  of  practical  home  help  is  highest  in  the  Netherlands  and  lowest  in  the  Czech  Republic. 
SHARE shows that older adults in the Czech Republic did get a lot of practical help in 2006 and 2007, 
when the survey was carried out, but this help was almost exclusively in the form of informal care. 
This seems to indicate that informal care acted as a substitute for formal care for this type of help in 
the Czech Republic. The low use of formal personal and nursing care at home does not appear to be 
‘compensated’ to the same extent by informal care use, as the use of informal personal care is about 
average  in the Czech Republic.  Again, it  may be that persons  who  have  more severe  care  needs 
receive residential care. Holub & Hava (2011) show that 31%  of the care users  with the  highest 
disability grade use only inpatient care in the Czech Republic; for care users with the lowest disability 
grade, this is still 9%.
11 
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Table 4.6 Percentage of older people that use long-term formal care at home 
(13 weeks or more, weighted) 
Country  Personal and nursing care (%)  Home help  Meals on wheels 
Austria  4.2  4.9  1.4 
Belgium  6.5  12.2  3.0 
Czech Republic  0.6  0.4  4.4 
Denmark  5.2  14.6  4.8 
France  4.7  12.8  3.0 
Germany  3.6  4.7  2.7 
Greece  0.5  1.3  0.3 
Italy  1.0  5.4  0.2 
Netherlands  3.7  16.6  3.6 
Spain  1.8  5.0  0.0 
Sweden  1.3  4.8  1.3 
Switzerland  3.8  6.0  1.7 
Source: SHARE, wave 2. 
4.4  The probability of receiving help 
In this section  we  look  into  differences among countries in the probability that older people  with 
limitations receive help. If people who really need help (e.g. people with more severe limitations) get 
help, this means that there is some system in place to provide that help. That does not have to be a 
formal collectively funded system; it could also be that older people get informal help. In the latter 
case, of course, we have to realise that the help is not ‘free’: persons who provide informal help have 
to spend time and effort that they cannot spend on other activities (working, household tasks,
12 leisure, 
etc.).  We  want  to  find  out  to  which  extent  older  people  in  different  countries  have  a  different 
probability of getting help, after correcting for all characteristics that may affect the need for help or 
the availability of help in the household and family. In this way we want to determine the differences 
between the national LTC systems. SHARE includes a lot of information to explain the degree of 
(un)met needs, but naturally it is still possible that some relevant characteristics are not observed. For 
example, if not all relevant aspects of the health status are included, this may affect the results. 
We analyse the probability of getting help for older people with limitations (mobility, iADL or ADL) 
by using a logit model. The explanatory variables are: information on limitations and health problems, 
the country in which a person resides, the household and family situation and socio-economic control 
factors.
13 In section 4.2.2 we describe our conceptual framework. This also guides the selection of 
exogenous factors. Limitations and health affect the need for care and, via this need, they affect the 
probability of actually receiving care. The household and family situation impacts the opportunity for 
receiving care, as it affects the possibilities for informal care giving. The country of residence will 
affect the probability of receiving help mostly via the LTC system (after correction for other relevant 
factors). Possibly the country of residence does not just affect the probability of getting help directly, 
but also through a different impact of  other factors. For example, the  impact  of  having  cognitive 
problems may differ among countries depending on the degree to which the LTC system is attuned to 
                                                   
12 The carrying out of household tasks may also be part of informal care with iADL. 
13 We construct a cognitive function variable by a principal component analysis of four test results in SHARE 
(recalling words, naming as many animal species as possible, solving mathematical exercises, and knowing the 
correct date and day  of the week). We use the first component as a measure for cognitive functioning (the 
eigenvalues of the first and second component are respectively 2.1 and 0.8). The first component accounts for 
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such problems. Another example is that the impact of income may differ because of differences in 
eligibility, income-dependent co-payments, etc. A number of interaction effects between country and 
other variables turn out to be important and are included in the specification. 
The inclusion of interactions with country dummies makes the estimation results more difficult to 
interpret. Therefore, we report the estimation results of the logit model in a separate document with 
appendices that accompanies this report (Appendices, chapter 1, Table A.1). In this section, we present 
average marginal effects of changes in explanatory variables on the probability of receiving help. For 
example, the average marginal effect of living in a certain country shows the impact of the country of 
residence on the probability of receiving help for persons with all sort of different characteristics in the 
sample. The average marginal effect (AME) of living in Austria instead of Germany is calculated as 
follows: for each person in the sample living in Germany is assumed and the probability of receiving 
help is calculated. In the next step, for each person living in Austria is assumed and the probability of 
receiving help is calculated. The difference of these probabilities is calculated for each person and the 
AME is a (weighted) average of these differences over the whole sample. Another way of presenting 
the results is to calculate probabilities of receiving help for persons with certain characteristics. This 
type of results is shown in the separate document with appendices (Appendices, section 1.2).  
Below, we start by discussing the impact of the health, family situation and socio-economic control 
variables  on  the  probability  of  receiving  help.  We  do  this  first  for  Germany  and  then  discuss 
differences among countries in the impact of some of the control variables. Following that, we discuss 
the differences among countries after controlling for all these factors. Since we want to assess the LTC 
systems of different countries, we are especially interested in the impact of the country of residence on 
the probability of receiving help. 
4.4.1  Effect of control variables  
Table 4.7 reports the average marginal effects of the control variables for persons living in Germany. 
Important factors in determining the probability of help in Germany are age, limitations, health status 
and  household  and  family  situation.  The  probability  of  help  is  larger  for  persons  who  are  older 
(especially the oldest age group), have a grandchild, have more severe (i)ADL limitations, have a 
larger number of mobility limitations and suffer from more chronic disorders. The probability of help 
is lower for persons who live alone. Despite the fact that information on limitations and health is 
included, age still seems to play an independent role affecting the probability of help in Germany and 
many other countries. A possible explanation is that the specification does not correct completely for 
health status. Alternatively, persons who decide about giving help (either formally or informally) may 
use age as an indicator for the health status or the necessity of help. 
Table  4.8  shows  differences  among  countries  in  marginal  effects  of  the  control  variables.
14  The 
positive effect of being 80 to 85 years old on the probability of receiving help is not everywhere 
equally large and significant. Income only seems to play a role in Austria.
15 It is somewhat surprising 
that a higher income is correlated with a lower probability of receiving help. Our Austrian partners 
suggested the following possible explanation: “So-called 24-hour-care was only available on the grey 
market but was not yet legalised during the SHARE 2006 data collection (and even now we have to 
assume a large black market here, due to many carers from abroad not meeting the criteria for public 
support), so persons using this may have avoided stating this in an official questionnaire. This kind of 
care requires substantial private means, can hardly be financed by poorer households. This effect may 
have reduced the stated amount of care, compared to the true amount of care” (Kraus & Riedel, 2012). 
Being a woman leads to a significantly higher probability of receiving help in France, Poland and 
                                                   
14 The table only includes the control variables that have a different impact in different countries.  
15 Income as included in the specification is in thousands of euros, purchasing power adjusted and adjusted for 
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Sweden and not so much in the other countries. The degree of urbanisation has opposite effects in 
Belgium and the Czech Republic on the one hand and Denmark, Italy and Poland on the other hand: in 
the latter countries living in a more rural area decreases the probability of receiving help; in Belgium 
and the Czech Republic it increases the probability.  
Table 4.7 Marginal effects of control factors in Germany 
    dy/dx  Std. Err. 
70-75  0.05***  0.019 
75-80  0.064***  0.02 
80-85  0.018  0.049 
>= 85  0.214***  0.032 
Education middle  0.006  0.018 
Education high  -0.009  0.028 
Standardised income  0.001  0.001 
Woman  0.047  0.037 
Urbanisation  -0.015  0.012 
Child(ren)  -0.012  0.062 
Intensive contact with child  0.017  0.016 
Living alone  -0.191***  0.042 
Grandchild(ren)  0.058**  0.027 
iADL at most  0.197***  0.046 
1 ADL at most  0.217***  0.024 
2 ADL at most  0.322***  0.038 
3 or more ADL at most  0.507***  0.047 
Number of mobility lim.  0.017*  0.009 
Number of symptoms  -0.001  0.005 
Cognitive functioning  0.013  0.015 
Depression  0.038  0.044 
Number of chronic disorders  0.014***  0.005 
The symbols *, ** and *** mean that the difference is statistically significant at respectively the 10%, 5% and 
1% level. 
Somewhat surprisingly  we find a weakly significant negative  effect of having  children  in France, 
Denmark and Italy. Our French partners suggest as possible explanation a positive correlation between 
health status and having children. They remark that they find no significant relation between children 
and help in a slightly different analysis of French data.
16 Another possible explanation of the negative 
relationship is that older people with children receive less formal help in some LTC systems, because 
the system assumes that the children can help their parents. Living alone generally has a negative 
effect  on  the  probability  of  receiving  help,  but  this  effect  is  much  larger  in  the  Czech  Republic, 
Germany, Greece and Poland. For older people with limitations in iADL and no limitations in ADL, 
the  probability  of  help  is  much  higher  than  for  older  people  with  only  mobility  limitations  (the 
reference group) in all countries.  
 
                                                   
16 Wittwer & Dufour-Kippelen (2012) state: “Nevertheless, note that we obtain no significant effect of having 
children with French data (Handicap-Santé-Ménage, probit models, own computation) for population 60+ with 
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Table 4.8 Marginal effects of control variables on the probability of receiving help in different countries 
  80-85  Standardised 
income 









Austria  0.205***  -0.005**  -0.006  -0.006  0.022  -0.070  0.156***  0.028***  0.017  0.155*** 
Belgium  0.129***  0.001  0.043  0.037***  -0.027  -0.058*  0.229***  0.040***  -0.014  -0.002 
Czech 
Republic  0.120**  0.001  0.020  0.033**  -0.022  -0.228***  0.264***  0.013  -0.022  0.065 
Denmark  0.066  0.000  0.039  -0.032**  -0.122*  -0.087**  0.34***  0.032***  -0.039***  0.046 
France  0.119**  0.000  0.117***  -0.014  -0.108**  -0.009  0.305***  0.029***  -0.016  0.035 
Germany  0.018  0.001  0.047  -0.015  -0.012  -0.191***  0.197***  0.017*  0.013  0.038 
Greece  0.096**  -0.002  -0.010  0.002  -0.026  -0.139***  0.257***  0.045***  0.032**  0.009 
Italy  0.007  -0.001  0.035  -0.029***  -0.113*  0.004  0.184***  0.035***  -0.031**  0.025 
Netherlands  0.118*  -0.001  0.030  -0.008  0.087  -0.024  0.232***  0.035***  -0.012  0.006 
Poland  0.095**  -0.001  0.067**  -0.026**  -0.051  -0.139***  0.229***  0.025***  -0.028**  0.057* 
Spain  0.092*  0.000  0.026  0.017  -0.070  -0.087*  0.239***  0.012  -0.032*  0.016 
Sweden  0.113***  0.001  0.055*  0.008  -0.070  -0.047  0.379***  0.050***  -0.002  0.002 
Switzerland  0.195***  0.000  0.076  0.008  0.073  -0.051  0.221***  0.040***  0.005  -0.009 
The symbols *, ** and *** mean that the difference is statistically significant at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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There is some variation across countries for persons with iADL limitations: in Sweden and Denmark 
they have the largest probability of receiving help compared to other countries.
17 A larger number of 
mobility limitations increases the probability of receiving help more in some countries than in others. 
This is in particular an important factor in Sweden, Greece, Switzerland and Belgium. For four other 
countries, we find a significantly negative effect of the cognitive functioning variable: Denmark, Italy, 
Poland and Spain. This finding means that better cognitive functioning decreases the probability of 
receiving  help.  In  these  countries  the  help  seems  to  be  well  targeted  at  persons  with  cognitive 
problems. The association works in the opposite direction in Greece: better cognitive functioning goes 
hand in hand with a higher probability of receiving help. Being depressed increases the probability of 
receiving help in Austria and Poland. Our Polish partners suggest that the depression scale in SHARE 
may also pick up other problems than actual depression.
18 
4.4.2  Country effects 
The effect of living in a certain country on the probability of receiving help is shown from highest to 
lowest in Table 4.9. We see that the probability is highest in Germany. The probability of receiving 
help is significantly lower in all other countries in the sample than in Germany. This probability is 
lowest  in  Poland.  In  the  Czech  Republic,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Switzerland  and  Austria  the 
probability of receiving help is relatively high, although not as high as in Germany. 
Table 4.9 Countries ordered by the average marginal effect on the probability of receiving help, 
compared to Germany 
Country  dy/dx  Std. error 
Germany  0  n.a. 
Czech Republic  -0.06**  0.03 
Belgium  -0.094***  0.027 
Netherlands  -0.096***  0.036 
Switzerland  -0.109***  0.039 
Austria  -0.112***  0.034 
Denmark  -0.153***  0.031 
Sweden  -0.154***  0.031 
France  -0.175***  0.031 
Italy  -0.303***  0.028 
Spain  -0.311***  0.037 
Greece  -0.334***  0.031 
Poland  -0.374***  0.036 
The symbols *, ** and *** mean that the difference is statistically significant at respectively the 10%, 5% and 
1% level. 
The table shows that the impact of the country of residence on the probability of receiving help is 
more  or  less  similar  for  a  number  of  countries.  Table  4.10  shows  the  results  for  the  pair-wise 
comparisons of country average marginal effects. Using these results, we can check which groups of 
                                                   
17 By “iADL limitations at most” we mean that iADL limitations are the most serious limitation; that is to say 
that there are no ADL limitations. 
18  Golinowska  &  Sowa  (2012)  state:  “Medically  assessed  depression  is  rare  in  Poland  compared  to  other 
countries. The set of questions formulated in the SHARE questionnaire with respect to mental condition is very 
broad and positive answers could also be symptoms of other conditions (i.e. caused by hard work and tiredness) 
than depression itself, especially in a pessimistic (complaining) society. Studies show that labour intensity in 
Poland is much higher compared to other countries and pre-transformation period.” THE EXPERIENCE OF LTC USERS  31 
 
countries actually differ significantly from each other in the probability of receiving help. To do that, 
we need a point of reference to construct groups. We start by selecting the country with the highest 
probability  of  receiving  help.  Following  that,  we  check  whether  there  are  countries  where  the 
probability of receiving help does not differ significantly. If we find such countries, we arrange them 
in the same group as the country with the highest probability. Among the remaining countries, we look 
again for the country with the highest probability and we start constructing a new group in the same 
way. We repeat this process till all countries are ordered in a group. 
Following this approach, we find the following five  different groups of countries, ordered from a 
higher to a lower probability of receiving help: 
Group 1: Germany 
Group 2: Czech Republic, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria 
Group 3: Denmark, Sweden, France 
Group 4: Italy, Spain, Greece 
Group 5: Poland 
Germany is the country with the highest probability of receiving help. It differs significantly from all 
other countries, so Germany is in a group by itself. The Czech Republic is the country with the next 
highest  probability  of  receiving  help.  For  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Switzerland  and  Austria,  the 
probability is not significantly different, so we consider them part of the same group. Of the remaining 
countries, Denmark has the highest probability of receiving help. Sweden and France belong in the 
same group. Italy is the country with the next highest probability of receiving help. For both Spain and 
Greece the difference with Italy is not significant, so they form part of the same group. Poland is – as 
the one remaining country – in a group by itself.  
The probability of receiving help in Spain in 2006-07 did not differ significantly from the relatively 
low  probability  in  Italy  and  Greece.  However,  since  the  data  collection  for  the  second  wave  of 
SHARE, a large reform of the Spanish system has been introduced. Due to the economic crisis, Spain 
has not been able to carry out all planned reforms. But the results for the second wave of SHARE may 
be unnecessarily pessimistic for Spain. 
4.4.3  Relation with the typology of LTC systems based on use and financing 
of care 
We can check whether the four selected countries that should represent different LTC systems are also 
in different groups if we look at the probability of receiving help, even though this probability does not 
necessarily have to differ among types of LTC systems. We find that the four representative countries 
are in different groups arranged according to the probability of receiving help, at least if we follow the 
method as described above. However, the clustering is different in a number of respects from the 
typology we created earlier based on use and financing of care. For example, Germany is not in the 
same cluster as Belgium and the Czech Republic, but they are in adjoining groups. The Netherlands is 
not in the same group as Denmark and Sweden, even though these countries are in adjoining groups as 
well. In the above ordering, Spain is part of the same group as Italy, which is not the case in the 
typology based on use and financing of care. 
It is not very surprising that these groups differ in some respects from the earlier typology of LTC 
systems based on use and financing of care. That typology was much affected by the division among 
formal and informal care and the expenditures on LTC. But the probability of receiving help does not 
necessarily have to differ a lot between more or less formalised systems and between more or less 
expensive systems in terms of expenditure on formal LTC. In the less formalised and less expensive 
systems, the probability of receiving help can still be high because of a high use of informal care. 
Actually, we find that the probability of receiving help is highest in Germany, a country with relatively 
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Table 4.10 Pair-wise comparison of average marginal effects of living in different countries on the 
probability of receiving help 
Country  DE  AU  SE  NL  ES  IT  FR  DK  GR  CH  BE  CZ  PL 
DE    --***  --***  --***  --***  --***  --***  --***  --***  --***  --***  --**  --*** 
AU      ns  ns  --***  --***  --*  ns  --***  ns  ns  ns  --*** 
SE        +*  --***  --***  ns  ns  --***  ns  +**  +***  --*** 
NL          --***  --***  --**  ns  --***  ns  ns  ns  --*** 
ES            ns  +***  +***  ns  +***  +***  +***  ns 
IT              +***  +***  ns  +***  +***  +***  --** 
FR                ns  --***  +*  +***  +***  --*** 
DK                  --***  ns  +**  +***  --*** 
GR                    +***  +***  +***  ns 
CH                      ns  ns  --*** 
BE                        ns  --*** 
CZ                          --*** 
PL                           
The symbols *, ** and *** mean that the difference is statistically significant at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
4.4.4  Relationship of country effects with systems’ characteristics 
The preceding sections reported on the differences we found among countries in the probability of 
receiving help for older people with limitations. Since we try to correct for all relevant covariates, 
these differences should tell us something about the performance of the LTC system in these countries. 
Looking at this one aspect, the German system seems to function better than the others. Why is that? 
In WP1 and in this WP we have collected information on characteristics of LTC systems. Now we 
want to see if we can explain the results for the probability of receiving help from these systems’ 
characteristics by looking for significant quantitative relationships. Unfortunately, we have only 10 or 
11 observations for each characteristic.
19 
We have data on seven characteristics of national long-term care systems from the ANCIEN study of 
Kraus, Riedel, Mot, Willemé, Röhrling & Czypionka (2010). We know the public expenditures on 
LTC as a share of GDP (these expenditures are corrected for differences in needs between countries), 
the private LTC expenditures as a share of total LTC spending, the number of informal care recipients 
divided by the number of formal care recipients (indicating whether the system uses more informal 
care or formal care), a measure for the support that informal caregivers receive (e.g. income support), 
the value of cash benefits (averaged for home-based care and institutional care, corrected for income 
differences  between  countries),  whether  access  to  publicly  financed  home-based  care  and  formal 
institutional care is means-tested (e.g. whether it excludes persons with a high income) and the quality 
of coordination between LTC and other services (e.g. the health system). For more details on these 
characteristics, see Kraus, Riedel, Mot, Willemé, Röhrling & Czypionka (2010). Moreover, we have 
data on four additional characteristics via a questionnaire we distributed among our ANCIEN partners. 
We asked our partners how satisfied (on a scale from 1 to 10) the people in their country are with the 
role of informal care in the LTC system, the role of private funding in the LTC system, the role of 
residential  care  in  the  system  and  the  complexity  of  the  LTC system.  The  expert  opinion  of  our 
partners  is  regularly  based  on  research,  but  also  contains  a  subjective  element  if  no  appropriate 
research was available. Since we have a very limited number of observations (namely, the number of 
countries), we regress the average marginal effects of living in a certain country separately on each 
country characteristic and a constant. This method does not tell us anything about causality, but we 
can  see  whether  there  is  a  significant  correlation.  As  these  OLS  regressions  use  only  a  few 
                                                   
19 The analysis of the probability of receiving help includes 13 countries, but for some of them we have not 
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observations, the results may be sensitive to outliers. For that reason, we also carefully study scatter 
plots of the relationship between the AMEs and the variables. 
Table 4.11 reports the estimation results. The probability of receiving help in an LTC system appears 
to have a significant negative relationship with the share of private funding and with means-testing. 
The relationship with the satisfaction about the complexity of the system is positive. For the other 
factors there is no significant correlation. 
Table 4.11 The AME of country of residence on the probability of receiving help explained by country-
specific characteristics 
System characteristic  Coefficient  p-value  Number obs  R
2 
Income and needs corrected spending  0.360  0.614  11  0.03 
Share of private expenditures  -0.747***  0.009  11  0.55 
Informal care use / Formal care use  -0.011  0.798  10  0.01 
Informal care use  0.197  0.608  10  0.03 
Formal care use  0.452  0.316  10  0.13 
Support for informal caregivers  0.041  0.135  11  0.23 
Importance of cash benefits  -0.162  0.340  11  0.10 
Means-testing  -0.224***  0.000  11  0.81 
Quality of coordination between LTC and other 
services  0.060  0.438  11  0.07 
Satisfaction about role of informal care  0.003  0.926  7  0.00 
Satisfaction about role of private funding  0.016  0.436  7  0.13 
Satisfaction about role of residential care  0.038  0.127  7  0.40 
Satisfaction about complexity of system  0.039*  0.061  7  0.54 
The symbols *, ** and *** mean that the difference is statistically significant at respectively the 10%, 5% and 
1% level. 
Figure 4.4 shows on the left side the relationship between the probability of receiving help and the 
share of private funding. Higher private funding and a lower probability of receiving help seem to go 
hand in hand. It may be that fewer people get the help they need in countries with high private funding 
because  they  do  not  have  sufficient  means.  However,  we  have  to  be  careful  in  interpreting  the 
relationship with the probability of receiving help as the private funding is measured in classes (so we 
are using class  middles and the  information  is  not  very precise) and  more recent  information for 
Germany indicates a higher share of private funding of about 30% (see Rothgang, 2011).  
The right side  of Figure 4.4 shows the relation between the probability of receiving help and the 
existence of means-testing. In the three countries with means-testing, the probability of receiving help 
is much lower. These countries do not spend a lot of money on publicly financed LTC and possibly 
they want to target the money that they do spend at those who need it the most in their view.  
The left side of Figure 4.5 concerns the relationship between satisfaction with the complexity of the 
system and the probability of receiving help. Again, we have to be careful with the interpretation. If 
we take Poland out, the relationship would be very different. Our national experts also report the 
satisfaction  with the complexity  of the system  for a number  of countries that are not  included in 
SHARE. The satisfaction with the complexity is especially low in many new member states: Poland, 
Bulgaria, Estonia and the Czech Republic. It is also very low in England. The satisfaction appears to 
be  higher on average  in countries with  more  mature, well-developed and  more  generous systems. 
Maybe a more generous system does not need so many rules to find out who is eligible for publicly 
financed care. 
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Figure 4.4 Relationship between the probability of receiving help in a LTC system and a) the share of 
private funding and b) means-testing 
  
Figure 4.5 Relationship between the probability of receiving help in a LTC system and a) satisfaction 
with the complexity of the system and b) public expenditures on LTC 
 
 
We find no significant relationship between spending and the probability of receiving help. The scatter 
plot on the right side of Figure 4.5 also shows the lack of a clear relationship. We see that income and 
needs corrected spending is the highest in Sweden, but the probability of receiving help is much higher 
in Germany with its low spending. In the Czech Republic spending is even lower than in Germany, but 
the probability of receiving help is not much lower. One way to explain this is an intensive use of 
informal care. In Figure 4.6 and Table 4.5 we see indeed that informal (practical) care use is high in 
the  Czech  Republic  and  to  a  somewhat  lesser  extent  in  Germany.
20  Over  all  these  countries,  no 
                                                   
20 The information on informal care use in Figure 4.6 is based on the WP1 database, filled by the national 
experts, while the information in Table 4.5 is based on SHARE, wave 2. Because of differences in definitions 
and other aspects, the information from both sources can differ. Incidentally, according to our national experts, 
the satisfaction with the role of informal care in the system is low in Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland, 
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significant relationship is found between informal care use and the probability of receiving help. For 
example, in Italy and Spain the informal care use is comparable to Germany (lower for practical help 
and higher for personal care, see Table 4.5), but the probability of receiving help is much lower. It 
seems likely that a combination of factors finally decides the probability of receiving help: public 
spending, private spending, the efficiency of the system and the use of informal care are possible 
determining factors.  
Sweden  has  a  medium  score  on  the  probability  of  receiving  help  for  Swedish  older  adults  with 
limitations living at home (that is to say, it is part of the third group of countries out of the five 
groups). Given Swedish public spending we might have expected a better score. However, we have to 
keep in mind that the use of residential care, which is not well represented in SHARE, is rather high in 
Sweden (see Table 4.1). Still our Swedish partner also expected a somewhat better score and suggests 
the following possible explanation: “The proportion of people that get help at home has during the 
1990s and until 2006-2007 decreased  in Sweden. These are the  years that the SHARE data were 
collected. Since 2008 the proportion of people getting home help started to increase. This can be an 
explanation for the lower than expected results for Sweden.”
21 Another possibility is that SHARE for 
some reason does not represent the Swedish situation concerning help very well. 
 
Figure 4.6 Relationship between the probability of receiving help in an LTC system and the use of 
informal care  
 
Sources: ANCIEN WP1 and WP7. 
 
4.5  Does the help meet the needs? 
The question in SHARE about getting help only asks whether there is any help (“...does anyone ever 
help you with these activities?”). There is a follow-up question about the degree to which this help is 
sufficient: 
“Would you say that the help you receive meets your needs?” (possible answers: 1. all the 
time, 2. usually, 3. sometimes or 4. hardly ever). 
As mentioned above, the answers to this question may be affected by the expectations that people have 
concerning LTC in different countries. Also, it may be that answers are influenced by gratitude and 
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social  desirability (e.g. answers on the sufficiency  of informal  care)  or that response styles  differ 
among persons with different characteristics (e.g. from different countries). Since vignettes are not 
available for this question, we cannot correct for differences in response style in this case. We just 
have to keep in mind these caveats in interpreting the results for the sufficiency of the help. 
Naturally  help  that  meets  the  needs  only  “sometimes”  or  even  “hardly  ever”  is  not  sufficient. 
Fortunately only 1% of the respondents state that the help meets the need “hardly ever”. For this 
question we want to analyse the difference among countries, in a comparable way to the question 
about  getting  help.  Apart  from  the  country,  the  explanatory  factors  are  again  socio-economic 
characteristics, household situation and limitations and health. In addition, we check whether the type 
of help that people receive also affects the sufficiency of the help. Since information about formal care 
use is not available for Poland, we only use information about the use of informal care.
22 We include 
two dummies: one for persons who receive informal help with personal care (either from inside or 
outside  the  household)  and  one  for  persons  who  receive  informal  practical  help  from  outside  the 
household (e.g. help with shopping, household chores or paperwork). For the correct interpretation of 
the results, we have to keep in mind that the question about the sufficiency of the help was answered 
by persons who have limitations (in mobility, iADL and/or ADL) and who receive some help (either 
formal or informal). Thus this group does not include persons without help and by using the dummies 
we  compare  the  effect  of  different  types  or  combinations  of  help.  For  example,  for  the  informal 
personal care dummy we compare persons who receive such care, either alone or in combination with 
other forms of care, with persons who receive no such care but are using any other form of care 
(informal practical help from outside or inside the household, formal help with personal care or with 
practical chores, either alone or in any combination). This means that the reference group is rather 
mixed, thereby making the results difficult to interpret.
23 Also, when persons receive informal help 
with personal care, this points to the existence of ADL limitations, so this explanatory variable is not 
independent from the ADL variables. It turns out that this variable has the highest correlation with 
having three or more ADL limitations, namely 0.42. The correlation with fewer ADL limitations is 
lower.  
We use an ordered logit model since the sufficiency of the help can take four logically ordered values. 
We present results for the most favourable response category: help meeting the needs all the time. The 
full estimation results are presented in the document with appendices (Appendices, chapter 1, Table 
A.2). Again, we start by discussing the impact of control variables and then go on to discuss the 
impact of the country of residence.  
4.5.1  Effect of control variables  
The marginal effects for Germany for the answer “help meets the needs all the time” can be found in 
Table 4.12. 
Much of the variation in the sufficiency of the help is unexplained, as the pseudo R2 is low. Important 
determinants are health, the household and family situation, the type of help received and the country 
of residence. The probability that the help is always sufficient is much larger for persons with children. 
The probability that the help is always sufficient is generally smaller for persons living alone and 
persons with more chronic disorders. Persons with depression see the help as less sufficient in all 
countries. It is not clear to which extent this assessment may be affected by the depression.  
 
                                                   
22 We particularly do not want Poland to drop out of the analysis, as it is one of our four selected representative 
countries. 
23 Unfortunately, the only way to improve this situation is to drop Poland from this analysis.  THE EXPERIENCE OF LTC USERS  37 
 
Table 4.12 Marginal effect of control variables on “help meets the needs all the time” in Germany 
  dy/dx  Std. Err. 
70-75  0.006  0.039 
75-80  0.049  0.036 
80-85  0.012  0.04 
>= 85  0.059  0.045 
Education middle  -0.02  0.031 
Education high  -0.008  0.053 
Standardised income  0.001  0.002 
Woman  -0.01  0.029 
Urbanisation  0.01  0.009 
Child(ren)  0.138**  0.058 
Intensive contact with child  0.025  0.03 
Living alone  -0.064*  0.033 
Grandchild(ren)  -0.028  0.047 
iADL at most  -0.007  0.033 
1 ADL at most  -0.01  0.042 
2 ADL at most  -0.046  0.052 
3 or more ADL at most  0.052  0.052 
Number of mobility lim.  -0.006  0.006 
Number of symptoms  -0.009  0.007 
Cognitive functioning  0.022  0.019 
Depression  -0.061**  0.028 
Number of chronic disorders  -0.019**  0.009 
Informal personal care  0.017  0.063 
Informal practical care from outside  -0.057**  0.027 
The symbols *, ** and *** mean that the difference is statistically significant at respectively the 10%, 5% and 
1% level. 
The impact of some of the factors differs among countries (see Table 4.13). In Germany, receiving 
informal help with personal care does not have a large impact on the help meeting the needs all the 
time, but it does have a significant positive impact in France, Austria, Greece, Poland and Spain. In 
these countries, people who receive informal help with personal care are on average more positive 
about the sufficiency of the help than people who do not receive this type of care. The information 
about limitations does not have a significant impact; possibly it is picked up to a large extent by the 
dummy for receiving personal care. Receiving informal practical care from outside the household has 
a negative impact on the help meeting the needs all the time. Possibly this help from outside the 
household is not always given at the time or with the frequency that the older person with limitations 
would prefer.  
The effect of income also differs among countries. In Austria and Spain persons with higher incomes 
have a smaller probability of the help meeting the needs all the time, while in Greece and Sweden the 
opposite holds. In most other countries income seems to have little impact. Our Spanish partners let us 
know that a higher income may have led to less public formal care in 2006, but this link is no longer 
present in the new Spanish LTC system.
24  
                                                   
24 Jiménez-Martín & Vilaplana Prieto (2012) state: “In 2006, each Autonomous Community awarded long-term 
care benefits using their own system of weights, according to which, they considered not only physical and 
cognitive limitations, but also age, dwelling conditions and income. Therefore, it could be that people with more 
economic resources would receive less public formal care, and consequently, they should rely on informal and 
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In Germany, the impact of cognitive functioning on the probability that the help is always sufficient is 
not very large. However, in Austria and France, persons with better cognitive functioning have a larger 
probability that the help always meets their needs. Cognitive functioning may be important to be able 
to organise the help. If this explanation is correct, it suggests that there are shortcomings in taking care 
of older people with cognitive problems. In Greece, on the other hand, worse cognitive functioning is 
associated with more sufficient help (see also Table 4.13 with marginal effects for different countries).  
Table 4.13 Marginal effects of control variables on “help meets the needs all the time” in different 
countries 
Country  Standardised income  Cognitive functioning  Informal personal care 
Austria  -0.007**  0.065***  0.294*** 
Belgium  0.001  0.011  -0.003 
Czech Republic  0  0.025  -0.071 
Denmark  -0.001  0.035  0.14 
France  0.002  0.077***  0.312*** 
Germany  0.001  0.022  0.017 
Greece  0.006  -0.067***  0.231*** 
Italy  0.002  0.041  0.15*** 
Netherlands  0.004*  -0.013  -0.12 
Poland  -0.003  -0.019  0.173*** 
Spain  -0.002**  0.014  0.17** 
Sweden  0.005*  0.03  -0.151 
Switzerland  0  -0.039  0.015 
4.5.2  Country effects 
Table 4.14 shows the differences among countries in the probability of the help meeting the needs all 
the time. In Switzerland and Italy this probability is significantly larger than in Germany. In Spain the 
probability is significantly smaller. The other countries are more or less comparable to Germany. 
Table 4.14 Countries ordered by the average marginal effect on the probability of “help meeting the 
needs all the time”, compared to Germany 
  dy/dx  Std. Err. 
Switzerland  0.16***  0.056 
Italy  0.132***  0.046 
Netherlands  0.068  0.056 
Belgium  0.042  0.039 
Czech republic  0.042  0.044 
Austria  0,028  0.044 
Denmark  0.008  0.049 
Germany  0  n.a. 
France  -0.034  0.047 
Sweden  -0.051  0.05 
Poland  -0.057  0.06 
Greece  -0.066  0.053 
Spain  -0.124*  0.065 
                                                                                                                                                               
private  formal  care  (www.imsersomayores.csic.es/documentos/documentos/libroblancodependencia/mtas-
libroblancocap05-01.pdf). However, we must clarify that with the new System of Autonomy and Attention to 
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Table 4.15 reports the pair-wise  comparison  of the  average  marginal  effects  of  living in  different 
countries. We can use this information to construct groups of countries with different probabilities of 
the help meeting the needs all the time in the same way as we did in section 4.4. Again, we start with 
the country with the highest probability of the help meeting the needs all the time. This is Switzerland. 
For two countries the differences with Switzerland are not significant: Italy and the Netherlands. The 
country  with the  next highest probability  of the  help meeting the  needs all the time  is the Czech 
Republic.  Many  remaining  countries  do  not  differ  significantly  from  the  Czech  Republic  in  this 
respect:  Belgium,  Austria,  Denmark,  Germany  and  France.  Sweden  is  the  country  with  the  next 
highest probability of the help meeting the needs all the time. The remaining countries, Poland, Greece 
and Spain, do not differ significantly from Sweden.  
This method produces the following groups: 
Group 1: Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands 
Group 2: Belgium, Czech Republic, Austria, Denmark, Germany, France 
Group 3: Sweden, Poland, Greece, Spain 
Table 4.15 Pair-wise comparison of average marginal effects of living in different countries on the 
probability of the help meeting the needs all the time 
Country  DE  AU  SE  NL  ES  IT  FR  DK  GR  CH  BE  CZ  PL 
DE    ns  ns  ns  --*  +***  ns  ns  ns  +***  ns  ns  ns 
AU      ns  ns  --**  +**  ns  ns  --*  +*  ns  ns  ns 
SE        +**  ns  +***  ns  ns  ns  +***  +**  +**  ns 
NL          --***  ns  --*  ns  --**  ns  ns  ns  --* 
ES            +***  ns  +**  ns  +***  +***  +***  ns 
IT              --***  --**  --***  ns  --**  --**  --*** 
FR                ns  ns  +***  +*  ns  ns 
DK                  ns  +**  ns  ns  ns 
GR                    +***  +**  +**  ns 
CH                      --**  --**  --*** 
BE                        ns  --* 
CZ                          --* 
PL                           
The symbols *, **, and *** mean that the difference is statistically significant at respectively the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Three  of  our  selected  countries  for  different  types  of  LTC  systems  end  up  in  different  groups 
concerning the probability of the help meeting the needs all the time. Poland and Spain, however, are 
in the same group concerning this aspect. Somewhat surprisingly, Sweden with its well-developed 
LTC system is also part of that group (together with Greece). As stated before, the question about the 
help  meeting  the  needs  has  a  more  subjective  character  than  the  question  about  receiving  help. 
Possibly disappointment about the changes in Swedish society had some impact on the answers of 
Swedish respondents. Our Swedish partner states: “The shifts towards a more market oriented society 
have for many people been a “traumatic” transformation, and especially for the age group that are 
included in the SHARE data. These are the people that were taking part and building our society 
during the “golden years”, expecting ageing with a welfare state providing care, and now they are 
experiencing  how  their  system  transforms  to  something  they  do  not  recognize,  a  matter  of 
disappointment.”
25 Another surprising aspect is that Italy is in the same group as the Netherlands for 
the probability of the help meeting the needs all the time. In WP1 we found that the Dutch system as a 
whole was much more attractive to older people in need of care. A possible explanation is that people 
are  happy  with  the  informal  care  that  plays  a  relatively  large  role  in  Italy  (especially  regarding 
informal personal care).  
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4.5.3  Country results and systems’ characteristics 
Just as we  did for the probability of receiving help, we try to  explain the probability of the  help 
meeting the needs all the time by the characteristics of LTC systems. The results are presented in 
Table 4.16. None of the system characteristics shows a significant relation to the probability of the 
help meeting the needs all the time in the different countries. The differences in the sufficiency of the 
help cannot be explained from what we know about the systems; in any case not with the limited 
number of observations that we have available. This part of the analysis is only relevant for persons 
with limitations who receive help. It may be that LTC systems are more of a determinant of receiving 
help or not, while the sufficiency of the help depends to a larger extent on more micro-level factors, 
such as the person who gives informal care or the quality of the specific home-care provider.  
Table 4.16 The AME of country of residence on the probability of the help meeting the needs all the 
time explained by country-specific characteristics 
System characteristic  Coefficient  p-value  Number obs.  R
2 
Income and needs corrected spending  0.369  0.374  11  0.09 
Share of private expenditures  -0.066  0.743  11  0.01 
Informal care use / Formal care use  -0.018  0.515  10  0.05 
Informal care use  -0.101  0.698  10  0.02 
Formal care use  0.244  0.429  10  0.08 
Support for informal caregivers  -0.018  0.292  11  0.12 
Importance of cash benefits  0.062  0.547  11  0.04 
Means-testing  -0.022  0.654  11  0.02 
Quality of coordination between LTC and other 
services  0.010  0.832  11  0.01 
Satisfaction about role informal care  0.003  0.835  7  0.01 
Satisfaction about role private funding  0.007  0.373  7  0.16 
Satisfaction about role of residential care  0.006  0.588  7  0.06 
Satisfaction about complexity of system  0.008  0.426  7  0.13 
 
4.6  Methodology and robustness checks 
4.6.1  Sample selection bias 
In the analysis we describe above, the probability of receiving help and the probability of that help 
meeting the needs are treated as independent phenomena. Yet it is possible that persons receiving help 
are  a  select  group  based  on  unobserved  variables.  Maybe  there  are  factors  unknown  to  us  that 
influence both the probability of receiving help and the probability of that help meeting the needs all 
the  time.  For  example,  if  someone  has  a  sunny  and  optimistic  character,  that  may  increase  the 
probability of receiving informal help. At the same time, such a person may be more likely to consider 
that the help meets the needs all the time. In that case, our estimation results might be biased. To check 
whether it is indeed acceptable to treat these two aspects independently, we estimate two variants via 
the Heckman model. The first variant is an ordered response model with sample selection (De Luca & 
Perotti, 2011). This model studies variables that are naturally ordered (in this case: the degree to which 
the help meets the needs) where the possibility of observation is determined by a binary selection 
mechanism (in this case: receiving help or not). This model can be used to estimate the correlation 
between the error terms in the selection equation and the equation of interest, and to check whether 
this correlation is significantly different from zero. This turns out not to be the case, indicating that it 
is  no problem to analyse the two  equations  independently. The  estimation results for the  ordered 
response  model  with  sample  selection  are  reported  in  the  companion  document  to  this  report THE EXPERIENCE OF LTC USERS  41 
 
containing statistical appendices (ENEPRI Research Report No 117A, Appendices, Chapter 1, Table 
A.3). 
Second, we estimate a probit model with sample selection, after having recoded the probability of the 
help meeting the needs in a binary variable. In this case the correlation between the error terms was 
also not significantly different from zero. Sample selection bias does not appear to be a problem in this 
analysis. 
4.6.2  Heterogeneity and outliers 
Poland, with its high disability level in SHARE and other sources, may be an outlier in the group of 13 
countries analysed in this chapter. To check whether the presence of Poland has a large impact, we did 
our estimates of section 4.4 and section 4.5 again with all countries except Poland. This turned out to 
have little impact on the results for other countries.  
4.6.3  Selection of explanatory variables 
SHARE includes some variables that objectively measure aspects of health, such as walking speed and 
the maximum grip strength of the hands. Since we want to correct for health and limitations as much 
as possible in our analysis, it would seem to be a good idea to use such information in addition to more 
subjective estimates that respondents make of their own health situation. However, walking speed has 
many missing observations.
26 As we want to study differences among countries, we cannot afford to 
lose that many observations. The variable ‘maximum grip strength’ has fewer missing observations, 
but these turn out to be selective. Persons with many limitations have a much larger probability of a 
missing observation for this variable. For these reasons, we decided not to use these two variables. 
4.6.4  Correlation among explanatory variables 
Since we use many explanatory variables concerning health status, limitations and care use in our 
analyses, it is advisable to check the correlation among these variables. We do not find any correlation 
coefficients that are so high that we have to worry. We do indeed find that the correlation among 
health variables themselves and with LTC use variables is higher than the correlation among the other 
variables, but it is in all cases well below 0.7.
27  
4.7  Life satisfaction 
In  the  previous  section,  we  study  whether  the  probability  that  a  person  receives  help  and  the 
probability that this help is appropriate differs between countries. These are the two properties of the 
LTC system of a country that we observe via the SHARE data. However, a national LTC system also 
has many other properties that we do not observe via the SHARE data. Think, for example, about the 
control of care recipients over their daily life, the dignity of the care recipient and the bureaucracy of 
the system. In this section, we study the life satisfaction of people to get an idea about how national 
LTC systems perform on these unobserved properties. The basic idea is that the difference in life 
satisfaction  between  people  for  which  the  LTC  system  is  relevant  and  other  people  is  smaller  in 
countries  with  better  (unobserved)  properties  of  the  LTC  system.  For  example,  suppose  that  the 
unobserved properties of the Danish LTC system are very good and that the unobserved properties of 
the Dutch system are very poor. In that case, the difference in life satisfaction between people for 
which the LTC system is relevant and other people is larger in the Netherlands than it is in Denmark 
(all other things being equal). 
                                                   
26 This variable has been recorded only for persons aged 75 years and older. 
27  The  highest  correlation  coefficient  is  found  between  non-health  variables:  having  a  child  and  having  a 
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Our approach is primarily driven by the available data. First, life satisfaction, our outcome measure, is 
a broad  measure that includes  many  other aspects of life than contentment  with the LTC system. 
Hence, it is not a perfect measure of the satisfaction of people with the unobserved properties of the 
LTC system even if we can compare the life satisfaction of persons with and without limitations in 
different countries while controlling for many relevant factors. It would be better if we would have a 
measure that specifically emphasises the impact of LTC on life satisfaction, like ‘social care-related 
quality of life’. Second, we have no data on LTC systems at the individual level except for the two 
properties of the LTC system that we use in the previous sections. For other properties, only data at the 
country level are available. This lack of data makes it inevitable to determine the effect of unobserved 
properties of LTC systems indirectly. Thus their values may be influenced by confounding factors that 
we have no information on (see below). 
Specification 
We estimate differences in the country-specific impact of the unobserved properties of LTC on life 
satisfaction via the following specification: 
    =   +      ∙      
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+    
Here,     is the  life satisfaction  of person i,      
  equals 1 if person i lives  in  country c and  0 
otherwise (there are C countries),      
  is 1 if person i has limitation m (there are M=12 different 
(i)ADL limitations),       equals 1 if person i has at least one (i)ADL limitation,      equals 1 if 
person i receives (formal or informal) help because of his ((i)ADL or mobility) limitation,     2  is 1 
if person i receives help because of his ((i)ADL or mobility) limitation and this help usually meets the 
needs,     3  equals 1 if person i receives help because of his ((i)ADL or mobility) limitation and 
this help sometimes or hardly ever meets the needs,   
  are the other control variables (there are V=28 
of these), and    is the error term. The other control variables measure, among other things, health 
status, demographic characteristics and social interactions. These variables might be correlated to both 
the life satisfaction and the variables of interest. By including these variables we prevent that the 
estimated relation between the  life satisfaction and  variables  of  interest  depends upon differences 
between persons in these aspects. 
In this specification,    measures the effect of country c on the life satisfaction of people without 
limitation,    measures  the  generic  effect  of  having  limitation  m  on  life  satisfaction,  and  the   ‘s 
measure the effect of the observed properties of the LTC system (help and the appropriateness of this 
help). Our main interest is the coefficient   . This coefficient measures the additional effect of having 
a limitation in country c on life satisfaction. Since we control for help and to what degree this help is 
appropriate, this additional  effect reflects the  other (unobserved) properties  of the LTC system in 
country c. Thus, we assume that the effect of receiving help of a certain type does not differ between 
countries:  national  differences  in  help  are  already  captured  by  the  variable  that  measures  the 
appropriateness of this help. 
We  test  whether  the    ’s  differ  significantly  between  countries.  If  they  do,  we  conclude  that  the 
unobserved  properties  of  the  national  LTC  systems  differ.  We  expect  that  the  total  effect  of  a 
limitation  on life satisfaction is negative  (   +    < 0). Moreover, we  expect that receiving help 
increases life satisfaction:    > 0,    +    > 0, and    +    > 0 (the effect of respectively help that 
always meets the needs, help that usually meets the needs, and help that sometimes or hardly ever 
meets the  needs is positive). However,  we  expect that help that  is  less appropriate  has a smaller 
positive effect (0 >    >   ). THE EXPERIENCE OF LTC USERS  43 
 
We stress that    measures the part of the difference in the life satisfaction of people with and without 
limitations that is not caused by our control variables. We claim that this part mostly reflects the 
unobserved properties of the LTC system. Although we include the most relevant control variables in 
our specification, the estimated    may cover factors that cause a difference in the life satisfaction of 
people with and without limitations, but that do not strictly relate to the LTC system (ideally, we 
would observe these factors and include them in our specification). We mitigate the potential impact 
of these factors by studying the differences between the   ’s (and not the level of the    ’s). If a 
relevant omitted factor exists and our estimate of    is too low or too high, then this is not a problem if 
all estimated   ’s differ in the same way from their real value (i.e., if the impact of the omitted factor 
is the same in all countries). However, the potential impact of possible omitted factors should be borne 
in  mind  when  we  interpret  our  results.  We  consider      an  imperfect  but  useful  measure  for  the 
unobserved properties of LTC systems. 
Unobserved characteristics could also influence our estimate of the effect of help. For example, it is 
quite likely that we do not fully control for health status. If the unobserved part of the health status is 
negatively correlated with receiving help, then the estimated effect of help is too small (as it also 
captures the negative effect of the unobserved bad health status on life satisfaction). However, if this 
would  be  the  case,  then  the  rank  of  the  estimated  coefficients  for  the  different  degrees  of 
appropriateness of help could still make sense. We will further elaborate on possible pitfalls of our 
methodology at the end of this section. 
4.7.1  Estimation: ordered probit with vignettes 
We  estimate  our  specification  via  ordered  probit  with  vignettes.  To  have  a  benchmark,  we  also 
estimate the specification via standard ordered probit and OLS. 
Ordered probit is appropriate since the SHARE respondents could only choose from a limited number 
of answers to express their life satisfaction. These alternative answers have a logical ordering (from 
‘very dissatisfied’ (=1) to ‘very satisfied’ (=5)). A standard ordered probit model assumes that there 
exists a latent continuous life satisfaction (   
∗) that depends on the characteristics of individuals (in 
this case there are Z different characteristics    
 ): 
   




+    
However, we do not observe the continuous life satisfaction    
∗. We only observe a discontinuous 
representation of it. What we observe is the answer a person gave in the survey (   ). This answer can 
take j different values. A standard ordered probit model states that we observe a particular answer if 
the value of the latent continuous variable is between certain threshold parameters: 
    =  																			     <    
∗ ≤	  																			  = 1,2,3,4,5 
where    = −∞	and	   = ∞. Hence, the probability that a person chooses j is the probability that the 
latent variable is between      and   . It is possible to estimate    and    to   . 
However, in our case a standard ordered probit estimation is probably not sufficient. It is quite likely 
that  surveyed  persons  differ  in  the  way  that  they  fill  in  questionnaires.  For  example,  it  is  not 
necessarily true that a reported value of 5 for life satisfaction means the same in all countries. Figure 
4.7 contains the reported life satisfaction of people in Denmark and in the Netherlands. Denmark and 
the Netherlands seem to be very comparable countries and you would expect that the life satisfaction 
in these two countries does not differ much. However, the figure shows that there are much more 
highly satisfied people in Denmark than there are in the Netherlands. It is possible that this difference 
does not reflect a difference in true life satisfaction, but a difference in reporting style. In terms of the 
ordered  probit  model  discussed  above:  Dutch  people  translate     
∗  differently  to       than  Danish 
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By using vignettes it is possible to distinguish the effect of true life satisfaction and the effect of 
reporting style on the observed life satisfaction (that is, the answer in the survey). We will only briefly 
discuss the intuition behind vignettes. For a more detailed discussion of vignettes see, for example, 
Tandon, Murray, Salomon & King (2003), King, Murray, Salomon & Tandon (2004) and Kapteyn, 
Smith & Van Soest (2007). The SHARE survey asks respondents two questions. The first question is: 
“How satisfied are you with your life in general?”. The second question is: “John is 63 years old. His 
wife died 2 years ago and he still spends a lot of time thinking about her. He has 4 children and 10 
grandchildren who visit him regularly. John can make ends meet but has no money for extras such as 
expensive gifts to his grandchildren. He has had to stop working recently due to heart problems. He 
gets tired easily. Otherwise, he has no serious health conditions. How satisfied with his life do you 
think John is?”. The second question is the same for all persons, so any difference in the answers 
should  only  be  caused  by  differences  in  the  reporting  style  of  respondents  (this  is  the  so-called 
‘vignette equivalence’ assumption). These differences in reporting style can then be used to scale the 
answers of people’s own assessment (this is the so-called ‘response consistency’ assumption: a person 
uses the same reporting style for both questions). The resulting scaled own assessments only differ 
between persons due to differences in true life satisfaction, not due to differences in reporting style. 
Figure 4.7 Life satisfaction in Denmark and the Netherlands (unweighted) 
 
Source: SHARE, wave 2. 
If we formally apply this intuition to the ordered probit model discussed above, one of the additions of 
vignettes  to  the  model  is  that  the  threshold  parameters     now  depend  on  the  characteristics  of 
individuals. Hence, the threshold parameters become individual specific. So we can estimate the effect 
of the characteristics of persons on both their life satisfaction and their threshold parameters. The 
former unravels the relation between characteristics and true life satisfaction, while the latter shows 
the relation between characteristics and reporting style.
28 As mentioned before, these paragraphs only 
cover  the  main  intuition  behind  vignettes.  For  a  more  elaborate  discussion  we  refer  to  the 
aforementioned references. For other applications of the vignette method, see e.g. Jones, Rice, Bago 
d’Uva & Balia (2007) and Angelini, Cavapozzi, Corazzini & Paccagnella (2011). The latter study uses 
SHARE data to evaluate differences in life satisfaction between countries. 
                                                   
28 Ideally,  we  would also correct the variables that measure  whether the received help meets the needs  for 
differences in reporting style as these variables contain a subjective judgment of respondents (see Section 3). 
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Finally,  we  mention  two  more  technical  points.  SHARE  contains  two  different  vignettes  for  life 
satisfaction and we use both for the estimations (see e.g. King, Murray, Salomon & Tandon, 2004). 
Moreover, we estimate all coefficients at once in the ordered probit model with vignettes. 
A  disadvantage  of  the  vignette  method  is  that  a relatively  small  part  of  the  SHARE  respondents 
answered  questions  from  the  part  of  the  survey  on  vignettes  (about  3,000  persons  in  total;  these 
persons  are  from  Germany,  Sweden,  the  Netherlands,  Spain,  Italy,  France,  Denmark,  Greece, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic and Poland). However, in the general part of the survey there is a very 
similar  question  on  life  satisfaction  that  about  14,000  persons  answered  (including  people  from 
Austria and Switzerland). We also estimate our specification for this larger group of respondents. For 
this  purpose,  we  use  the  estimated  relation  between  the  (estimated)  threshold  parameters  and  the 
characteristics  of  persons  from  the  smaller  vignette  sample  to  predict  person-specific  threshold 
parameters for persons in the large sample. We take the estimated coefficients for Germany as the 
country-specific  coefficients  for Austria and Switzerland to calculate the threshold parameters for 
residents of these countries. Subsequently, we explain the life satisfaction in the large sample with the 
help of these predicted threshold values (so in this case we do not estimate all coefficients at once). 
Again, we also report OLS and standard order probit estimation results as a benchmark.  
The question on life satisfaction in the general part of the survey is very similar to the question in the 
part on vignettes. The exact question is: “How satisfied are you with your life?”. Respondents could 
answer this question with any integer between 0 and 10. We convert these answers to a 1-to-5 scale (as 
the vignettes are answered on this scale). Although the questions are very similar, it is important that 
the  answers  of  the  same  respondents  to  these  two  questions  differ  substantially.  The  correlation 
between  the  answers  to  the  question  from  the  general  part  (measured  on  the  new  scale)  and  the 
answers to the question from the vignette part is only 0.55.  
4.7.2  Results 
Table C.1 in the document with appendices (Appendices, section 1.3) reports the main estimation 
results for the vignette sample (3,087 observations). The first five columns report the results for the 
ordered  probit  model  with  vignettes.  We  start  by  studying  the  patterns  in  the  reporting  style.  In 
columns 2 to 5, the characteristics explain the threshold parameters    to   . A positive sign of a 
characteristic’s  coefficient  implies  that  persons  with  a  higher  value  for  this  characteristic  have  a 
relatively high value for this particular threshold parameter. Hence, these persons report a given value 
of true life satisfaction as a relatively low value in the survey: you could say that they report relatively 
‘pessimistically’ (or that they have high standards). A negative sign means the opposite. Persons with 
relatively high values for a characteristic with a negative sign report relatively ‘optimistically’ (or have 
low standards). So, for example, living in the Netherlands without limitations has a positive coefficient 
across  all  threshold  parameters.  Thus,  Dutch  people  without  limitations  report  relatively 
‘pessimistically’ (compared to German people  without limitations, since Germany is the reference 
country).  Similarly,  living  in  Denmark  without  limitations  has  a  negative  impact  on  all  threshold 
parameters. Therefore, Danish people without limitations report relatively ‘optimistically’ (compared 
to Germans without limitations). These results seem to be in line with what Figure 4.7 suggests. The 
table also shows that across the majority of the threshold parameters people without limitations in 
Sweden, Spain, Italy, France, Greece, and Belgium tend to report relatively pessimistically (compared 
to Germans). Other characteristics also have a significant impact on the threshold parameters. For 
example, persons with a high education and persons with children report relatively pessimistically. For 
some of these other characteristics there seems to be a straightforward explanation. The table shows, 
for example, that depressed people report relatively pessimistically (i.e. they have high standards).  
Next  we  discuss  the  relation  between  life  satisfaction  and  characteristics,  taking  into  account 
differences in the reporting style of respondents. The first column of Table C.1 reports these results. 
We first discuss the effect of living without limitations in a certain country. The first column of Table 
4.17 ranks the coefficients from high to low, indicating which countries have the most positive effect 
on life satisfaction and which countries the least. People without limitations are more satisfied with 46  RIEMER FABER & ESTHER MOT WITH THE COOPERATION OF ALI AOURAGH 
 
life in the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Denmark and Spain than they are in Germany. And people 
without  limitations  are  less  satisfied  with  life  in  Greece,  the  Czech  Republic,  Poland,  Italy  and 
Belgium. These results are very similar to the results of Angelini, Cavapozzi, Corazzini & Paccagnella 
(2011).  
Second, we discuss our main interest, the coefficients that measure the additional effect of having a 
limitation in country c (γ ). If this additional effect differs significantly between countries, then the 
unobserved properties of the national LTC systems differ. The estimated coefficients are ranked from 
high  to  low  in  the  second  column  of  Table  4.17.  Highly  ranked  countries  have  relatively  good 
unobserved properties of the LTC system. The table shows that Poland, Belgium, Greece, Denmark, 
and Germany have relatively good unobserved properties of the LTC system, while the Netherlands, 
Spain,  France,  Italy,  Sweden,  and  the  Czech  Republic  have  relatively  unfavourable  unobserved 
properties of the LTC system.  
Table 4.17 Ranking of estimated country-specific coefficients (for the vignette sample) 
Ranking of life satisfaction of people without 
limitation (  ) 
Ranking of additional country-specific effect of 
having a limitation (  ) 
Netherlands  Poland 
France  Belgium 
Sweden  Greece 
Denmark  Denmark 
Spain  Germany 
Germany  Czech Republic 
Belgium  Sweden 
Italy  Italy 
Poland  France 
Czech Republic  Spain 
Greece  Netherlands 
 
Table  4.18  contains  for  each  country  pair  a  test  whether  the  difference  between  the  countries  is 
statistically  significant.  It  turns  out  that  for  most  country  pairs  there  is  no  significant  difference 
between the unobserved properties of the LTC system. Hence, we do not find much evidence for 
differences between countries. There is one exception though, the unobserved characteristics of the 
Polish LTC system are better than those of the German, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, French and Czech 
system.
29 One possible explanation for this finding is that the Polish system uses a lot of informal care 
and  that  elderly  with  limitations  appreciate  this  type  of  care  (although  there  may  also  exist 
disadvantages of a heavy use of informal care, like the quality of care and the burden on informal care 
providers). Another possible explanation is that in Poland there is a higher prevalence of limitations 
than in other countries (see section 4.3). It is possible that Polish people tend to report limitations soon 
(e.g. due to the phrasing of the question in the Polish survey or tax advantages). However, people that 
quickly report limitations do not have as much reason to be dissatisfied with their life as people with 
serious limitations and therefore the reported difference in life satisfaction between people with and 
without limitations may be relatively small. As a result, the unobserved properties of the LTC system 
may  look  good.  We  will  come  back  to  both  possible  explanations  later  on  in  this  section.  All 
estimation results that we present in this section do not change much if we exclude Poland. Hence, our 
conclusions do not depend on the inclusion of Poland in the sample.  
                                                   
29 Other studies find similar results. Smoczyńska (2010a, 2010b) shows that the quality of life of Polish people 
with limitations does not significantly differ from the quality of life of Polish people without limitations (except 
for people with higher levels of disability and people suffering from multiple diseases).  THE EXPERIENCE OF LTC USERS  47 
 
Table 4.18 Difference between the unobserved properties of the LTC system (i.e., the additional 
country-specific effect of having a limitation) for each pair of countries (for the vignette 
sample) 
  DE  SE  NL  ES  IT  FR  DK  GR  BE  CZ  PL 
DE                       
SE  -                     
NL  -  -                   
ES  -  -  +                 
IT  -  -  +  +               
FR  -  -  +  +  -             
DK  +  +  +  +  +  +           
GR  +  +  +  +  +  +  +         
BE  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +       
CZ  -  +  +  +  +  +  -  -  -     
PL  +*  +  +*  +*  +**  +*  +  +  +  +*   
A ‘+’ (‘-’) means that the country in the row has better (worse) unobserved properties of the LTC system than 
the  country  in  the  column  (γ   row  −  γ   column).  The  symbols  *,  **  and  ***  mean  that  the  difference  is 
statistically significant at respectively the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. 
We use the same methodology as in the previous section to summarise Table 4.18. There exist two 
groups of countries: 
Group 1: Poland, Belgium, Greece, Denmark, Sweden 
Group 2: Germany, the Czech Republic, Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands 
Third, we discuss the effect of having an (i)ADL limitation on life satisfaction. We calculate for each 
limitation the total country-specific effect (   +   ). This number reflects how the life satisfaction of 
a person from country c changes if the person has limitation m instead of no limitation. The results are 
not reported to save space, but are available on request (although the main message is already clear 
from Table C.1). For none of the limitations there is a significant effect on life satisfaction for the 
majority of the countries. People that indicate to have problems with bathing and showering have a 
significantly lower life satisfaction in four countries. Other limitations are at most significant for one 
country. A test for the joint significance of the coefficients that measure the generic effect of having a 
limitation (the   ’s) strongly rejects the null hypothesis that all these coefficients equal 0. 
Fourth,  we  discuss  the  effect  of  the  observed  properties  of  the  LTC  system:  help  and  its 
appropriateness.  Although  the  effect  of  help  is  never  statistically  significant,  the  coefficients  do 
provide some useful information. Table C.1 shows that the effect of help that always meets the needs 
of the recipient (  ) is positive. Moreover, it shows that the effect of help that usually meets the needs 
of the recipient is smaller. And that the effect of help that sometimes or hardly ever meets the needs of 
the recipient is smaller than both of these (0 >    >   ). However, the total effect of help that usually 
meets the needs and the total effect of help that sometimes or hardly ever meets the needs is negative 
(   +    < 0  and     +    < 0),  although  both  are  not  significant.  As  discussed  before,  this  is 
probably the case because we do not perfectly control for health status. Most likely, people with more 
serious health problems get help sooner. Therefore, the coefficient for help may be biased downward 
because it partly captures the effect of these health problems on life satisfaction.  
Finally, we discuss the effect of the control variables. Table C.1 reports that having more medical 
symptoms,  being  depressed,  and  living  alone  significantly  decrease  individuals’  life  satisfaction. 
Moreover,  we  find  that  a  good  cognitive  functioning,  a  high  income,  having  children,  being  a 
volunteer, providing care, and being actively involved in a church or political organisation increase 
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The standard ordered probit and OLS estimation results are reported in respectively column VI and 
VII of Table C.1. First, the table shows that the OLS and standard ordered probit methods produce 
similar  results.  Most  coefficients  have  the  same  sign  and  the  coefficients  that  differ  statistically 
significant from 0 are almost the same. Second, if we compare the OLS and standard ordered probit 
results to the results of the ordered probit with vignettes (column I), then we see that these do not 
differ too much. Often coefficients have the same sign and more or less the same coefficients are 
significant. There are some notable differences, however. For example, people without limitations that 
live in Denmark have a significant higher life satisfaction according to the OLS and standard ordered 
probit methods. However, if we take into account that Danish people report life satisfaction relatively 
optimistically,  this  significant  effect  disappears.  Similarly,  we  see  that  living  in  the  Netherlands 
without limitations does not significantly impact life satisfaction according to the OLS and ordered 
probit estimates. Nevertheless, we do see that it significantly impacts life satisfaction if we correct for 
the pessimistic reporting style of Dutch people. However, for most characteristics the three methods 
point in the same direction.  
4.7.3  Results for the large sample 
Table C.2 in the document with appendices (Appendices, section 1.3) presents the estimation results 
for the large sample (14,093 persons). Remember that the dependent variable is still life satisfaction, 
but that the source is another question from the survey and that the answers to this question differ 
substantially from the answers that the same respondents gave to the question we used previously. 
Column  I  of  Table  C.2  reports  the  estimation  results  for  ordered  probit  with  vignettes.  The  used 
threshold parameters are based on the coefficients reported in Table C.1. First, we discuss the effect of 
a country on life satisfaction. Similarly to Table 4.17, the first column of Table 4.19 ranks the country-
specific coefficients that measure the effect of living without limitations in a certain country on life 
satisfaction  (the    ’s).  The  table  shows  that  people  without  limitations  are,  in  comparison  with 
Germany, more satisfied with life in Switzerland, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, 
Austria,  and  Spain.  People  without  limitations  are  less  satisfied  with  life  in  Poland,  the  Czech 
Republic, Greece, and Belgium. These results do not differ a lot from the results for the vignette 
sample that we present in the first column of Table 4.17. 
Table 4.19 Ranking of estimated country-specific coefficients (for the large sample) 
Ranking of life satisfaction of people without 
limitation (  ) 
Ranking of additional country-specific effect of 
having a limitation (  ) 
Switzerland  France 
Sweden  Poland 
France  Belgium 
Netherlands  Greece 
Denmark  Denmark 
Italy  Sweden 
Austria  Netherlands 
Spain  Spain 
Germany  Switzerland 
Belgium  Italy 
Greece  Germany 
Czech Republic  Austria 
Poland  Czech Republic 
 
Next, we discuss the coefficients that measure the additional effect of having a limitation in a certain 
country (i.e., the coefficients that reflect the unobserved properties of the LTC system). We rank the 
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and Greece have relatively good unobserved properties of the LTC system. The unobserved properties 
of  the  LTC  system  in  the  Czech  Republic,  Austria,  Germany,  Italy,  Switzerland,  Spain,  and  the 
Netherlands are relatively unfavourable. Most countries end up in the same part of the list as in the list 
based on the vignette sample, but there are exceptions (France, the Netherlands and Spain score better, 
Germany and the Czech Republic score worse). Poland, Belgium, Greece, and Denmark are on top of 
both lists. To see whether the differences between countries are statistically significant, Table 4.20 
contains for each pair of countries a test on equality of the coefficients. In contradiction to the vignette 
sample, there are many significant differences in case of the large sample (remember that this estimate 
uses  more  than  four  times  as  many  observations).  The  unobserved  properties  of  the  French  LTC 
system are significantly better than those of all other national systems. Poland performs significantly 
better  than  all  other  countries  except  France  and  Belgium.  Belgium  scores  better  than  all  other 
countries except France, Poland and Greece. Greece performs better than all other countries except 
France, Poland, Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland. And Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and 
Denmark  perform  significantly  better  than  the  Czech  Republic.  These  differences  result  in  the 
following five groups of countries: 
Group 1: France 
Group 2: Poland, Belgium 
Group 3: Greece, Denmark, Switzerland 
Group 4: Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Germany, Austria  
Group 5: the Czech Republic 
 
The  estimated  effects  of  (i)ADL  limitations  on  life  satisfaction  seem  more  plausible  than  in  the 
estimation that uses the vignette sample. The total country-specific effect of a limitation (   +   ) is 
for all limitations for most countries negative (again, results are not reported to save space). For five 
limitations the negative total effects are statistically significant for at least eight countries. These five 
limitations are: problems with dressing, problems with walking across a room or getting in and out of 
bed, problems with bathing or showering, problems with using the toilet, problems with preparing a 
hot meal, and problems with shopping for groceries. The limitations with a significant negative impact 
include all ADL limitations, except problems with eating. 
Table 4.20 Difference between the unobserved properties of the LTC system (i.e., the additional 
country-specific effect of having a limitation) for each pair of countries (for the large 
sample) 
  AT  DE  SE  NL  ES  IT  FR  DK  GR  CH  BE  CZ  PL 
AT                           
DE  +                         
SE  +  +                       
NL  +  +  -                     
ES  +  +  -  -                   
IT  +  +  -  -  -                 
FR  +***  +***  +***  +***  +***  +***               
DK  +  +  +  +  +  +  -***             
GR  +***  +**  +*  +*  +*  +**  -***  +           
CH  +  +  -  -  -  +  -***  -  -         
BE  +***  +***  +***  +***  +***  +***  -***  +**  +  +**       
CZ  -  -  -*  -*  -*  -*  -***  -*  -***  -  -***     
PL  +***  +***  +***  +***  +***  +***  -***  +***  +*  +**  +  +***   
A ‘+’ (‘-’) means that the country in the row has better (worse) unobserved properties of the LTC system than the country in 
the  column  (γ   row  −  γ   column).  The  symbols  *,  **,  and  ***  mean  that  the  difference  is  statistically  significant  at 
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The  interpretation  of  the  effects  of  the  observed  properties  of  the  LTC  system  (help  and  its 
appropriateness) does not change in comparison with the interpretation of the results obtained via the 
vignette sample, although the effects are now significant. There is a significant positive effect of help 
that always meets the needs (  ). Help that usually meets the needs and help that sometimes or hardly 
ever meets the needs have a significantly smaller effect (0 >    >   ). The total effect of these two 
latter types of help remains negative (and this is also statistically significant). 
We also find similar results for the control variables with the large sample. A person’s life satisfaction 
decreases significantly in case that person has many mobility limitations, has at least one medical 
symptom, has many medical symptoms, has a depression, suffers from cancer, or lives alone. We find 
that a person has a higher life satisfaction if that person has a good cognitive functioning, has an age 
between 80 and 85 years, has an age of 85 years or more, has an average level education, has a high 
level education, has a high income, is a woman, lives in a large town, has children, is a volunteer, 
provides care to others, or is actively involved in a church or political organisation. 
Columns II and III of Table C.2 present the  estimation results in case  we use OLS and standard 
ordered probit. Again, OLS and standard ordered probit produce similar results as ordered probit with 
vignettes. Also the interpretation in Tables 4.19 and 4.20 is similar if we use these estimation results.  
4.7.4  Explaining the unobserved properties of the LTC systems 
Next, we relate the estimated properties of the LTC systems that were unobserved in our specifications 
above to a few properties of the national LTC systems on which we have data via ANCIEN. Hence, 
we explain the additional country-specific effect of having a limitation (that we estimated via SHARE 
micro-data)  by  country-specific  macro-data  from  another  source.  This  exercise  helps  to  better 
understand the ranking of the unobserved properties of the LTC systems. In section 4.4, we provide 
information about the available macro-data.  
Since we have a very limited number of observations (namely, the number of countries), we regress 
the  additional  country-specific  effect  of  having  a  limitation  (  )  separately  on  each  country 
characteristic and a constant. An alternative approach could be to include the country-level variables 
directly in the previous (person-level) specifications (i.e., assign the same value of the variable to all 
persons  with  a  limitation  in  a  specific  country).  However,  in  that  case  it  would  not  be  possible 
anymore  to  estimate  the  country-specific  effect  of  having  a  limitation  (due  to  perfect 
multicollinearity). Therefore, we choose a similar two-step estimation procedure as Angrist & Pischke 
(2009, p. 313) describe. 
Table 4.21 reports the main estimation results. We focus on the   ’s that follows from the ordered 
probit with vignettes estimation method. Columns I-III report the results if we use the    from the 
vignette sample (Table C.1, column I). The first column contains the estimated coefficient, the second 
column the R
2 of the regression, and the third column the number of observations. Columns IV-VI 
contain the same results, but for the estimated   	from the large sample (Table C.2, column I). Due to 
the  low  number  of  observations,  a  significance  level  of  10%  seems  sufficient.  However,  at  this 
significance level there does not exist a significant relation between    and any of the country-specific 
variables (not for the vignette sample and not for the large sample). Also scatter plots do not reveal a 
clear relation. Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 show the relation between    (large sample) and the public 
expenditures on LTC, the number of informal care recipients divided by the number of formal care 
recipients, and the value of cash benefits. There does not seem to be a relation between the public 
expenditures and the unobserved properties  of the systems.  Above,  we  mention the  heavy use of 
informal care as one possible reason for the high ranking of the unobserved properties of the Polish 
system.  However,  the  right  panel  of  Figure  4.8  does  not  show  a  positive  relation  between  the 
unobserved properties of the LTC systems and the number of informal care recipients divided by the 
number of formal care recipients (although we do not have an observation of the latter variable for 
Poland). Figure 4.9 seems to show a negative relation, but with so few observations available we have 
to be careful (e.g. taking out France impacts the plot substantially). THE EXPERIENCE OF LTC USERS  51 
 
Table 4.21 The unobserved properties of the LTC system (according to the ordered probit with 
vignettes method) explained by country-specific characteristics 
    (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI) 
       from vignette sample     from large sample 
    Coef.  R   Obs.  Coef.  R   Obs. 
Income and needs corrected 
spending    -1.644 
(1.396)  0.148  10  0.165 
(2.109)  0.001  11 
Share of private expenditures    0.061 
(0.756)  0.001  10  0.779 
(0.976)  0.066  11 
Informal care use / Formal 
care use    0.009 
(0.070)  0.002  9  -0.061 
(0.138)  0.024  10 
Support for informal 
caregivers    -0.046 
(0.060)  0.069  10  0.116 
(0.077)  0.201  11 
Importance of cash benefits    -0.480 
(0.339)  0.201  10  -0.419 
(0.494)  0.074  11 
Means-tested access to 
publicly financed formal 
institutional care /  home-
based care 
  0.124 
(0.178)  0.057  10  0.047 
(0.250)  0.004  11 
Quality of coordination 
between LTC and other 
services 
  0.092 
(0.180)  0.031  10  -0.073 
(0.231)  0.011  11 
Satisfaction about role 
informal care    -0.098 
(0.055)  0.390  7  0.106 
(0.089)  0.221  7 
Satisfaction about role 
private funding    -0.049 
(0.042)  0.218  7  -0.032 
(0.066)  0.046  7 
Satisfaction about role 
residential funding    -0.084 
(0.053)  0.332  7  0.017 
(0.093)  0.007  7 
Satisfaction about 
complexity of system    -0.077 
(0.046)  0.356  7  -0.019 
(0.082)  0.010  7 
In this table, the symbols 
#, *, **, and *** indicate that a variable is significant at respectively the 10%, 5%, 1%, 
and 0.1% level (there are no significant variables in this table). 
All in all, the properties of the LTC systems that we observe via other sources cannot well explain the 
properties  of  the  LTC  systems  that  are  unobserved  via  the  SHARE  data.  The  differences  in  the 
unobserved properties of the LTC systems that we find have to be explained by other aspect of the 
LTC systems like, for example, the control of people with limitations over their daily life and their 
dignity. 
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Figure 4.8 Relation between the unobserved properties of the LTC system and (left panel) the public 
expenditures on LTC and (right panel) the number of informal care recipients divided by 
the number of formal care recipients 
 
Figure 4.9 Relation between the unobserved properties of the LTC system and the value of cash 
benefits (measured in thousands of euros) 
 
4.7.5  Discussion 
In this subsection, we discuss limitations and pitfalls of our analysis. As mentioned before, the main 
limitations of the analysis are due to a lack of data. First, we use general life satisfaction as a measure 
of users’ contentment with the LTC system as we have no information on ‘social care related quality 
of life’. Second, an analysis that uses explicit measures for (parts of) the unobserved properties of the 
LTC systems would be more straightforward. 
When we interpret our results, there are at least two possible pitfalls. First, it is possible that the 
unobserved properties of the LTC system affect the life satisfaction of both people that are involved in 
the LTC system and other people. It could be that both people with and without limitations are more 
satisfied with life  in countries  with good unobserved properties of the LTC system. For example, 
because  people  without  limitations  know  that  good  LTC  is  available  if  necessary  or  because  it 
increases the  life satisfaction  of people  without limitations that others get good LTC. This would 
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of the unobserved properties  of the LTC system  is  underestimated. It is also possible that people 
without limitations are less satisfied in countries with good unobserved properties of the LTC system. 
For example, because people without limitations largely pay for these unobserved properties (it is 
likely  that  persons  with  limitations  pay  fewer  taxes).  Hence,  in  this  case  the  difference  in  life 
satisfaction  between  people  with  and  without  limitations  is  relatively  small  and  it  seems  that  the 
unobserved properties of the LTC system are good, while it is just an expensive system.  
A second possible pitfall is that the difference in life satisfaction between persons for which the LTC 
system  is  relevant  and  other  people  differs  between  countries  because  of  other  reasons  than  the 
unobserved properties of the LTC system (i.e., the missing relevant control variables do not have the 
same impact in each country). We include the most relevant control variables in our specification, but 
we cannot exclude that there exist other relevant factors that we do not include. For example, it could 
be that the respect of society for limited people differs between countries. Another possible example is 
that some countries could have easy access to public transportation that mostly benefits people with 
limitations. In this case, our estimate of the unobserved properties of the LTC system also captures 
other differences between countries. 
4.8  Conclusion 
In this chapter we evaluate the effect of different national LTC systems on the experience of actual 
and potential LTC users. We use information on three aspects of the LTC experience as included in 
the internationally comparable SHARE database: receiving help, the sufficiency of the help and life 
satisfaction of persons with and without limitations. In analysing life satisfaction, we use vignettes to 
correct for differences in response style. An important caveat to keep in mind is that SHARE only 
includes older persons living at home. Not only do  we  miss  information  on the  quality of life  in 
institutions,  we also  have to  consider that groups  of older people  living at home are  not  directly 
comparable across countries because countries differ in the rate of institutionalisation.  
In Table 4.22 we present the results for the three different aspects. For the probability of receiving 
help and the probability of the help meeting the needs all the time, we consider the average marginal 
effect of living in a certain country as the most informative measure. It represents the impact that 
living in a country has after correction for the usual socio-economic variables, household situation, 
limitations and health. We take the additional country-specific effect of having a limitation (γ
c) from 
the estimates based on the large sample as the indicator for the unobserved properties of the LTC 
system. 
Table 4.22 The experience of LTC users and ranking of countries 













Austria  -0.112  6  0.028  6  -0.403  12 
Belgium  -0.094  3  0.042  5  0.230  3 
Czech Republic  -0.06  2  0.042  4  -0.506  13 
Denmark  -0.153  7  0.008  7  -0.185  5 
France  -0.175  9  -0.034  9  0.694  1 
Germany  0  1  0  8  -0.275  11 
Greece  -0.334  12  -0.066  12  0.047  4 
Italy  -0.303  10  0.132  2  -0.239  10 
Netherlands  -0.096  4  0.068  3  -0.206  7 
Poland  -0.374  13  -0.057  11  0.270  2 
Spain  -0.311  11  -0.124  13  -0.207  8 
Sweden  -0.154  8  -0.051  10  -0.199  6 
Switzerland  -0.109  5  0.160  1  -0.227  9 
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Table 4.22 shows how the countries rank on the three aspects. Ranking the countries is an accessible 
way of presenting the results, but we have to keep in mind that differences between countries can be 
small and non-significant. 
Table  4.23  takes  this  consideration  into  account.  This  table  presents  the  groups  of  significantly 
differing countries that we constructed in the sections above. The ordering of the groups is translated 
into a description of the relative position of a country. For example, for the probability of the help 
meeting the needs all the time, we distinguished three groups of countries. The sufficiency of the help 
in these three groups is indicated as high, medium and low.  
Table 4.23 Relative experience of LTC users for groups of countries  
Country name  Level of help  Level of sufficiency  Unobserved properties 
Austria  medium high  medium   medium low 
Belgium  medium high  medium   medium high 
Czech Republic  medium high  medium   low 
Denmark  medium   medium   medium  
France  medium   medium   high 
Germany  high  medium   medium low 
Greece  medium low  low  medium  
Italy  medium low  high  medium low 
Netherlands  medium high  high  medium low 
Poland  low  low  medium high 
Spain  medium low  low  medium low 
Sweden  medium   low  medium low 
Switzerland  medium high  high  medium  
Number of groups  5  3  5 
 
The two tables show that many countries score  high on some aspects and not so high  on  others. 
Germany, for example, scores very high on persons with limitations getting help, but the scores for the 
help  meeting  the  needs  and  the  unobserved  properties  of  the  LTC  system  are  much  lower.  The 
Netherlands scores  high  on the sufficiency  of the  help, but the results are  mediocre for the  other 
aspects. Poland scores low on all aspects except the unobserved properties of the LTC system, where it 
scores medium high. It is important to note that Poland has a high number of people with a limitation 
and this may impact our results. Spain scores low or medium-low on all aspects. However, we have to 
keep in mind that reforms may have improved Spain’s score since the data were collected in 2006-
2007  (before  the  reform).  Switzerland,  Belgium  and  France  score  consistently  high  on  all  three 
aspects. 
These three indicators for the LTC-related quality of life are meant to be one of the aspects in the 
overall system evaluation, together with criteria such as equity, the burden of LTC and quality of care 
(see chapter 7). Therefore, we would like to have some comparable quantitative indicators for the 
three  aspects,  and  ideally  also  for  the  overall  experience  of  LTC  users  on  the  three  aspects.  We 
construct comparable quantitative indicators by calculating standardised scores from the results for the 
AMEs and γ
c in Table 4.22. Following that, we calculate both a weighted and an unweighted average 
of  these  three  standardised  scores  (see  Table  4.24).  The  methodological  soundness  of  simply 
combining these three aspects in one indicator is debatable. However, since we think that all three 
aspects are an indicator for the quality of life of LTC users and we want to pay attention to this quality 
of life in the overall evaluation, we proceed despite possible problems. After calculating the average 
standardised scores, we again standardise the result. The weighted average is calculated with a weight 
of  0.5  for  the  score  on  the  probability  of  receiving  help,  a  weight  of  0.25  for  the  score  on  the 
probability  of the  help  meeting the  needs all the time and a  weight  of 0.25 for the score  on the 
unobserved properties of the LTC system. This choice was made to emphasize that the results for the THE EXPERIENCE OF LTC USERS  55 
 
probability  of receiving  help  may  well be the  most  reliable and robust of the three. The answers 
concerning the probability of the help meeting the needs all the time may be affected by gratitude, 
social desirability and different response styles and may be less indicative of the system as a whole, 
while  the  results  on  the  unobserved  properties  are  the  end  product  of  a  complex  decomposition 
exercise where we cannot be sure that all necessary controls are included.  
Table 4.24 shows that the ranking of countries differs in a limited way between the simple and the 
weighted average. Belgium and Switzerland show the best overall score for LTC experience in both 
weighting schemes. France, Germany and the Netherlands follow directly behind, but their ordering 
depends on the weights. Poland, Greece and Spain score lowest with both sets of weights. The Czech 
Republic,  Italy,  Denmark,  Austria  and  Sweden  score  somewhat  in  the  middle,  where  the  exact 
ordering again depends on the chosen weights.  
Table 4.24 Standardised average of standardised scores for three quality of life indicators, ordered by 
score 
Country   Simple average  Country   Weighted average 
Belgium  1.36  Belgium  1.20 
Switzerland  1.31  Switzerland  1.12 
France  1.22  Germany  1.00 
Netherlands  0.68  France  0.81 
Germany  0.52  Netherlands  0.75 
Czech Republic  0.06  Czech Republic  0.47 
Italy  -0.02  Austria  0.14 
Denmark  -0.09  Denmark  0.02 
Austria  -0.14  Sweden  -0.33 
Sweden  -0.61  Italy  -0.49 
Poland  -0.94  Poland  -1.36 
Greece  -1.24  Greece  -1.42 
Spain  -2.10  Spain  -1.91 
 
Table 4.25 reports standardised scores that are calculated in the same way as in Table 4.24, but in this 
case only for four selected representative countries are taken into account. Both for the unweighted 
and the weighted average of the three quality of life aspects, the Netherlands scores highest, followed 
by Germany, Poland and Spain. However, based on the weighted average, the difference between the 
Netherlands and Germany is very small, so it would be reasonable to say that both countries share the 
first place in this case.  
Table 4.25 Standardised average of standardised scores for three aspects of quality of life, 
only for the four selected representative countries 
Country   Simple average  Weighted average 
Germany  0.493  0.807 
Netherlands  0.851  0.815 
Spain  -1.423  -1.241 
Poland  0.079  -0.381 
 
Our conclusion, mostly based on Table 4.23 that shows significant differences among countries, is as 
follows. Concerning receiving help with their limitations, older persons living at home are best off in 
Germany out of the 13 countries in our sample. Given that help is available, the sufficiency of the help 
is  best  ensured  in  Switzerland,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands.  The  unobserved  properties  of  the  LTC 
system are most favourable in France. An older person who considers all three aspects important, 56  RIEMER FABER & ESTHER MOT WITH THE COOPERATION OF ALI AOURAGH 
 
might  be  best  off  living  in  Belgium  or  Switzerland  (see  Table  4.24).  Out  of  the  four  selected 
representative countries, the Netherlands is the most attractive one if all three aspects are considered 
equally  important  (see  Table  4.25).  The  least  attractive  countries  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
experience of LTC-users are Spain, Greece and Poland.  
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5.  Analysis of equity 
Adelina Comas-Herrera (LSE) 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter seeks to  evaluate the potential performance in terms  of  equity  of the long-term care 
systems of Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain by assessing whether key features of these 
long-term care systems promote or hinder equity. As explained in chapter 1, these four countries were 
chosen  as  representative  of  the  four  different  long-term  care  system  clusters  identified  in  Work 
Package 1 of the ANCIEN project (see Kraus, Riedel, Mot, Willemé, Rohrling & Czypionka, 2010).  
Cluster 1, to which Germany belongs, consists of countries in which a low level of public spending is 
combined with a modest share of private spending, high informal care use and high informal care 
support. The Netherlands belongs to a cluster of Northern European countries characterized by high 
public LTC spending, low private spending, low informal care use and high informal care support. 
Spain and the other countries of cluster 3 share the profile of cluster 1 with regard to informal care use 
and support, but have a much higher level of private responsibility and a somewhat higher level of 
public spending. Poland  is allocated to cluster 4, which  is  characterized by a small public sector 
involvement, more private spending, high informal care provision but few supportive measures for 
informal caregivers. 
The chapter starts with a brief discussion of the concept of equity in relation to long-term care. It then 
looks at how  key features  of long-term care systems perform  in terms  equity, by reviewing both 
theoretical and empirical literature. The likely implications of the presence and relative importance of 
such features for the equity of a care system are explored.  
Finally, the chapter discusses how the long-term care systems of Germany, the Netherlands, Poland 
and  Spain  are  expected  to  perform  in  terms  of  different  aspects  of  equity,  using  macro-level 
information obtained from the country reports prepared as part of the ANCIEN project, as well as 
information from other sources, to assess the degree to which different features are present and their 
likely impacts.  
5.2  Equity and long-term care systems 
Equity  is  a  widely  accepted  objective  of  public  long-term  care  systems  and,  more  generally,  the 
welfare state system. Of course equity is not the only consideration and, as discussed in Wittenberg, 
Sandhu & Knapp (2002), Glendinning, Davies, Pickard & Comas-Herrera (2004), Wanless (2006) and 
Fernández, Forder, Truckeschitz, Rokosova & McDaid (2009), it needs to be considered alongside 
other performance criteria, such as the criteria discussed in chapter 2. 
The  relative  importance  of  these  multiple  objectives  will  vary  dependent  on  the  national  context, 
which will be affected by values, traditions, economic and political circumstances, etc. It is important 
to consider that these objectives may often contradict each other. Crucially, the pursuit of full equity 
may be both unaffordable and inefficient. 
Equity  objectives  generally  stress  the  importance  of  a  fair  distribution  of  resources  and  burdens 
(Österle,  2002),  and  equality  (see,  for  example,  Culyer,  2001).  It  is  a  multifaceted  concept.  This 
chapter focuses  on two  key concepts: Horizontal equity, which requires the  like treatment of  like 
individuals  and  Vertical  equity,  which  requires  the  unlike  treatment  of  unlike  individuals,  in 
proportion  to  the  differences  between  them  (Knapp,  1984;  Culyer,  2001;  Wittenberg,  Sandhu  & 
Knapp, 2002). These two concepts are used to interrogate how different features of care systems will 
affect the performance of the systems in terms of vertical and horizontal equity. Applying these two 
concepts to the different features that form the system separately may well result in some aspects of 
the system performing very differently in terms of equity. Also, while some features of a system may 
perform very well under, for example, horizontal equity, it is very possible that they do not perform so 
well in terms of vertical equity or vice-versa.  ANALYSIS OF EQUITY  59 
 
The equal treatment of like individuals and unequal treatment of unlike individuals with regards long-
term care is normally assessed with reference to the needs of individuals and their resources. Equity is 
affected both by the ways in which revenues are raised and by how those resources are allocated. With 
regards  the  way  resources  are  raised  the  main  focus  is  on  ability  to  pay,  whereas  for  resource 
allocation, equity considerations arise both in terms of individual resources (including the ability to 
pay
30) and the levels of need. 
Another  important  consideration,  particularly  when  discussing  revenue-raising,  is  how  the  system 
performs in terms of intergenerational equity: that is, striking a fair balance between the current and 
future generations (see for example, Colombo et al., 2011). A key aspect of intergenerational equity is 
which generation or generations are bearing the costs of care. In a funded system (where funds for care 
are accumulated before they are needed), care is paid for by the generation who uses it. In a pay-as-
you-go system, much of the care of older people is paid by younger generations of working age. There 
are concerns that pay-as-you-go schemes may exacerbate imbalances between the generations. The 
concerns arise where there are substantial differences in the relative size of the populations and where 
different generations have experienced different economic opportunities.  
In this chapter the long-term care systems are analysed in terms of the equity implications of the way 
in which revenue is raised and the way resources are allocated. The focus is on the horizontal and 
vertical  equity  implications  of  revenue  raising  and  resource  allocation  mechanisms,  which  are 
considered separately for each country. Intergenerational equity will not be discussed. 
5.3  Equity and revenue-raising 
According to Van Doorslaer & Wagstaff (1992, p. 389), in healthcare systems it is broadly accepted 
that care should be financed according to the ability to pay but delivered according to need. This 
principle is not as broadly accepted (at least in practice) in long-term care, in the sense that in many 
countries the long-term care system is not financed in a way that is consistent with this principle (see 
for example, Colombo et al., 2011). 
With regards revenue raising, horizontal equity would require that individuals with the same resources 
pay the same amount of money into a long-term care scheme. Vertical equity is concerned with the 
extent to which the funds are raised in a way that is progressive (well-off people pay proportionally 
more), proportional (everyone pays an equal proportion of their resources), or regressive (well-off 
people pay proportionally less). The more progressive the system, the better its performance in terms 
of vertical equity. 
The bullet points below illustrate some of the key financing-related mechanisms that are likely to 
affect equity with regards revenue-raising: 
  Horizontal equity (those with equal resources pay the same) 
o  Degree of risk pooling (in the public and private sector): affects the extent to which disabled 
people  pay  more  for  long-term  care  than  non-disabled  people  with  the  same  income  and 
assets. 
o  Degree of geographical variation. 
o  Diagnostic/sector inequity (health vs. social care). 
  Vertical equity: 
o  With regards revenue-raising, it is affected by the relative weight of main sources of funds and 
assessment of their progressivity: taxation (direct vs. indirect, income vs. capital, national vs. 
local), social insurance, private funding (insurance, private savings…), and informal care.  
                                                   
30 Although ability to pay may seem mostly as a revenue raising issue, in countries with a safety-net type of 
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Care in any country is normally financed by a combination of revenue-raising mechanisms that have 
very different properties in terms of risk-pooling and redistribution. The relative importance of the 
different  mechanisms  (and  their  progressivity),  will  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  overall  equity 
performance of a system. For example, the role of private income and assets in financing long-term 
care is very different in systems where these are used as the sole or main source of finance, compared 
with systems where income and assets have a relatively small role as part of co-payments paid only by 
the better off. 
When  looking  at  revenue-raising  mechanisms  in  terms  of  equity,  the  key  considerations  are  the 
amount of risk-pooling, the degree of coverage and the amount of redistribution involved. 
5.3.1  Informal care 
Informal care is the most important source of long-term care resources globally. Therefore, even if it 
does  not  involve  a  monetary  transaction,  it  needs  to  be  considered  as  a  form  of  long-term  care 
“revenue-raising”, in kind. 
Horizontal equity 
People who need long-term care can only receive informal care as long as there are other people who 
are  willing  and  able  to  provide  it.  While  informal  care  may  involve  some  risk-pooling  and 
redistribution  within  a  family  or  other  close  network,  it  does  not  involve  much  risk-pooling  or 
redistribution outside this group. The relationship between need for care and receipt of informal care is 
entirely dependent on the availability of potential carers, which means that people with more need for 
care may receive less informal care compared to others who are “richer” in resources (in this case 
potential carers). Therefore, informal care does not perform highly in terms of horizontal equity.  
Vertical equity 
The costs of providing informal care are mostly born by those who provide it, although care recipients 
may experience indirect costs too, for example as a result of feeling that they are a burden to their 
carers. International evidence (Colombo et al., 2011) shows that people who provide informal care are 
most likely to be women, less likely to work or more likely to work less hours and face an increase in 
the risk of poverty. It is also important to consider that informal carers of working age who withdraw 
from the labour market or who reduce their working hours will be affected financially, both in the 
present and in the future (as a result of possible difficulties returning to the labour market, smaller 
pension entitlements, etc.).  
In terms of vertical equity, informal care is potentially regressive as a form of financing long-term care 
as people with lower incomes tend to provide more informal care and so contribute proportionally 
more to the system (even if it is in-kind).  
Therefore,  systems  that  rely  more  on  informal  care,  particularly  where  this  is  a  result  of  lack  of 
availability or affordability of formal care, can be considered less equitable than those where publicly-
funded formal care is more available. 
The relative importance of the role of informal care as a source of LTC in-kind resource in different 
countries is difficult to quantify. Ideally, as well as looking at the volume, we would also consider the 
economic costs  of  informal care  in the  different countries. An  important consideration  is  whether 
informal care is provided through choice, complementing available formal care, or whether informal 
care is provided because formal care is either not available or unaffordable.  
5.3.2  Private income, savings and assets 
The equity implications of financing care via private income or assets depend very much on their role 
in the system. First, they may be the only source of funds for formal care as a result of the absence of 
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income and assets are above a certain threshold and as a result are excluded from the public system, 
third, they may be used to top-up insufficient publicly funded care or, fourth, they can play a relatively 
small role as an income or asset dependent co-payment for care organised by the public system.  
Like informal care, the financing of LTC with private income and assets involves no risk-pooling or 
redistribution. As discussed in Wittenberg, Sandhu & Knapp (2002) and Holdenrieder (2006), private 
income and savings as the main source of finance do not perform well in terms of equity.  
Even where there is a publicly funded/organised system, in most countries a substantial amount of care 
is purchased outside the publicly organised care system, directly from care providers in the private 
(and sometimes “grey  economy”) sector. It is very  difficult to obtain reliable  estimates  of private 
expenditure in  directly purchased care, as this  information is not routinely  collected by statistical 
offices. The best source of information for this are likely to be surveys, but then it is often difficult to 
disentangle  from  surveys  who  pays  for  care  (although  efforts  are  being  made  to  improve  data 
collection in this area, see King et al., 2010). 
Where private financial contributions to care are not mediated by an insurance mechanism that shares 
the risk between the population, or where only a very small part of the risk is covered by the public 
sector or partial insurance, not only will people who need care have to pay more than those who do not 
need care, but there will be people whose entire income and assets may be spent paying for care. 
While many people will not require any care (and a result will not face any expenditure), those who do 
need  care  may  be  faced  with  very  high  costs,  particularly  if  they  suffer  from  conditions  that  are 
severely  disabling  but  have  little  effect  on  length  of  life  (such  as  dementia).  Estimates  of  the 
distribution of expected life time costs of care at age 65 from England by Fernandez & Forder (2011) 
have shown that, while about one-third of people aged 65 will face virtually no care costs at all, a 
small percentage of people can incur huge costs (15% will face costs of over £100,000 and 5% over 
200,000),  which  can  be  deemed  “catastrophic”  as  they  can  easily  wipe  out  a  persons’  entire  life 
savings and assets. 
Two more key considerations are whether the means tests cover only income, or whether they also 
include assets (which may be in the form of housing) and whether the financial liability is limited to 
the persons needing care or whether their children may be liable too. 
Horizontal equity 
Private income and assets, particularly where they are the sole or main mechanism used to meet the 
costs of care are an inequitable way of funding care from a horizontal equity perspective. A key reason 
for this is that there is no risk-pooling, so those who need care will pay more towards it than those who 
do not need care. Also, in a system that relies on individual or family-based income and savings as the 
main source of finance, those with higher levels of income and or savings will be able to obtain more 
and better (formal) care than those with less financial resources, given similar care needs. 
Vertical equity 
Given  the  same  level  of  need,  especially  in  the  absence  of  public  funding  or  insurance,  or  very 
carefully designed co-payment mechanisms, those with low incomes will use a higher proportion of 
their incomes and assets to pay for long-term care, than those with high incomes. Therefore, from a 
vertical equity point of view, private income and assets can be a regressive way of funding LTC. 
5.3.3  Private insurance 
Horizontal equity 
Private insurance involves risk-pooling and as a result there is an element of redistribution of risk 
between  those  who  are  insured.  Therefore,  it  performs  better  in  terms  of  horizontal  equity  than 
informal  care  and  private  income  and  savings  (Barr,  2010).  However,  unless  private  insurance  is 
compulsory (which would necessitate mechanisms to subsidise those who cannot afford the premiums 62  ADELINA COMAS-HERRERA 
 
at market prices, as discussed in Wittenberg et al., 2002), by leaving outside the system those without 
enough resources to purchase insurance, it is still not very horizontally equitable. 
It is also relevant to  note that women  have a  much higher risk  of  needing long-term care and  in 
principle would need to pay higher premiums than men. At the same time, women on average earn 
less than men over their lifetime, potentially making insurance premiums even less affordable for them 
(Holdenrieder, 2006). In March 2011, an EU court ruling dictated that men and women should be 
charged the same levels of premiums. 
Typically private insurance premiums are set according to the risk profile of the purchaser, rather than 
according  to  their  income  and  assets.  Therefore,  as  Holdenrieder  (2006,  p.  142)  points  out,  it  is 
possible  that  “two  individuals  with  the  same  income  and  capital  may  have  to  pay  different 
contributions”. 
Vertical equity 
Unless there is an element of redistribution (which could be enforced through a legal requirement), 
insurance premiums will vary according to the risk profile of the purchasers, which is likely to result 
in those who are better off paying lower premiums (Barr, 2010). Even if the risk profiles of those who 
are less-well  off  where the same as those  who are better off, it would still be the case that, as a 
proportion of their income and wealth, poorer people will pay a higher proportion of their income in 
premiums, making this a regressive form of financing.  
5.3.4  Social insurance 
Horizontal equity 
In principle, as in the case  of  compulsory private  insurance, social  insurance  has the potential to 
provide good horizontal equity, depending on how resources are allocated and on whether the entire 
population is covered. 
Vertical equity 
Analysis of the redistributive effects of healthcare financing has shown that health social insurance 
schemes do not necessarily contribute to vertical equity in funding terms (van Doorslaer et al., 1999 
and Mossialos & Dixon, 2002). There are various features of social insurance systems that will result 
in poor vertical equity. The first is that contributions are generally proportional to employment income 
and disregard income from other sources (such as capital gains, rents, see, for example, Rothgang, 
2011). Those additional sources of income are more prevalent among wealthier people. The second 
feature is that in some countries very wealthy people are allowed to opt out of the system and buy 
alternative  insurance.  In  Germany,  for  example,  different  groups  of  people  (self-employed,  civil 
servants, those with high levels of income) can opt out of long-term care social insurance scheme and 
take,  instead, compulsory private  insurance (Rothgang, 2011). It is likely that most  of the people 
taking  up  private  insurance  pay  lower  contributions  and  present  lower  risk  of  needing  care.  This 
increases  vertical  inequity.  Third,  there  are  often  maximum  ceilings  to  contributions  (as  in  the 
Netherlands, for example), which means that the very wealthy will pay a smaller proportion of their 
income compared to other people. 
5.3.5  Taxation 
Horizontal equity 
In principle, as in the case of compulsory private insurance, social insurance and taxation have the 
potential to perform well in terms of horizontal equity, depending on how resources are allocated. 
Where taxes are set at local level, however, there is potential for geographical inequities if people 
living in different areas pay different levels of taxation.  ANALYSIS OF EQUITY  63 
 
Vertical equity 
Different types of taxes have different vertical equity implications. Personal income taxes are normally 
progressive and redistribute income between the rich and the poor (see, for example, Verbist, 2004). 
There are usually higher tax rates for those with higher incomes, which means that better off people 
contribute a higher proportion of their income than people who are less affluent. Indirect taxes are 
often regressive as they are likely to affect disproportionally less well-off people (see, for example, 
Glennerster, 2003).  
The relative importance of different sources of taxation will determine the degree to which funding 
care via taxes performs in terms of vertical equity.  
5.4  Equity and resource allocation 
Once the resources have been raised, equity will also be affected by the mechanisms that are used to 
allocate the resources.  
With regards resource allocation, it is useful to distinguish between equity of outcomes, equity in 
levels and mix of services relative to needs, and equity of access. As with the discussion of equity in 
revenue-raising, equity in resource allocation can also be considered in terms of whether the system 
promotes  horizontal  and  vertical  equity.  Equity  may  be  measured  both  in  relation  to  care  needs 
(comparing how the systems treat those with similar/different care needs), and means (income, assets, 
availability of informal care).  
Resource  allocation  mechanisms  that  promote  equity  will  ensure  that  individuals  with  equal 
needs/means enjoy similar outcomes/services/access, and that individuals in greater need experience 
bigger improvements in their outcomes (which is likely to require better access and more services). 
While financial resources, are, at least in principle, relatively easy to measure, different care systems 
(and  sometimes  different  regions/localities)  will  define  ‘need’  differently,  but  typically  this  will 
include the impacts of physical and mental health status on the ability to perform activities of daily 
living (ADLs), such as washing, feeding and eating and, in some settings, on the ability to undertake 
instrumental activities  (IADLs)  including  light  housework, shopping or preparing  meals. Different 
assessment tools will measure needs in different ways, and there is concern that the tools used in some 
countries do not capture adequately the needs of older people with dementia and other mental health 
problems. There are, of  course,  many  other aspects of  need, such as need in relation to financial 
situation  or  due  to  lack  of  potential  informal  carers  (Österle,  2002),  which  may  or  may  not  be 
considered in different systems.  
Equity of outcomes 
The long-term care system’s ultimate goal is to improve people’s well-being, compensating for needs 
arising from ill-health and disability on both the person in need of care and those involved in the 
process  of  caregiving  (including  informal  carers).  Ideally  LTC  systems  would  ensure  equity  of 
outcomes. From a horizontal equity perspective this would involve achieving equal outcomes for equal 
levels of need and wealth.  
Measuring  outcomes  in  long-term  care  is  difficult,  although  important  efforts  are  being  made  to 
develop  measures  of  social  care  outcomes  (see  Netten  et  al.,  2012).  As  a  result  of  the  lack  of 
information on long-term care outcomes in most countries, in practice, long-term care is more often 
quantified in terms of the “intermediate outputs” (Knapp, 1984), and equity is more often evaluated in 
terms of equity of access and equity in levels and mix of services (Österle, 2002). 
Equity of access 
Access to care can be defined in different ways. For clarity, the definition of ‘access’ used here is in 
line with that used by Culyer (2001, p. 280), in terms of gaining admission to the system. In terms of 64  ADELINA COMAS-HERRERA 
 
long-term care access to the system  would  normally imply  having an assessment  of  needs and/or 
resources. 
In practice, this would be measured by looking at the extent to which people with the same level of 
needs (and resources) are able to access the system  in the same  way (horizontal  equity).  Vertical 
equity  would  be  concerned  with  whether  people  with  higher  levels  of  need  (or  lower  levels  of 
resources) are able to access the system more easily.  
Access matters, in terms of equity, because as discussed by Culyer & Wagstaff (1993), equal access 
may contribute to better equity of outcomes, and Hurley (2000, cited in Allin, Hernández-Quevedo & 
Masseria, 2009), argues that equal access matters because of the ethical notion of “equal opportunity”.  
There are various ways in which the care system may restrict access: costs, waiting lists, complexity, 
stigma, etc. Le Grand (1982) and Mooney (1983) define costs of access in terms of the money and 
time costs incurred in obtaining access. These costs may be incurred through out-of-pocket payments, 
transport  costs,  or  the  opportunity  costs  of  time  spent  travelling  and  waiting  (Van  Doorslaer  & 
Wagstaff, 1992).  
Waiting lists are a common mechanism that limits access to the care system. It can also be argued that 
making the system complex and difficult to navigate can make system harder to enter for people with 
fewer resources. Stigma, concern about quality of care or lack of awareness of care entitlements may 
also deter people from accessing care. 
Care systems have different access rules. The key aspect is who is entitled to publicly funded care. In 
universal systems access to the publicly funded care system is determined by need, whereas in other 
countries people with financial or informal care resources are excluded from the public care system. 
Another key consideration is that in some countries there are clear national entitlement rules, whereas 
in  others  access  to  care  is  determined  according  to  local  or  regional  rules  (resulting  in  potential 
geographical inequities), whereas in other countries access to care is on the basis of individual-level 
assessments (usually following national guidelines). 
Systems where the entitlement to care is based exclusively on need and do not restrict access to care 
according to ability to pay, availability of informal care or geography are more likely to guarantee 
horizontal equity, as those with the same level of need have, in principle, the same access to care. 
Where  access  is  determined  by  national  eligibility  criteria,  those  individuals  with  substantial  care 
needs but who fall just below the entry level, are excluded from the system. From a vertical equity 
point of view this “cliff edge” results in the system performing less well. 
Equity in levels and mix of services relative to needs 
Horizontal  equity  would require that people  with the same levels  of  need  would  obtain the same 
packages of care or size of benefits. Vertical equity would require that those with the highest levels of 
need receive proportionally higher value of benefits (or services).  
The  key  policy  aspects  to  consider  when  attempting  to  evaluate  equity  in  the  levels  and  mix  of 
services relative to need include:  
-  Whether benefits or packages of care are allocated using national algorithms that match size of 
benefits to pre-defined levels of need, or according to professional assessments 
-  The extent of geographical variation 
-  The way in which need is defined: does it take sufficient account of harder to measure needs such 
as those of people with dementia? 
While individual needs based assessments may raise concerns about local variations and potential for 
horizontal  inequity  (different  levels  of  care  for  the  same  level  of  need)  compared  to  national 
algorithms, from a vertical equity point of view, individual-level needs assessments have the potential 
to  perform  better  in  terms  of  allocating  resources  in  proportion  to  the  severity  of  need.  National 
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less care than those  who fall in the step  just above  (see Glendinning, Davies, Pickard & Comas-
Herrera, 2004, for a discussion). 
5.5  TheLTC systems of Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland from an 
equity point of view 
With regard to revenue raising, the relative importance of the difference sources of funds, given the 
different performance the different sources in terms of equity, is a major determinant of the overall 
equity of the system. 
With the data currently available it is not feasible to quantify the economic value of informal care in a 
comparable way across the four countries and to compare how much the system relies on it compared 
to the monetary sources. 
It is important to acknowledge that estimates of the size of private payments at national level are not 
very reliable as this information is rarely collected systematically. This is particularly important with 
regards private payments used to fund the care of people who are not considered eligible to the public 
care system. In the case of Poland there were no estimates available. 
Table 5.1 Revenue-raising: Percentage of people providing informal care and percentage of total LTC 
expenditure by source 
  Germany
a   Netherlands




e  5%  2%  7%  4% 
Social insurance  57  68  57*  10 
Taxation  10  24  43*  50 
Private payments   31  9  n.a.  31 
Private insurance  2  negligible  negligible  (0.3) 
a Source: Rothgang, 2011. 
b Source: Schut and Van den Berg, 2011. 
c Source: Golinowska, 2010. 
d Source: Gutierrez et al., 2009. 
e Pickard, 2012. 
*Note: as a percentage of public expenditure only, see country section for sources. 
**Prevalence of provision of informal personal care to older people by people aged 50 and over (percentages). 
Pickard (2012). 
5.5.1  Germany 
This section relies to a great extent on a description of the LTC system in Germany prepared by 
Schulz (2010) as part of the ANCIEN project. It is complemented with information from Rothgang 
(2011) and other sources. 
The German long-term care system’s main feature is a social long-term care insurance system (LTCI), 
established in 1995. The LTCI system covers almost the entire population. At the time of introduction 
of the system, members of the public health insurance system became members of the public LTCI 
system, and those who had private health insurance were obliged to buy private, mandatory LTCI 
(providing the same benefit packages).  
It is important to highlight that the LTCI system does not cover all expenses generated due to the need 
for long-term care. All insurance benefits are capped and there is no coverage for people whose levels 
of need are below the national needs-test. 
 
 66  ADELINA COMAS-HERRERA 
 
5.5.1.1  Revenue raising 
How LTC funds are raised in Germany 
There  are  two  main  sources  of  information  about  the  relative  importance  of  different  sources  of 
funding for long-term care in Germany. Table 5.2 shows estimates based on the information available 
from  the  System  of  Health  Accounts  (SHA).  Table  5.3  is  based  on  information  available  from 
Rothgang (2011), excluding informal care. The two sources use different definitions, which inevitably 
result in slightly different estimates. Broadly, they suggest that about 10% of LTC expenditure  is 
funded  with  resources  raised  through  taxation,  about  30%  by  private  payments  (which  include 
voluntary insurance benefits) and about 60% is raised by compulsory insurance (of which just under 
2% relates to private compulsory insurance). 
Table 5.2 Raising funds for LTC in Germany (1): System of Health Accounts 
Source of funding  % of all LTC spending 
Public authorities (taxation)  10.0 
Statutory health insurance  8.1 
Statutory LTC insurance  51.9 
Statutory injury insurance  0.7 
Total statutory insurance  60.7 
Private compulsory insurance  1.9 
Employers  2.2 
Private households  25.1 
Source:  Own  calculations,  based  on  data  from  the  Federal  Statistical  Office  of  Germany,  National  Health 
Accounts 2008 provided by E. Schulz (personal communication). 
Table 5.3 Raising funds for LTC in Germany (2) 
Source of funding  % of all spending  % of public/compulsory spending 
Social insurance  56.8  82.6 
Private mandatory LTCI  1.7   2.5 
Social Assistance  8.3   12.1 
Welfare for war victims  1.9   2.7 
Out-of-pocket payments*  31.3    
*Estimated by Rothgang (2011, p. 89). 
Informal care 
The German system relies on informal care to a considerable extent (Schulz, 2010). According to 
analysis of the 2007 Eurobarometer survey data carried out as part of the ANCIEN project by Pickard 
(2011, p. 13) 14.5% of people aged 15 or more in Germany provide informal help to others who need 
it with one or Activities of Daily Living (ADL) which is higher than the ANCIEN countries average of 
12%).  
The German LTC system  includes some  important features to  offer social protection for informal 
carers so that they have levels of social protection comparable to those enjoyed by people in the labour 
market. This helps mitigate some of the negative impact of caring, for example, in terms of forgone 
pensions  contributions.  Reducing  the  social  protection  opportunity  costs  of  caring  can  result  in  a 
reduction of some of the inequity inherent to informal care as a form of LTC financing. 
Private income and wealth 
As benefits are capped, private co-payments are a substantial source of finance in the system (in the 
region of 25 to 30% of funding). Also, people whose LTC needs are not high enough to be covered by ANALYSIS OF EQUITY  67 
 
the LTCI system have to meet the entirety of the costs. Schulz (2010) reports that in 2008 there were 
approximately 100,000 people  employed  outside the long-term care system as “privately  financed 
home-helpers”. 
Means-tested social assistance is available to help those who cannot afford the costs of care that are 
not covered by the LTCI benefits. It is important to note that the means test for social assistance also 
takes account of the income of the adult children of the potential beneficiary. 
Social insurance 
Van  Doorslaer  et  al.  (1999)  analysed  in  detail  the  financing  of  healthcare  in  various  European 
countries. Their work concluded that the way funds are raised for the German health social insurance 
system is regressive, as a result of mostly three key elements: 
-  The exclusion of income other than that from work and work-related pensions (this means that 
people  with  substantial  income  from  sources  such  as  assets  and  investments  pay  a  lower 
proportion of their income than those with only work income) 
-  The existence of a contribution ceiling 
-  The  fact  that  people  with  very  high  incomes  are  able  to  opt-out  and  participate  in  a  private 
insurance scheme with a better risk profile than that of the public system, and where the premiums 
are based on risk rather than income (see, for example, Zuchandke, Reddemann & Drummaker, 
2012).As these elements are also present in the long-term care insurance system, it is reasonable to 
assume that their presence will also result in the system being regressive  
 
 
Box 5.1 Contributing to the public LTCI 
The LTCI social insurance system is funded by means of salary deduction of income-based insurance 
contributions. The contribution rate is set by law (set at 1.95% of income since July 2008, shared 
equally, 0.975% between employers and employees), additionally members aged 23 and older without 
children have to pay a surcharge of 0.25%). There is a wage ceiling of €3,600 per month in 2008. 
Retirees have to pay the full contribution rate themselves. 
Dependent children and spouses, whose monthly income does not exceed the contribution threshold, 
are insured without  contributions as part of  family insurance. There is comprehensive risk-pooling 
among the long-term care insurance providers. 
In 2007 around 70 million people were insured in the statutory LTCI. 
Employees who have earned more than €4,012.50 on average per month in the last three years can opt 
for private health and long-term care insurance. Private, mandatory LTCI involves at least the same 
benefits  as  the  public  LTCI,  there  is  no  health  screening  and  children  must  be  insured  without 
contributions. The premiums are not based on the income of the insured person, but on the age of the 
person when the contract was taken out. They are the same for men and for women.  In 2007 9.4 
million people had LTCI with a private insurance fund. 
The costs of LTC not covered by LTCI funds have to be paid by the care users. Beneficiaries in nursing 
homes have to pay the ‘hotel costs’ (room and board) themselves (on average €580). Additionally, in 
some  Lander  beneficiaries  in  nursing  homes  have  to  pay  the  investment  costs  of  building  and 
modernizing care facilities (an estimated €347 per month on average in 2007). Where they do not have 
enough means they can apply for means-tested social assistance. 
The Länder have responsibility for financing investments in premises for LTC services. Some finance 
nursing home investment directly whereas others do this by subsidizing nursing home residents who 
rely or would otherwise rely on social assistance. 
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Private LTC insurance in lieu of social insurance  
Private  insurance  LTC  in  lieu  of  social  insurance  covers,  according  to  Arntz  (2009),  9%  of  the 
population. It represents just under 2% of the total expenditure in LTC. The impact of this system on 
the overall equity of the compulsory LTCI system has been discussed in the section above. This is a 
funded scheme, whereas social insurance is purely pays-as-you-go. 
Premiums are paid according to risk (mostly based on age), rather than according to income. There is 
no exclusion on the basis of health history and existing condition and the premium is independent of 
gender and health status. The premium should not exceed the contribution assessment ceiling of the 
social insurance system and the benefits must be at least equivalent to the social insurance system 
benefits (Zuchandke, Reddemann & Drummaker, 2012). 
Tax funding 
According to Rothgang (2011), about 30% of residents in care homes are in receipt of social assistance 
to help meet the costs of their care. He estimates that this represents 8% of the total expenditure in 
LTC. This element of funding contributes to the vertical equity of the system as funding is obtained 
from taxation (which is highly progressive in Germany; see Verbist, 2004). 
Länder are also required to pay for the investments costs of care homes (Schulz, 2010). 
Complementary insurance  
According to Zuchandke, Reddemann & Drummaker (2012), 1.3 million people owned a voluntary 
additional insurance contract in 2008 (2.2% of all public and private LTCI members), to obtain cover 
for  the  costs  of  care  that  are  not  covered  by  the  social  insurance  system.  The  market  for 
complementary LTC insurance in Germany is expected to grow. 
5.5.1.2  Resource allocation 
Equity of access 
Entitlement
31 to benefits is on the basis of need alone and irrespective of age, income, wealth or the 
availability  of  informal  carers.  Individuals  who  are  insured  in  Germany  yet  living  in  another  EU 
country are entitled to cash benefits alone. 
In terms of equity of access, the German social insurance system has the potential to be very equitable 
in terms of horizontal equity. National eligibility criteria (see Box 5.2) ensure that, in principle, those 
with equal needs have the same access to care.  
An important equity of access concern, however, is that the system does not cover at all those with 
levels of need lower than the entitlement threshold (Rothgang, 2011) and access to care for people 
outside the system will be determined by their levels of social support and wealth. It is estimated that 
in 2006 (Scheekloth & Leven, cited in Schulz, 2010) about 3 million people needed care at level 0 
(defined as persons needing care but not receiving benefits from LTC insurance funds). 
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Equity in levels and mix of services relative to needs 
In Germany, in principle, everyone within the same assessed needs category would have access to the 
same care or benefit.
32 The system has been criticised for making it difficult to give enough resources 
to people with more complex needs (for example, dementia). There have been various reforms to 
improve the allocation of services to people with complex needs that have gradually addressed these 
concerns. It is planned that, in the future, the criterion for assessing the need for care will not be the 
time needed to provide care, but rather the degree of independence in performing activities and in 
coming to terms with aspects of everyday life or in care settings. 
In common with other care systems where care is allocated on the basis of algorithms that assign 
packages of care to different care needs groups, while this way of allocating resources performs well 
in terms of horizontal equity and gives certainty to potential care users, it does not perform as well in 
                                                   
32 In practice it is likely that there is some element of variation. Schulz (2010) also points out that the assessor 
may deviate from assessment tool if necessary. 
Box 5.2 Assessment of needs and entitlement in Germany 
In  legal  terms  the  “need  for  long-term  care”  is  defined  as:  individuals  who,  due  to  a  physical, 
psychological or mental disease or handicap, require a significant or major amount of help to carry out 
the daily and recurring activities of everyday life over a prolonged period of time, most likely for a 
minimum period of six months. The entitlement is based help is needed to perform at least two basic 
activities of daily living (ADL) and one additional instrumental activity of daily living (IADL). There 
are  three  levels  of  severity,  according  to  frequency  of  assistance  and  how  long  it  takes  a  non-
professional caregiver to help the dependent person. 
-Care level I: People needing assistance with personal hygiene, feeding or mobility for at least two 
activities from one or more areas at least once a day, and who additionally need help in the household 
several times a week for at least 90 minutes a day with 45 minutes attributable to basic care. 
-Care level II: People who need assistance in at least two ADLs at least three times a day at various 
times and additional help in IADLs several times a week for at least three hours a day, with two hours 
attributable to basic care. 
-Care level III: People who need assistance in at least two ADLs around the clock and additional help 
in an IADL several times a week for at least five hours per day, with four hours attributable to basic 
care. 
-Hardship cases: People at care level III and in particular individuals who need assistance in ADLs for 
at least seven hours a day with at least two hours during the night, or who need basic care than can only 
be provided by several individuals together (at the same time). 
The assessment of needs is carried out by the Medical Advisory Service of LTCI Funds. Assessments 
are done primarily by nurses and physicians who observe both the home and social environment of the 
person  in  need  of  care.  They  assess  the  person’s  health  and  functional  status  following  national 
standards and detailed guidelines. The assessment is mostly based on ADLs and IADLs, but recent 
special criteria have been added for people whose competence in coping with everyday life is impaired. 
While  the  assessment  does  not  consider  income  and  assets,  it  does  take  into  account  the  family 
situation and home environment, including an assessment of the “stresses in caring and the stress-
bearing capacity”. 
A report is produced to the LTCI fund, specifying the care services needed and the severity of care 
need. The assessment will be repeated at regular intervals to monitor changes in functional status. 
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terms of vertical equity, as inevitably there are differences in care needs between people in the same 
group  and  people  who  fall  just  below  a  needs  threshold  may  be  disadvantaged  as  a  result  (see 
Glendinning, Davies, Pickard & Comas-Herrera, 2004, p. 8, for a discussion). 
The German social insurance system has been designed to enhance horizontal equity for the part of the 
risk of dependency it covers. The overall performance of the long-term care system is affected by the 
fact that a substantial part of the risks of long-term care are not covered by the system (either because 
the need threshold is high or because the benefits only cover part of the costs of care). The design of 
the social insurance revenue raising mechanisms and the limited responsiveness to variations within 
needs categories mean that vertical equity is not favoured. 
5.5.2  The Netherlands 
This section relies very considerably on the ANCIEN country report for the Netherlands (Mot, 2010), 
complemented with information from Schut & van den Berg (2011). 
The  public  system  of  long-term  care  insurance  (Exceptional  Medical  Expenses  Act,  AWBZ)  was 
created in 1968. It covers everyone who lives in the Netherlands, and it involves care for people of any 
age who require chronic care.  
The AWBZ covers care at home and in institutions for the elderly, care in institutions for the mentally 
and physically handicapped and care in institutions for chronic psychiatric patients. In 2007, home 
help was transferred to the municipalities under the new Social Support Act (WMO).There are means-
tested  co-payments  for  practically  all  LTC  services.  For  older  people  using  residential  care  co-
payments may be rather high, depending on their income and other circumstances (see Box 5.3). An 
important feature of the Dutch LTC system is that it covers both people with low and high levels of 
need, offering a very high level of protection against the risk of dependency. 
5.5.2.1  Revenue raising 
In principle, the AWBZ is funded by social security premiums and co-payments. However, the AWBZ 
premiums do not to cover all the costs and part of the AWBZ expenditure is funded from taxation. In 
2008, 68% of AWBZ expenditures were financed from social security contributions, 24% from taxes 
and 9% from user charges (Schut & van den Berg, 2011, p. 56). 
Informal care 
Informal care plays a smaller role in the Netherlands compared to other European countries (see, for 
example, Pickard, 2011; Bolin et al., 2008 and Kraus, Riedel, Mot, Willemé, Rohrling & Czypionka, 
2010). 
In  some  cases  informal  carers  can  be  paid  using  personal  budgets,  which  may  reduce  the  costs 
associated with caring. However, the role of cash benefits in the Netherlands will become smaller 
because of cost control measures.
33 
Private contributions  
The AWBZ offers very comprehensive coverage of the risk of needing long-term care and the level of 
private payment for care is relatively low. According to Schut and van den Berg (2011), 9% LTC 
                                                   
33 Recently the circumstances under which a cash benefit can be received were restricted considerably compared 
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revenues come from user charges, which much lower than the 30% estimated by Rothgang (2011) for 
Germany, and 17% for Spain (Gutiérrez, Jiménez-Martín, Vegas Sánchez & Vilaplana, 2010).  
Co-payment rates increase with the level of income, which contributes to vertical equity as wealthier 




The AWBZ premium, in 2009, was 12.15% of income in the first two tax brackets (up to an income 
ceiling of about €32,000; see Mot, 2010, p. 30).  
The presence of a ceiling above which contributions cease to increase means that, as a proportion of 
their income, wealthier people contribute less, which in terms of vertical equity, is likely to make the 
system regressive overall. 
Private LTC insurance 
Almost (if not completely) non-existent due to the high level of risk coverage afforded by the AWBZ. 
Taxation 
Taxation covers a substantial part of the AWBZ expenditure (24%, according to Schut and van den 
Berg, 2011). As taxation usually performs better in terms of vertical equity than social insurance, the 
higher the proportion of funding raised from taxation, the less regressive the overall system is likely to 
be. 
5.5.2.2  Resource allocation 
Equity of access 
Access  to  care  is  obtained  following  an  individual  assessment  of  care  needs.  There  is  some 
consideration of the role of available informal carers. 
Box 5.3 Co-payments in the Dutch LTC system 
Cost-sharing  differs  between  institutional  care  and  non-institutional  care.  Outside  of  institutions, 
AWBZ beneficiaries have to  pay €12.60 for each hour of  care that they receive, with an income-
dependent maximum. The maximum depends not just on income, but also on the number of persons in 
the household and whether the client is 65 or older. For single elderly persons with an income of 
€14,812 or less, the maximum amount of cost-sharing per four weeks is €17.20, which is less than the 
price of one hour of care. For the same person with a total income of €40,000, the maximum would be 
€307.83 for four weeks. Cost sharing for domestic help under the WMO is structured in the same way, 
but the local council can change some of the parameters – as long as maximum cost sharing does not 
exceed the AWBZ maximum, and cost sharing does not exceed the cost price of domestic help. Cost-
sharing for the WMO has to be paid first.  
  With regard to institutional care, there are two levels of cost-sharing: low and high. Low cost-sharing 
is  relevant  for  the  first  six  months  in  an  institution  and  for  a  number  of  special  situations—  for 
example, when the client has a spouse who is still living independently. In the situation of low cost-
sharing,  the  client  has  to  pay  12.5%  of  the  relevant  income  with  a  minimum  of  €141.20  and  a 
maximum of €741.20 per month. In the situation of high cost-sharing, the maximum amount of cost-
sharing is €1,838.60 per month. If this is too high compared to their income, the client has to pay 8.5% 
of the relevant income, with a reduction of 8% or 16% in 2009. This reduction was introduced in 2009 
as  part  of  new  regulation  (replacing  an  older  scheme)  to  financially  support  chronically  ill  and 
handicapped persons.  




Cost containment measures in the 1990s, resulted in problems with waiting lists and waiting times that 
were seen as unacceptably long. These problems were addressed from the year 2000 on, making extra 
funds available within the care system to increase the availability of services and reduce waiting times. 
Equity in levels and mix of services relative to needs 
An important aspect of the Dutch public care system is that the social insurance system also covers 
people with relatively mild care needs. 
Care  and  cash-benefits  are  allocated  on  the  basis  of  individual  assessments  of  needs,  following 
detailed guidelines (see Box 5.4), but taking into account people’s individual circumstances. Some 
AWBZ beneficiaries can choose between care in-kind and cash reimbursement. The cash is given in 
the form of personal budgets. 
The individual nature of the allocation of services or benefits according to individual need may result 
in less horizontal equity, as people with similar needs may obtain different services. Local factors 
(including  assessor-bias)  may  affect  the  amount  and  type  of  benefits  and/or  services  received. 
However, because the services and benefits are matched closely to individual needs, the system is 
likely to achieve higher vertical equity (that is, higher resources for those with higher levels of need), 
than  a  system  based  on  national  algorithms,  where  there  can  often  be  a  big  step  between  levels, 
resulting  in  those  at  the  “top”  of  a  low  need  band  not  receiving  enough  services  or  benefits 
(Glendinning, Davies, Pickard and Comas-Herrera, 2004). 
Overall  the  Dutch  system  performs  highly  both  in  terms  of  horizontal  and  vertical  equity,  as  the 
system offers high levels of coverage and is sensitive to individual level variations in need. 
5.5.3  Spain 
This section is mostly based on the ANCIEN country report for Spain by Gutiérrez, Jiménez-Martín, 
Vegas Sánchez & Vilaplana, (2010), complemented with information from other sources. 
A  citizen’s  right  to  long-term  care  (the  “fourth  pillar  of  the  welfare  system)  was  established  by 
legislation passed in 2006. The act introduced a universal entitlement to long-term care for people in 
need of help carrying out activities of daily living. 
Box 5.4 Assessment of needs 
Every  request  for  AWBZ  care  is  assessed  by  an  independent  organisation,  CIZ  (Centrum 
Indicatiestelling Zorg; Centre for Care Assessment). There are no financial incentives for CIZ, in the 
sense  that  its  decisions  do  not  affect  its  own  financial  position.  It  should  make  an  independent, 
objective and integrated assessment. A person may be eligible for AWBZ care only when one or more 
need factors (grondslagen) are present: 
1. A somatic, psycho-geriatric or mental disorder or limitation; 
2. An intellectual, physical or sensory disability. 
The assessment procedure is the same for care in cash and care in kind. CIZ uses national standards to 
determine whether a person is eligible  for  one  or  more ‘functions’ (separate LTC services) within 
AWBZ care: assistance, personal care, nursing, treatment and stay in an institution, extended stay for 
psychiatric reasons. For each function, the amount of the necessary care is determined. Other persons 
in the same household are supposed to supply the “usual care” that family members give to each other. 
People are not eligible for AWBZ care with respect to the usual care. The effect of informal unpaid 
care that exceeds the usual care is more complicated: this may decrease the entitlement to AWBZ care 
as long as this informal care is voluntarily given and received. 
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The Act made provision for the development of a System for Autonomy and the Care of Dependency 
(SAAD), which involves both the national and the regional governments. 
Before this, long-term care was seen mostly as a family responsibility, with the public system having a 
residual role and helping only when family resources were not sufficient to meet needs. The new 
system was developed in response to changes in family patterns and higher rates of female labour 
market participation. Due to the change in economic climate the system has not been implemented as 
originally planned in the 2006 Act and in July 2012 some elements were cut very significantly (El 
Pais,  10  July  2012).  Only  people  with  the  highest  levels  of  severity  are  currently  covered.  The 
Government  also  announced  that  regional  governments  were  allowed  to  take  up  to  two  years  to 
provide care or support to claimants, without the claimants obtaining any retrospective rights to care or 
cash payments. This way of rationing care takes no account of the levels of need or circumstances of 
dependent people and it is likely to result in many people with very high levels of need dying before 
any care is provided or funded, or being cared for instead in the health service. 
5.5.3.1  Revenue raising 
How LTC funds are raised in Spain 
According to the System of Health Accounts, 10% of the funding used towards funding long-term care 
is  raised  via  social  insurance  (social  security  contributions),  58%  via  taxation,  31%  via  private 
payments (including co-payments and privately purchased care), and a very small amount, 0.3% is 
raised from private insurance. 
Table 5.4 Total Long-Term Care Expenditure by source, Spain, 2009 
  Total Long-Term Care Expenditure 2009 (%) 
Social insurance  10.2 
Taxation  58.4 
Private payments  31.1 
Private insurance  0.3 
Source: System of Health Accounts (http://www.msc.es/estadEstudios/estadisticas/sisInfSanSNS/pdf/ 
SCS_-_Datos_estadisticos.pdf). 
Informal care 
Informal care plays a very important role in the Spanish LTC system. An important aspect of the new 
LTC system has been the introduction of special pension rights for carers and cash payments that can 
be claimed to  compensate informal carers, which as discussed  in the  case  of Germany,  may  help 
reduce the opportunity costs to informal carers. However, the pension rights for carers were scrapped 
in July 2012. 
Private income and savings 
Despite the  increased coverage since the reform, there are substantial contributions from people’s 
income and savings. These are used to cover people whose needs are classified as being below the 
eligibility thresholds, and to meet co-payments, which amount to about 9% of the costs of public 
services. In July 2012 the co-payments were revised to include both income and assets (including 
housing), the percentage of co-payment will rise with the level of income and represent 5% of the 
estimated  value  of  assets.  This  measure  can  potentially  make  the  co-payment  system  more 
progressive. 
In 2009, private expenditure was estimated to cover approximately 31% of the costs of long-term care 
(SHA, Spain), however there is much uncertainty about how much is spent on care bought in the grey 
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Social insurance 
About 10% of long-term care expenditure is raised from social security contributions (paid for by 
employees and employers). 
Private LTC insurance  
About 0.3% of care revenue is raised from private long-term care insurance benefits. 
Taxation 
The public part of the SAAD system is financed by the national government and the autonomous 
regions. According to a recent official report, 39% of public care funds are covered by the national 
Government  and  53%  by  the  regional  governments  (and  9%  by  co-payments  from  care  users, 
Ministerio de Sanidad, 2011). 
The state funding should cover the “guaranteed minimum level of assistance”, while the autonomous 
communities should provide an amount at least equal to the amount provided by the state. 
While  taxation  on  household  income  is  progressive  in  Spain,  it  is  less  progressive  than  in  the 
Netherlands and Germany (Verbist, 2004). 
5.5.3.2  Resource allocation 
Equity of access 
The LTC system reform had the principles of universality, equality and accessibility at its core. In 
practice the state guarantees a “basic” level of cover and the rest depends on the regional government. 
The two year wait for access to care introduced in July 2012 means that many people assessed as 
needing care will die without obtaining access to the system. 
There  are  national  eligibility  criteria  based  on  need  alone  (see  Box  5.5).  There  are  important 
geographical variations in the rates of people assessed as needing care. 
 
Box 5.5 Assessment of needs 
The Act on the Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care for Dependent Persons defines the concept of 
“dependency” as the  permanent state in  which  persons that for reasons  derived from age, illness or 
disability and linked to the lack or loss of physical, mental, intellectual or sensorial autonomy require the 
care of another person/other people or significant help in order to perform basic activities of daily living. 
In the case of people with mental disabilities or illness, the concept of “need for support for personal 
autonomy” is applied in order that they may attain a satisfactory degree of personal autonomy in the 
community. 
The assessment of dependency is carried out by the autonomous administration corresponding to the 
applicant’s residence and is valid for the whole of Spanish state territory, because this is one of the 
conditions that guarantee equality. The degree and levels of dependency are determined using a scale 
approved by the Territorial Council of the System for Autonomy and Care for Dependency. 
The law distinguishes between different degrees of dependency, depending on the frequency with which 
help is required, which in turn establish the benefits and services that can be received. Each of the 
degrees of disability is split in two levels. Level one: individuals who can perform the activity without 
direct support from another person. Level two: individuals who need support.  
The ranking scale contains eleven activities divided into a series of tasks. Each activity and task receives 
a weight according to the age of the applicant and whether they have mental disability or cognitive 
impairment. A score is produced which is used to match people to their degree and level of dependency.  
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Equity in levels and mix of services relative to needs 
The Spanish care system assigns care packages (or cash payments) to different levels of disability, in a 
similar way as in the German model (see Box 5.6). People classified as having moderate care needs 
are not currently entitled to care. 
 
 
Although the entitlement system should, in principle, guarantee horizontal equity, in practice there are 
important regional variations, both in the degree to which people in different regions are assessed as 
being dependent, until recently different means-tests in different regions, and huge variation in the 
public and private prices  of social services  in  different regions,  which  means that the purchasing 
power of community cash benefits varies by region (Gutierrez, Jiménez-Martín, Vegas Sánchez & 
Vilaplana, 2010). 
Box 5.6 Assigning services to different levels of need 
Once the dependent person has been assessed people are assigned an Individual Care Plan.  
The Individual Care Plan can be reviewed at the request of the individual and at regular intervals 
established by the Autonomous Community. The ICP determines the services ore benefits that best 
match  the  applicant’s  needs.  This  process  is  carried  out  with  the  participation  of  the  beneficiary 
through  consultation  and  seeking  their  views  and,  where  applicable,  with  the  family  or  the  entity 
representing the dependent person. 
The Law requires that the care system should provide the following services: 
-  Services aimed at preventing dependency and promoting personal autonomy. 
-  Personal alarm systems 
-  Home-help services (addressing the needs of the household) 
-  Personal care 
-  Adult day-care centres 
-  Residential care services. 
If the administrations are unable to offer these services, the dependent person is entitled to receive cash 
benefits  instead.  The  amount  of  the  cash  benefits  depends  on  the  degree  of  dependency  and  the 
economic situation of the individual. There are three types of cash benefits: 
-  Financial assistance to access certain care services 
-  Financial assistance for informal caregivers 
-  Financial assistance to hire personal care-givers 
When the services are not available, the dependent person is entitled to receive financial benefits fixed 
at set amounts at national level. There are three types of financial benefits: 
-  Financial benefit linked to the service: granted when access to a public or subsidised care service is 
not available and depends on the degree and level of dependency and on the beneficiary’s financial 
situation. The public administration supervises how these benefits are used. 
-  Financial benefit for care in the family setting and support for non-professional carers. In theory 
this benefit should only be granted on an exceptional basis, when the beneficiary is cared for in the 
family  setting  and  as  long  as  the  home  meets  the  requirements  regarding  co-habitation  and 
habitability.  The  carer  must  be  registered  with  social  security  and  make  contributions  in 
compliance with regulations. 
-  Financial benefit for personalised care: this benefit would be used to hire a personal assistant, for a 
number of hours, to provide the beneficiary with access to education and employment, as well as 
help with basic daily living activities. 
Source: Gutiérrez, Jiménez-Martín, Vegas Sánchez & Vilaplana (2010, pp. 6-9). 76  ADELINA COMAS-HERRERA 
 
The Spanish system, particularly after the cuts in July 2012, offers a low degree of coverage of the risk 
of  dependency,  which  affects  negatively  the  performance  of  the  system  in  terms  of  equity.  In 
particular, the two year wait rationing method will contribute to making the system more inequitable 
as those with private means will be able to access the care they need by self-funding, and in terms of 
vertical equity people with higher levels of need will need to wait as long as people with lower levels 
of need. 
5.5.4  Poland 
This section relies to a very great extent on a description of the Long-Term Care System in Poland 
carried out as part of the ANCIEN project by Golinowska (2010), complemented with information 
from other sources. 
Long-term care in Poland mainly takes place in the family, with very high levels of “co-residency” 
compared to other countries (Reimat, 2009). The formal LTC system is in the initial stages, there is no 
comprehensive  long-term  care  system.  There  are  no  national  access  rules  to  the  care  system,  or 
regulation. Rather, formal long-term care is covered partly by the health sector and partly by the social 
assistance sector, and responsibility lies at both the national and the local level. 
5.5.4.1  Revenue-raising 
Public long-term care is funded from two sources: 60% from health insurance LTC services in the 
health sector) and 40% from general taxation (social assistance homes). 
There are co-payments in both health and social care funded homes. The co-payment is higher in the 
social care system. In the health sector the resident pays only accommodation and board. In the social 
assistance system people pay 70% of their own income, the family is expected to contribute too. The 
family contributions are paid by families with incomes above 10% of average earnings in the economy 
How LTC funds are raised in Poland:  
Informal care 
Informal care is the most important source of LTC in Poland. As discussed earlier, the higher the 
reliance on informal care or private income and savings, the less well a system will perform in terms 
of equity, both horizontal and vertical. 
Private savings and capital  
This  is  likely  to  be  used  for  the  private  purchase  of  care  (in  the  grey  market?)  and  to  meet  co-
payments. 
Social insurance  
Social insurance contributes to LTC funding in Poland through the health social insurance financing of 
“health sector” care homes. 
Private LTC insurance  
It appears there is no private LTC insurance in Poland at present. 
Taxation 
The social assistance system finances care in care homes and cash benefits for people aged 75 and 
over. 
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5.5.4.2  Resource allocation 
Equity of access 
Access to health-funded long-term care homes is based on an assessment of need based on the Barthel 
scale (40 points out of a possible 100), no account is taken of living conditions or level of income or 
wealth. 
In the social assistance system eligibility is determined by a means-test and the family situation of the 
applicant (for example whether they live alone). 
Care allowances are given to individuals aged 75 or more who are in receipt of old-age or disability 
pensions (irrespective of whether they need care). There is a special nursing allowance for those not 
entitled to the care allowance.  
In a way care allowances are very highly equitable as they cover the entire population, and they ensure 
that everyone receives some support, which contributes to horizontal equity. However it does not work 
well in terms of vertical equity, as resources do not increase with the level of need. Also, as resources 
are  spread  over  so  many  people,  the  amount  is  necessarily  limited  and  only  covers  a  very  small 
amount of the care needs of very dependent people. 
Equity in levels and mix of services relative to needs 
There currently is no national care system that determines how services are allocated to those who 
need them. Overall, the Polish system is characterised by low level of risk coverage, great reliance on 
family care, and a universal cash benefit for those aged 75 or more, irrespective of need. In terms of 
equity, the overall performance of the system is low. 
5.6  Comparative summary tables 
Table 5.5 Revenue-raising  
  Germany   Netherlands  Poland   Spain  
Degree of risk pooling and coverage  Medium high  Very high  Low  Medium low 
Progressivity  Medium  High  Low  Medium low 
 
These are the two key aspects of the revenue raising system which impact the potential for the care 
system  to  be  more  or  less  equitable.  The  degree  of  risk  pooling  (or  level  of  coverage  of  the 
dependency risk) is a key determinant of the performance of the system in terms horizontal equity. 
The lower the degree of risk pooling, the more likely it is that people with higher levels of need (and 
possibly lower levels of resources) have to contribute higher resources to their care. Countries with a 
low degree of risk pooling tend to rely greatly on informal care.  
The degree of progressivity of the way in which resources are raised will affect the performance of the 
system in terms of vertical equity. Where most resources are raised as informal care, or with forms of 
payment that are regressive, the system will perform worse in terms of vertical equity. 
Table 5.6 Resource allocation: main characteristics 
   Germany  Netherlands  Poland  Spain 
  Horizontal  Vertical  Horizontal  Vertical  Horizontal  Vertical  Horizontal  Vertical 
Equity of access:  
means vs. needs  
testing 
High  Medium  High  High  Low  Low  Medium  Low 
Equity in levels 
and mix of 
services relative  
to needs 
High  Low  High  High  Medium 
low 
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5.6.1  Summary 
This chapter examines the different features that form long-term care systems and discusses how they 
can be expected to perform in terms of horizontal and vertical equity. The approach used involves 
looking both at how resources are raised to fund care and how they are allocated. The care systems of 
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland (chosen as representatives of the clusters identified by 
the  ANCIEN  project)  are  analysed  to  see  how  the  presence  and  relative  importance  of  different 
features are likely to affect the overall equity of the system. Of the four countries, the Netherlands 
performs highly in terms of equity, both horizontal and vertical. Germany’s system performs well on 
horizontal equity but less so on vertical equity. The Spanish system’s reforms of 2006 introduced new 
features that potentially increased the equity of the system, however the system has not been fully 
implemented and major cuts have undermined its potential to deliver in terms of equity. The Polish 
system is characterised by a very small formal care sector and universal care-related cash benefits to 
everyone over 75 which does not perform well in terms of vertical equity. 
5.7  Conclusions 
Looking at the care systems in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland, and considering how 
different elements of the system are likely to contribute to horizontal and vertical equity, confirms that 
equity is a multi-faceted concept. A formal ranking of the care systems in different countries in terms 
of equity could only produce meaningful results if we had reliable weights for the different aspects 
considered in a social welfare function. In the absence of such weights, it is only possible to produce a 
ranking if one country outranks another one in all relevant aspects. The comparative summary tables 
in this report suggest that the Netherlands would score higher than or equal to Germany on the equity 
dimensions considered. The same is true for Germany as compared to both Spain and Poland. Only the 
ordering between Spain and Poland cannot be determined in this way. Spain scores higher than or 
equal to Poland on all aspects except one, where Poland scores better.  
As an example of multidimensionality, the German care system tends to perform much better in terms 
of horizontal equity than it does in terms of vertical equity, probably reflecting the values behind the 
introduction of the social insurance system.  
On the other hand, due to its very generous public coverage of the risk of long-term care (including 
people with relatively low risk compared to other countries), the LTC system in the Netherlands does 
appear to be the most equitable of the four countries considered. Because social insurance is the main 
source of funds, it does not perform as well in terms of vertical equity as it would if it were more 
reliant in tax funding. It is, however, likely to be less regressive than the German system as there is no 
separate scheme for wealthy people and higher reliance in taxation.  
With regards the Spanish system, the  implementation  of the new  dependency  law  from 2006 has 
improved very considerably the coverage of the risk of long-term care for those facing higher levels or 
risk. However, there are substantial geographical variations and, due to budget constraints and cuts, 
the system is not being fully implemented, covering only those with the highest levels of needs. People 
with considerable care needs are excluded from the public system. Very significant cuts announced in 
July 2012 are likely to change very fundamentally the equity performance of the system. For example 
the system can take two years to grant care or benefits to people, which is likely to result in many 
people dying before receiving any benefits or formal care. 
Poland relies very heavily on informal care, there is some provision of residential care in both the 
healthcare and social assistance sector, and a cash benefit for older people aged 75 or more. The low 
levels of coverage of the public sector mean that the system provides little coverage of the long-term 
care risk. As a result the system would rank low in terms of equity. The cash benefit does provide 
some improvement in horizontal equity, but not in terms of vertical equity. 
As stated above, even in the absence of reliable weights for the different equity aspects, the analysis of 
the equity of the care system in this report suggests an ordering for the four countries considered. Only 
the relative ranking of Spain and Poland is problematic. The Dutch system scores highest on overall ANALYSIS OF EQUITY  79 
 
equity, followed by the German system. The Spanish and Polish systems are both less equitable than 
the Dutch and German systems. The analysis provided here does not lend itself to a scientific way of 
ranking Spain and Poland in terms of equity, but it shows that the Spanish system dominates the Polish 
in most equity respects. For the purposes of the ANCIEN project work package 7 it is acceptable to 
assume  equal  weights for the  different  equity aspects and to  conclude that the Spanish system  is 
somewhat more equitable than the Polish system. Using this assumption the overall ranking on equity 
of the LTC system is: the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Poland.  
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6.  Projections of LTC expenditures 
Joanna Geerts and Peter Willemé (FPB) 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents results of projections of long-term care (LTC) expenditure for different care 
systems. The projections of LTC expenditure cover public and private spending for formal care, both 
at home and in residential care facilities. Projections are made up to 2060 for four countries: Germany, 
the Netherlands, Spain and Poland, using a standardised methodology. The countries were selected in 
WP1 of the ANCIEN project as representative of clusters of countries with different LTC systems 
(Kraus, Riedel, Mot, Willemé, Röhrling & Czypionka, 2010). The expenditure projections are based 
on projected future numbers of LTC users aged 65 and over made in WP 6 of ANCIEN, using a cell-
based  or  macro-simulation  model  and  cross-nationally  harmonized  data  of  the  Survey  of  Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe  (SHARE). The  ANCIEN care use projection  model  focuses  on 
personal and nursing care. The model links estimated probabilities of using different forms of personal 
and  nursing  care  (residential  care,  formal  home  care,  informal  care)  by  age,  gender,  disability, 
household composition and other relevant characteristics to projected numbers of older people divided 
into groups (cells) by the same characteristics (see Geerts, Willemé & Mot, 2012 for a description of 
the projection method and detailed projection results). To project future public and private long-term 
care  expenditure,  for  each  projection  year  projected  numbers  of  people  receiving  residential  and 
formal home care are multiplied with average costs per user. The base year expenditure data are based 
on estimates of age and gender profiles of LTC expenditure produced for the 2012 Ageing Report of 
the European Commission and the Ageing Working Group of the European Policy Committee (2012) 
and on total LTC expenditure data drawn from the System of Health Account (SHA) database (OECD 
Health  Data  2011).
34  This  chapter  also  explores  the  sensitivity  of  the  expenditure  projections  to 
alternative  assumptions  about  trends  in  disability,  socio-demographic  evolution  and  unit  cost 
development. For the four countries, it also simulates future LTC expenditure using one country’s 
demographic structure and the probabilities of care use and average user costs of another country.  
The next section discusses the projection methodology and data sources. The projection results are 
presented in Section 6.3. The chapter ends with some conclusions in section 6.4.  
6.2  Projection methodology and data sources  
The  projections  of  LTC  expenditure  cover  public  and  private  expenditure  on  formal  LTC  care, 
distinguishing between residential care and home care. For each projection year, projected numbers of 
care users, by five-year age category and gender, are multiplied with average costs per user.  
6.2.1  Base year unit costs  
Three variant estimates of base year (2010) unit costs are used. The first variant (AWG 1) consists of 
age (a) and gender (g) specific unit costs by home or residential care setting (s)  
   	1 =    	     	   	      , ,  
as calculated  for the 2012  Ageing Report of the European Commission and  the  Ageing Working 
Group of the European Policy Committee (2012). For some countries, these profiles may be based on 
a  broader  definition  of  long-term  care  (including  household  help)  than  the  ANCIEN  definition 
                                                   
34 We are grateful to Nicole Horschel, Álvaro Pastor Escribano and Valentin Neevel for providing us with the 
AWG data for Germany, Spain and the Netherlands, respectively. We also thank Erika Schulz (DIW, Germany), 
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(personal and nursing care only) and thus on larger numbers of LTC users and a different underlying 
age distribution of use. Furthermore costs per user for household help are likely to be lower than costs 
per user for personal and nursing care, which is generally provided by more highly skilled carers. 
Multiplying the AWG unit costs with the estimated numbers of residential and home care users of 
WP6 may therefore result in an underestimation of total LTC expenditure. The second variant (AWG 
2) is based on total age and gender specific LTC expenditures, used to calculate the AWG unit costs. 
These total costs are divided by the total base year numbers of users as estimated in WP6 of ANCIEN 
(Geerts, Willemé & Mot, 2012): N ANCIEN.  
   2 =	
   	     	      , , 
 	       , , 
 
Using AWG 2 estimates might on the one hand result in an overestimation of LTC expenditure as 
AWG estimates of total costs may not be restricted to personal and nursing care. On the other hand, 
costs per users for personal care or nursing care might be higher than costs per user for other services. 
As the AWG estimates cover public expenditure only and as AWG expenditure profiles could not be 
obtained for Poland, a third variant (SHA) has been calculated, based on LTC expenditure data by 
financing  source  (public  or  private)  drawn  from  the  System  of  Health  Account  (SHA)  database 
(OECD Health Data 2011). Expenditure categories included in the calculation are HC.3 1 Inpatient 
long-term care (health) and HC.3.3 Outpatient long-term care (health). Social long-term care services 
(HCR.1) have not been included. The share of total expenditure for the population aged 65 and over is 
calculated using AWG expenditure profiles or national data (Poland). It is implicitly assumed that the 
proportion of LTC expenditure for the older (65 years and over) population is the same for the SHA 
and AWG expenditure data and for public and private expenditure. Per user expenditure by financing 
source (f) and setting is calculated by dividing total expenditure by financing source and setting by the 
total base year number of users by setting as estimated in WP6 of ANCIEN. 
    =	
   	     	      ,  ×    	     	     	65+            
   	     	     	   	   	           
	
 	       
 
Both AWG and SHA data are for 2009 (with the exception of the AWG data for Germany which are 
for 2010) and have been adjusted to 2010 (base year) price levels.  
6.2.1.1  Expenditure data for Germany 
AWG age and gender profiles of public expenditure for Germany are based on social long-term care 
insurance data. Public expenditure under social assistance schemes and other public spending is not 
included. Expenditure for home care includes cash benefits (and the underlying numbers of ‘formal’ 
care users residing at home include persons receiving informal care only, as these benefits can be 
spent on informal care only). ANCIEN base year estimates of numbers of formal home care users only 
include persons using formal personal care or nursing care, yielding smaller numbers of home care 
users than the AWG base year numbers. As a consequence, base year unit costs estimates for home 
care are higher under the AWG 2 and SHA variant than under the AWG 1 variant (see Table 6.1 
below).  Age-specific  expenditures  are  quite  similar  for  men  and  women,  except  for  home  care 
expenditure in AWG variant 2, which is higher for men than for women until age category 80-84. At 
higher ages the pattern is reversed. Furthermore, as one can see in Table 6.2, the AWG expenditure 
data show a rather flat age profile, which can be explained by the fact that benefit receipt is not related 
to age, only to level of care dependency, and that benefits are capped (see Schulz, 2010). SHA LTC 
expenditure data for Germany are based on long-term care insurance data, social assistance statistics 
and other data sources. For the estimation of private LTC expenditure, a survey conducted for the 
Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizen, Women and Youth has been used. According to SHA, 
private expenditure for long-term care in Germany mainly consists of out-of-pocket expenses and, to a 84  JOANNA GEERTS & PETER WILLEMÉ 
 
much smaller extent, of private insurance costs. Private expenditure is considerable in Germany. One 
third of total spending per residential care user is private spending. In home care, the share of private 
spending is about one fifth. Unit cost estimates for residential care are highest under the SHA variant 
and lowest under the AWG 2 variant; unit cost estimates for home care are highest under the AWG 2 
and lowest under the AWG 1 variant.  
Table 6.1 Base year annual unit costs (in Euro), Germany 
Age category  AWG 1  AWG 1  AWG 2 
  Residential  Home  Residential 
  Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females 
65-69  15,144  15,449  6,591  6,565  14,348  15,25 
70-74  15,374  15,586  6,805  6,266  15,039  15,824 
75-79  15,573  15,596  7,119  5,995  15,242  15,803 
80-84  15,509  15,525  7,418  5,877  14,242  14,726 
85 and over  15,329  15,641  8,159  6,219  13,611  14,105 
65 and over             
 
Table 6.1 continued 
Age category  AWG 2  SHA 
  Home  Residential  Home 
  Males  Females  Public  Private  Public  Private 
65-69  16,577  5,313         
70-74  18,929  7,431         
75-79  9,362  7,933         
80-84  9,977  11,414         
85 and over  10,065  12,960         
65 and over      17,921  9,779  10,006  2,443 
 
6.2.1.2  Expenditure data for the Netherlands 
Both AWG age profiles and SHA expenditure data for the Netherlands refer to long-term nursing and 
personal care. The SHA LTC expenditure data for the Netherlands are based on Statistics Netherlands’ 
Health and Social Care Accounts. Data for 2009 result from a revision of the methodology in 2011. In 
previous years expenditure for personal care was not included in LTC expenditure. Base year private 
expenditure  data  have  been  obtained  from  CVZ  (College  voor  Zorgverzekeringen,  see 
http://www.cvz.nl/zorgcijfers/awbz-baten/awbz-baten.html)  as  SHA  does  not  include  any  recent 
information on private LTC expenditure for the Netherlands. The CVZ data only refer to co-payments 
for care provided under the public long-term care insurance scheme (AWBZ – Exceptional Medical 
Expenses Act) and are not differentiated by home or residential care. The AWG public expenditure 
data for the Netherlands are not differentiated by care setting (home and residential care) neither, 
whereas SHA public expenditure information is available for residential and home care separately.  
AWG total LTC costs by age and gender are calibrated to  match total LTC expenditure in SHA. 
However, the AWG number of care users (685,490 users aged 65 and over) is not restricted to users of 
nursing  and  personal  care  services  only.  It  includes  a  much  broader  range  of  LTC  service  users, 
including users of household help, and cash benefit recipients (Statistics Netherlands reports about 
483,000  older  users  of  personal  or  nursing  care  financed  by  the  AWBZ  (Exceptional  Medical 
Expenses Act, including cash benefit recipients). As ANCIEN base year estimates of the number of 
long-term care are lower than the AWG estimates (ANCIEN only includes users of formal personal PROJECTIONS OF LTC EXPENDITURES  85 
 
care or nursing care), estimates of base year unit costs are higher under the AWG 2 and SHA variant 
than under the AWG 1 variant (see Table 6.2 below).  
Both AWG variants show a higher average public expenditure for men than for women until age 
category 85+. Compared to Germany, the age profile of public LTC expenditure fluctuates somewhat 
more in the Netherlands. The share of private expenditure is much lower in the Netherlands than in 
Germany, but private expenditure for the Netherlands might be underestimated, as the figure includes 
co-payments only.  
Table 6.2 Base year annual unit costs (in euro), the Netherlands 
AWG 
Age category  AWG 1  AWG 2 
  Males  Females  Males  Females 
65-69  19,936  11,499  43,870  30,452 
70-74  15,401  9,986  22,865  17,617 
75-79  15,962  11,362  29,118  25,195 
80-84  15,031  13,236  30,461  30,291 
85 and over  16,329  20,996  23,419  30,758 
SHA/CVZ 
Age category  Public  Private 
  Residential  Home     
65 and over  55,527  12,014  3,473 
 
6.2.1.3  Expenditure data for Spain 
For Spain, available AWG data only include total public expenditure by age, gender and setting, not 
numbers of users or per user expenditure. Therefore, for Spain variant AWG 1 could not be calculated. 
AWG age and sex profiles for Spain have been estimated on the basis of information provided by the 
Spanish department responsible for the dependency benefits and also on the basis of a survey financed 
by the Institute of Fiscal Studies. The AWG expenditure data include services of long-term nursing 
care (nursing care and personal care services) and social services of long-term care, relating primarily 
to assistance with IADL (instrumental activities of daily living). As ANCIEN estimates of long-term 
care users only include users of formal personal care or nursing care, calculating costs per user by 
dividing AWG total costs by ANCIEN number of users (AWG 2 variant) might, overestimate costs 
per user. On the other hand, costs per user for personal care or nursing care might be higher than costs 
per user for IADL assistance. SHA LTC expenditure data for Spain are based on National Accounts, 
on the Household Budget Continuous Survey and on reports from the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs (IMSERSO, 2005, 2008). As in Germany, private expenditure for long-term care in Spain 
mainly consists of out-of-pocket expenses and, to a much smaller extent, of private insurance costs, 
and shares of private expenditure are of a similar magnitude as figures reported for Germany: about 
one third of total spending in residential care and about one fifth of total spending in home care. AWG 
2 expenditure profiles (see Table 6.3) show much lower costs per user for males than for females, in 
all age categories. For home care, gender differences in unit costs are smaller, with higher costs for 
males in some age categories. The age profile of public LTC expenditure fluctuates, but generally unit 
costs are higher for persons aged 85 and over than for younger persons. Finally, it is important to note 
that the base year expenditure profiles and the resulting projection do not take into account potential 
cuts in LTC spending in Spain due to the recent economic and financial crisis.  
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Table 6.3 Base year annual unit costs (€), Spain 
Age category  AWG 2    AWG 2    SHA       
  Residential  Home  Residential  Home 
  Males  Females  Males  Females  Public  Private  Public  Private 
65-69  2,692  11,086  1,472  2,704         
70-74  3,442  15,09  2,718  2,682         
75-79  4,442  13,631  6,192  4,9         
80-84  3,43  11,108  2,653  3,801         
85 and over  8,245  16,711  5,243  4,154         
65 and over          7,381  4,101  2,804  739 
 
6.2.1.4  Expenditure data for Poland 
For Poland only SHA data are available and unit costs have been calculated for residential care only, 
as the projections of care use for Poland do not include home care. Public LTC expenditure in SHA is 
underestimated due to a lack of data on the medical component of all services delivered within homes 
or  other  facilities  under  social  care.  Public  LTC  expenditure  also  includes  cash  benefits.  Private 
expenditure includes households’ expenditures on LTC care, estimated on the basis of the household 
budget  surveys  results.  It  does  not  include  other  forms  of  private  expenditures  such  as  private 
insurance, expenditures of employers, expenditures of non-profit institutions. Total public and private 
expenditure for persons aged 65 and over has been estimated using information on the share of persons 
aged  65  and  over  in  care  and  treatment  facilities  (ZOL)  and  nursing  and  care  facilities  (ZPO) 
(Golinowska & Sowa, 2012).  
The share of private LTC expenditure in Poland is relatively low (Table 6.4).  
Table 6.4 Base year annual unit costs for residential care (€), Poland 
  SHA 
  Public  Private 
Age 65 and over  2,451  368 
 
6.2.2  Scenarios 
Projections of LTC expenditure have been made under different scenarios, exploring the sensitivity of 
the  results  to  assumptions  regarding  the  evolution  of  disability,  socio-demographic  characteristics 
(household composition and education) and unit costs (costs per user). The base scenario uses the 
DELAY disability scenario. This scenario assumes that disability incidence is delayed to older ages 
with the same amount of time as mortality is delayed (see Bonneux, van der Gaag & Bijwaard, 2012). 
The base scenario further assumes no change in household composition or education by age, gender 
and disability. With regard to unit costs, it assumes costs to evolve in line with GDP per hour worked, 
reflecting  the  highly  labour-intensive  character  of  long-term  care  services.  This  is  the  base  case 
assumption of the AWG 2012 Ageing Report and projected trends in GDP are taken from this report.  
Future  LTC  expenditure  has  been  simulated  under  eleven  alternative  disability  scenarios.  These 
scenarios have been developed in WP 2 of ANCIEN (see Bonneux, van der Gaag & Bijwaard, 2012). 
A first set of scenarios explores the effect of different relationships between the incidence of disability 
and  mortality  (bio-demographic  scenarios).  A  second  set  explores  the  effects  of  two  risk  factors: 
obesity and smoking (risk factor scenarios). Furthermore, two alternative socio-demographic scenarios 
are formulated, one exploring the effect of household composition changes, another one exploring the 
effect of a higher educational level in future cohorts of older persons. A detailed description of the 
disability and socio-demographic scenarios can be found in Geerts, Willemé & Mot (2012). With PROJECTIONS OF LTC EXPENDITURES  87 
 
regard to unit cost development, two alternative scenarios are used: a first scenario assumes costs to 
evolve in line with GDP per capita; a second scenario assumes no rise in real average expenditure. The 
latter scenario allows examining the impact of changing volumes of use. The assumption of constant 
unit costs is quite artificial though, as long-term care services are labour-intensive and trends in unit 
costs of LTC are likely to depend largely on trends in earnings in the economy at large, and on trends 
in how the earnings of care staff are likely to rise in relation to average earnings (Comas-Herrera et al., 
2003). Other factors that could impact  on future unit costs are  changes  in the  efficiency  of LTC 
provision, for instance as a result of the introduction of new technologies, and changes in the quality 
of  formal  care  services  (Colombo,  Llena-Nozal,  Mercier  &  Tjadens,  2011;  Comas-Herrera  et  al., 
2003). Average expenditure will of course also be influenced by changes in the intensity (number of 
hours per user) of care provided. All scenarios assume that the probabilities of using residential care or 
formal home care, given the relevant background characteristics, remain constant over the projection 
period.  
Table 6.5 Overview of the different LTC expenditure scenarios 
  Base scenario  Alternative scenarios 
Disability   DELAY  Bio-demographic scenarios 
     CONST 
     PREV 
     CHRON 
     BIOL 
     Risk factor scenarios 
     SMOK 
     TREND 
     NOSMOK 
     NOSQUIT 
     BM 
     LEAN 
     FAT 
Household composition   Constant  Changing 
Education   Constant  Better education 
Unit costs   Evolve in line with GDP per hour worked 
Constant 
Evolve in line with GDP per capita 
 
6.3  Projection results  
6.3.1  Projections of long-term care expenditure under different scenarios 
This section presents projections  of LTC expenditure under the base scenario and alternative bio-
demographic, risk-factor and socio-demographic scenarios. It presents results for public expenditure 
based  on  AWG  expenditure  profiles  (variant  2)  (Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Spain)  and  SHA 
expenditure data (Poland), assuming unit costs to evolve in line with GDP per hour worked. More 
projection results (using AWG variant 1 and SHA unit costs for all countries and using alternative unit 
costs scenarios, as well as projections of private expenditure) are provided in the separate companion 
document with appendices (ENEPRI Research Report No. 117A, December 2012, chapter 2).  
The projection results show that current patterns of LTC expenditure differ considerably between the 
four countries. Public spending for formal home and residential care is much higher in the Netherlands 
than in the other countries (1.8% of GDP in total), as a result of both higher probabilities of formal 
care use (see Geerts, Willemé &. Mot, 2012) and higher spending per user. Public expenditure is lower 
in Germany and Spain (Germany: 0.4% of GDP for residential care, 0.3% of GDP for home care; 
Spain 0.3% of GDP for residential care and 0.1% of GDP for home care). It is very low in Poland 88  JOANNA GEERTS & PETER WILLEMÉ 
 
(0.04 % of GDP for residential care), reflecting both a very low prevalence of residential care use and 
a low expenditure per user.  
In all four countries, a considerable increase in public expenditure for formal LTC care is projected. 
Under the DELAY scenario, the projected increase ranges from 127% for home care in Spain to 235% 
for residential care in Poland. In percentage points, the projected increase ranges from 0.1 p.p. in 
Poland (residential care) to 2.9 p.p. in the Netherlands (residential and home care). In relative terms, 
the projected increase is higher for residential care expenditure than for formal home care expenditure.  
Sensitivity  analyses  have  shown  that  the  expenditure  projections  are  quite  sensitive  to  alternative 
assumptions about the incidence of disability and mortality. In the four countries, projected increases 
are lowest under the CONST scenario. This scenario assumes that mortality rates would not decrease 
in future years, resulting in lower numbers of older person and, hence, lower numbers of care users. 
Leaving  the  ‘optimistic’  and  not  very  realistic  CONST  scenario  out  of  consideration,  projected 
expenditures still vary considerably, but even in the optimistic BIOL scenario projected increases in 
expenditure  are  large.  The  different  BMI  scenarios  generally  have  little  impact,  while  alternative 
assumptions about future trends in smoking behaviour have a larger effect. Taking account of future 
trends in household composition generally makes little difference; the impact of the better education 
scenario differs.  
6.3.1.1  Projected LTC expenditure, Germany 
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Table 6.6 Projected public expenditure for residential care services, Germany (% of GDP) 
  DELAY CONST PREV CHRON BIOL SMOK TREND noSMOK noSquit BMI LEAN FAT 
2010  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
2020  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
2030  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6 
2040  0.7  0.6  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.8 
2050  0.9  0.7  1.1  1.1  0.8  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.0  0.9  0.9  1.0 
2060  1.0  0.7  1.2  1.3  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.9  1.0 
                         
pp change 2010-
2060  0.6  0.3  0.8  0.9  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6 
% change 2010-
2060   167  81  215  234  129  145  164  172  172  159  153  171 
diff 2060 to 
DELAY pp     -0.3  0.2  0.3  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0 
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Table 6.7 Projected public expenditure for home care services, Germany (% of GDP) 





2010  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
2020  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
2030  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
2040  0.6  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6 
2050  0.8  0.6  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.7 
2060  0.8  0.5  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8 








2060   150  72  177  186  136  132  149  156  156  148  145  154  154  149 
diff 
2060  to 
DELAY 
pp     -0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
6.3.1.2  Projected LTC expenditure, the Netherlands 
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Table 6.8 Projected public LTC expenditure, the Netherlands (% of GDP) 





2010  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.7 
2020  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.1  2.0 
2030  3.0  2.7  3.1  3.1  2.9  2.9  3.0  2.9  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.9  2.8 
2040  3.9  3.2  4.1  4.2  3.8  3.7  3.9  3.9  4.1  4.0  3.9  4.0  3.9  3.6 
2050  4.5  3.3  4.8  4.9  4.3  4.3  4.5  4.7  4.7  4.6  4.5  4.7  4.4  4.2 
2060  4.7  3.1  5.0  5.2  4.5  4.4  4.7  4.9  4.9  4.7  4.6  4.8  4.6  4.3 
                             
pp change 
2010-2060  2.9  1.3  3.3  3.4  2.7  2.6  2.9  3.1  3.1  2.9  2.9  3.0  2.8  2.6 
% change 
2010-2060  
166  76  188  194  155  149  168  178  178  168  165  174  160  152 
diff 2060 to 
DELAY pp     -1.6  0.4  0.5  -0.2  -0.3  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  -0.1  -0.3 
 
6.3.1.3  Projected LTC expenditure, Spain 
Figure 6.4 Projected public expenditure for residential care, Spain (€ million) 
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Table 6.9 Projected public expenditure for residential care services, Spain (% of GDP) 
  DELAY CONST PREV CHRON BIOL SMOK TREND noSMOK noSquit BMI LEAN FAT 
DELAY 
EDU 
2010  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
2020  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
2030  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
2040  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
2050  0.7  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7 
2060  0.8  0.6  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8 
                           
pp change 2010-
2060  0.4  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5 
% change 2010-
2060   134  66  139  141  131  124  134  138  138  135  134  137  142 
diff 2060 to DELAY 
pp     -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
Figure 6.5 Projected public expenditure for home care services, Spain (€ million) 
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Table 6.10 Projected public expenditure for home care services, Spain (% of GDP) 
  DELAY CONST PREV CHRON BIOL SMOK TREND noSMOK noSquit BMI LEAN FAT 
DELAY 
EDU 
2010  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
2020  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
2030  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1 
2040  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
2050  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2 
2060  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3 
                           
pp change 2010-
2060  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1 
% change 2010-
2060   127  70  155  163  109  114  128  133  133  127  121  141  95 
diff 2060 to DELAY 
pp     -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
6.3.1.4  Projected LTC expenditure (residential care), Poland 
Figure 6.6 Projected public expenditure for residential care services, Poland (€ million)  
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Table 6.11 Projected public expenditure for residential care services, Poland (% of GDP) 
  DELAY CONST PREV CHRON BIOL SMOK TREND noSMOK noSquit  BMI LEAN FAT 
2010  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
2020  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05 
2030  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
2040  0.09  0.07  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09 
2050  0.11  0.08  0.12  0.12  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.12 
2060  0.14  0.09  0.15  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.13  0.15 
                         
pp change 2010-2060  0.10  0.05  0.11  0.11  0.08  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.10 
% change 2010-2060   235  121  258  267  206  210  238  248  248  238  230  256 
diff 2060 to DELAY pp     -0.05  0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01 
 
6.3.2  Simulation results  
For the simulations, for each of the representative countries patterns of formal care use and costs per 
users have been substituted to the other countries’ levels. This section considers what the impact of 
such changes would be on a country’s future long-term care expenditure. Tables 6.12 and 6.13 show 
the results for public and private expenditure of applying the probabilities of residential and home care 
use and the costs per user of the ‘column countries’ to the projected number of older persons by age, 
gender and disability of the ‘row countries’. The scenario utilised for these simulations is the base 
scenario. Public unit costs are based on SHA data for all countries; private unit costs are based on 
SHA data for Germany, Spain and Poland and on CVZ data for the Netherlands.  
Of course, for all countries, simulated public expenditures are highest applying the high Dutch care 
use probabilities and unit costs and lowest using the Polish profile. Also, as Tables 6.12 and 6.13 
show,  the  projected  expenditures  are  highest  if  applied  to  the  Polish  population  structure,  mainly 
reflecting the high prevalence of disability at older age in Poland (Bonneux, van der Gaag & Bijwaard, 
2012). Simulated private expenditure is highest using the Dutch and German probabilities and unit 
costs. Whereas in the Netherlands, private expenditure as a percentage of GDP is high mainly because 
of the high prevalence of formal care use, in Germany the high private expenditure is rather due to the 
high private costs for residential care.  
Table 6.12 Simulations of public expenditure, 2010 and 2060 (% of GDP) 
    Probability and unit cost 
  Germany    Netherlands    Spain    Poland 
2010  Formal home  Residential Formal home  Residential Formal home  Residential  Residential 
Germany  0.30  0.46  0.80  2.10  0.10  0.24  0.02 
Netherlands  0.18  0.24  0.47  1.33  0.06  0.16  0.01 
Spain  0.34  0.60  0.90  2.50  0.11  0.25  0.02 
Poland  0.56  1.11  1.45  3.61  0.19  0.34  0.04 
    Probability and unit cost 
  Germany    Netherlands    Spain    Poland 
2060  Formal home  Residential Formal home  Residential Formal home  Residential  Residential 
Germany  0.73  1.26  1.79  6.99  0.23  0.57  0.04 
Netherlands  0.42  0.62  1.09  4.29  0.14  0.37  0.03 
Spain  0.74  1.34  1.84  7.00  0.24  0.57  0.04 
Poland  1.88  3.89  4.23  15.48  0.63  1.16  0.13 
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Table 6.13 Simulations of private expenditure, 2010 and 2060 (% of GDP) 
    Probability and unit cost 
  Germany    Netherlands  Spain    Poland 
2010  Formal home  Residential  Total  Formal home  Residential  Residential 
Germany  0.07  0.25  0.36  0.03  0.12  0.00 
Netherlands  0.04  0.13  0.22  0.02  0.09  0.00 
Spain  0.08  0.37  0.42  0.03  0.14  0.00 
Poland  0.14  0.61  0.64  0.05  0.19  0.01 
    Probability and unit cost  
  Germany    Netherlands  Spain    Poland 
2060  Formal home  Residential  Total  Formal home  Residential  Residential 
Germany  0.18  0.69  0.96  0.06  0.28  0.01 
Netherlands  0.10  0.34  0.58  0.04  0.21  0.00 
Spain  0.18  0.82  0.97  0.06  0.32  0.01 
Poland  0.46  2.13  2.19  0.17  0.65  0.02 
 
6.4  Conclusions 
The projections of long-term care expenditure for Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland are 
based on projected numbers of long-term care users from WP 6 of the ANCIEN project. These care 
use projections take account of trends in demography and disability and of current probabilities of 
using different types of LTC by age, gender, disability and other relevant characteristics.  
Under the base scenario, for all four countries the proportions of GDP spent on public and private 
long-term care are projected to more than double between 2010 and 2060, and even treble in some 
cases. The base scenario assumes care costs to rise in line with AWG assumptions about trends in 
GDP per hour worked. It further assumes a moderate delay of disability. Sensitivity analyses have 
shown that even under a more optimistic disability scenario LTC expenditure is still expected to rise 
considerably. This is mainly due to the large projected increases in numbers of care users, driven by 
population ageing.  
The chapter also highlights the huge differences in LTC expenditure between the four countries. In the 
Netherlands, the level of public spending on residential care was about 1.3% of GDP in 2010 and it is 
projected to rise to about 4.3% of GDP in 2060. Current and projected public spending on residential 
care is much lower in Poland: 0.04% of GDP in 2010 and 0.13% in 2060.  
If growing demand for LTC will be partially met by formal care services, all four countries will be 
confronted with rising LTC expenditures. Whether this will be sustainable depends on many factors, 
not in the least on trends in GDP and on the long-term consequences of the current financial and 
economic crisis. Rising pressures on public financing also need to be considered in relation to trends 
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7.  Overall evaluation of performance 
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7.1  Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the performance of different long term care (LTC) systems across 
Europe. To the extent possible, it brings together information on all dimensions of the performance 
framework that is described in chapter 2. The analysis in this chapter is based on the results of other 
work packages of the ANCIEN FP7 project and other elements of the current work package (WP7). 
We provide assessment following a performance framework; that is we evaluate the performance of 
the different LTC systems along several dimensions. The rationale for this approach is that there is no 
single indicator that could capture the performance or efficiency of a LTC system in itself. In this 
chapter we summarise available results for the following goals of the LTC systems: quality of care, 
improving functional ability and minimising the need for LTC, accessibility of care, total burden of 
care, support for informal caregivers and choice of setting and providers. These evaluations are based 
on system level data. Two separate studies of ANCIEN work package 7 provide a detailed analysis of 
the quality of life of LTC users and of the equity aspects of care (see chapters 4 and 5). The goals 
‘integration with healthcare and social services and coordination’ and ‘simplicity of the system and 
information’  are  not  discussed  here,  because  we  do  not  have  sufficient  information.  Possibly  the 
evaluation  of  quality  of  life  and  quality  of  care  partly  captures  the  aspects  of  integration  and 
simplicity/information.  
Ideally we would provide the complete performance analysis for the wide range of European countries 
included  in  the  ANCIEN  project.  However,  due  to  data  limitations,  several  countries  cannot  be 
covered concerning some of the dimensions of the evaluation framework. In those cases we focus on 
representative countries, basically Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain. These countries were 
identified  as  representative  of  four  clusters  of  LTC  systems  by  Kraus  et  al.  (2010).  Germany 
represents countries with LTC systems oriented towards informal care and high support for informal 
caregivers. The Netherlands is representative for generous LTC systems which are oriented towards 
formal care with good accessibility. Spain represents LTC systems oriented towards informal care 
with high private financing. Finally, Poland represents countries with low public spending on LTC, 
low informal care support, and where informal care seems to be a necessity. 
In the rest of this chapter we analyse the performance of the LTC systems step by step along the 
specified dimensions of performance. In section 7.8 we provide an overall evaluation of the different 
systems. 
7.2  Quality of care 
High quality  of LTC is essential  in  order to achieve general satisfaction among the users, and to 
improve  their  quality  of  life.  The  quality  of  care  in  itself  also  has  several  dimensions.  We  can 
distinguish  the  effectiveness,  safety,  responsiveness  of  the  care,  and  also  the  dimension  of 
coordination, including the timeliness, continuity and integration of the provided care. It is difficult to 
measure  all  the  aspects  of  quality,  and  especially  difficult  to  find  comparable  indicators  across 
countries. In this section we follow two approaches to provide comparable indicators on the quality of 
care. The first approach is based on the data collected in work package 5 of the ANCIEN project, and 
the second approach is based on the Eurobarometer data. These approaches complement each other, as 
the focus is on different aspects of quality. In addition, we also refer to results on nursing home quality 
from the SHELTER project. 
                                                   
35  This research  was  conducted  by  TARKI  Social  Research Institute  (Budapest). The  author  is  grateful  for 
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The first approach uses the data collected in work package 5; details about the data are provided by 
Dandi  et  al.  (2012).
36  This  approach  focuses  on  the  quality  evaluation  structure  in  the  countries 
covered by the survey. Therefore WP5 yields extensive information  on national  quality indicators 
collected, but it is more difficult to find internationally comparable information on the quality of care 
level. Using the information on the existing number of policies that pertain to quality dimensions 
(overall 16 variables), a score can be obtained on the intensity of LTC quality policy in each country. 
The variables containing quality dimension were weighted by the corresponding factor loadings in 
Dandi et al. (2012), and, finally, the so-obtained values were rescaled to the 0-100 range, with 100 
corresponding to the highest quality policy score.
37 These results are presented in the first column of 
Table 7.1, with the scores normalised to the 0-100 scale. The main advantage of this approach is that 
the number of policies is immediately comparable across countries. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that these results reflect the quality of LTC only if a higher number of quality policies implies 
higher quality. This assumption is questionable if the higher number of policies is the result of existing 
problems with LTC quality. Therefore it is important to extend the analysis of quality with a focus on 
the value of the available quality indicators, not just on the number of indicators. 
Table 7.1 Quality indicators  
  Quality score (0-100)  Eurobarometer quality (1-4) 
  Policies  At home  Nursing homes 
SE  96.9  2.94  2.92 
FR  75  3.08  3.06 
UK  71.9  2.83 (GB)  2.70 (GB) 
LV  68.8  2.52  2.56 
ES  64.1  2.8  2.74 
NL  62.5  2.92  2.79 
EE  56.3  2.51  2.43 
FI  56.3  2.72  2.74 
DE  56.3  2.82  2.58 
SK  56.3  2.53  2.52 
HU  50  2.5  2.56 
IT  46.9  2.39  2.46 
AT  43.8  2.95  2.81 
SI  15.6  2.82  2.75 
PL  12.5  2.38  2.28 
Source: ANCIEN WP 5 data, as described by Dandi et al. (2012), and Eurobarometer 67.3 
The above indicator of the quality policies can be complemented with the information available in the 
Eurobarometer 67.3 survey. The European Commission conducts the Eurobarometer survey twice a 
year, collecting information on the public opinion in the European Union. The country specific sample 
size is around 1,000. Apart from the standard topics, the survey also addresses various special topics. 
The Eurobarometer 67.3 survey is titled "Health care Service, Undeclared Work, EU Relations with its 
Neighbour Countries, and Development Aid", and it also provides information on the observed quality 
of LTC services. Among others, the respondents were asked to evaluate the quality of specified health 
services,  including  care  services  for  dependent  people  in  their  home,  and  the  quality  of  nursing 
                                                   
36 The results based on ANCIEN Work Package 5 were provided us by Georgia Casanova, Roberto Dandi and 
Roberto Naranek. We are grateful for their collaboration. 
37 Details on the methodology are available from Georgia Casanova (geo.casanova@gmail.com) and Roberto 
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homes.
38 This survey was conducted during May - June 2007. The advantage of using this data set is 
that  it  provides  a  general  measure  of  the  quality  of  LTC services  for  a  wide  range  of  European 
countries. The main drawback is that this is a subjective measure, and differences across countries 
might reflect different responding styles instead of differences in the quality of services. 
We  report  the  average  of  the  reported  indicators  in  the  last  two  columns  of  Table  7.1  for  those 
countries which are also covered by the data collected in the ANCIEN work package 5. The indicators 
are scaled so that 1 corresponds to very bad quality, and 4 corresponds to very good quality. Based on 
these indicators only a relatively small variation can be observed in the quality of services across the 
analysed countries. The average of the reported quality of the two types of LTC services is close to 
each other for all of the countries. According to these statistics, the quality of services is generally low 
in the new member states, whereas it is relatively high in Austria, Germany, France, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. Although the statistics reported in the first and last two columns of the table are based on 
very different approaches, those indicators still have positive correlation with correlation coefficients 
of 0.4 (care at home) and 0.5 (nursing homes). 
Frijters et al. (2012) also provide indicators on the quality of nursing homes in eight countries: the 
Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Israel, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Their study is part of the SHELTER project. The SHELTER data collection in Europe started  in 
autumn 2009 and  was finished  early 2011. The SHELTER data sample consists  of  nursing  home 
patients from 59 private and public long term care facilities. The aim was to recruit on average 500 
residents per country. Based on the available information, Frijters et al. rank the overall quality of 
nursing homes in the analysed eight countries. According to this ranking, institutions in the UK have 
the lowest quality, the Dutch institutions are ranked as the fourth, the German as the fifth. In their 
study the average quality is found to be the highest in the Czech Republic. Although these results are 
based on a relatively low number of nursing homes, these still reflect that focusing purely on the 
quality policies can be misleading when assessing the quality of LTC services. 
7.3  Improving functional ability 
One  goal  of  the  LTC  systems  is  to  improve  functional  ability  and  minimise  the  need  for  LTC. 
However,  the  prevalence  of  ADL  limitations  depends  on  several  other  factors,  apart  from  the 
efficiency of LTC. It is strongly affected by demography, by the overall healthcare system, by the 
individuals' behaviour, and so on. In this sense we can consider the health infrastructure in a country 
(interaction  of prevention, healthcare and LTC)  more  efficient  if the ratio  of people having  ADL 
limitations is lower. In this section we take a step towards identifying the effect of LTC systems in 
determining the need for care. In fact, what we do is decompose the effect of demography from the 
rest of the influencing factors. We have to keep in mind that LTC is only one part of these remaining 
factors. 
The following analysis is based on the work of Bonneux et al. (2012). They provide projections on the 
numbers of elderly care-dependent persons in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland. Bonneux 
et al. find that in a given country the main determinant of the future number of disabled elderly is the 
demographic structure of the population. In particular, the ageing of the large baby boom cohorts plays 
an important role. Risk factors, such as obesity and smoking, have little influence. Because of the 
demographic compositions, they predict the largest relative increase in the number of disabled by 2040 
for the Netherlands, and the smallest for Germany. 
In  this  decomposition  exercise  we  compare  the  influencing  role  of  demography  not  with  that  of 
individual risk factors, but with the role of the other country specific factors which include also the 
                                                   
38 The survey question is stated as "Thinking now about your own experiences of healthcare services in (OUR 
COUNTRY) and those of people close to you, please tell me if you think the quality of each of the following is 
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role of the LTC system. We do this with the help of simulations: we predict the number of disabled 
people  in  a  given  country  using  the  demographic  structure  of  this  country,  but  the  age-specific 
prevalence rates  of another country. The input  of this simulation  is the same as for the report of 
Bonneux et al. (2012). We use the "delay" scenario, i.e. we assume that the delay of the age, gender 
and country specific prevalence rates are comparable to the delay of mortality. This is the baseline 
scenario of Bonneux et al. (2012). The demography projections are based on the EUROPOP2008. 
(Except  for  the  projections  for  the  whole  population,  where  we  use  EUROPOP2010  numbers,  as 
available online from the Eurostat.) So as to maintain comparability with the results of Bonneux et al. 
(2012), we look at disability only for the population aged 65 and older. Thus we implicitly assume that 
the prevalence rate of disability at younger ages is negligible. We present predictions for year 2040. 
Table 7.2 shows the predicted ratio of people with ADL limitations within the 65+ age group. The 
numbers on the diagonals reveal that the predicted disability rate is the highest in Poland, whereas the 
lowest in the Netherlands. The differences in the demographic compositions play little role in the 
differences in the predicted disability rates within this age group. Whichever demographic structure 
we apply, Poland fares the worst, whereas the Netherlands the best. Thus the cross country differences 
in the predicted disability rates are not due to the different demographic structures within the aged 65+ 
group, but due to other factors, among others to the LTC systems. 
Table 7.2 2040 prevalence rate within the 65+ population 
Males    Prevalence       
    DE  ES  NL  PL 
  DE  0.19  0.19  0.13  0.34 
Demography  ES  0.17  0.17  0.12  0.32 
  NL  0.18  0.19  0.13  0.34 
  PL  0.18  0.18  0.13  0.33 
Females    Prevalence       
    DE  ES  NL  PL 
  DE  0.23  0.28  0.21  0.43 
Demography  ES  0.22  0.26  0.19  0.41 
  NL  0.23  0.27  0.21  0.43 
  PL  0.23  0.28  0.21  0.43 
Total    Prevalence       
    DE  ES  NL  PL 
  DE  0.21  0.24  0.17  0.39 
Demography  ES  0.2  0.22  0.16  0.37 
  NL  0.21  0.23  0.17  0.38 
  PL  0.21  0.24  0.17  0.39 
 
What  about  the  predicted  increase  in  the  number  of  disabled?  Not  surprisingly,  this  increase  is 
influenced by demography much more. As Table 7.3 reveals, in all countries the number of disabled is 
predicted to roughly double by 2040. The simulations show that this increase could be much higher or 
lower, depending on the demographic composition. For example, combining the Polish prevalence 
rates with the demography of the Netherlands would imply a huge increase in the predicted number of 
disabled. Applying the German and Dutch prevalence rates implies the lowest increase in the number 
of people living with disabilities, whereas the Dutch demographic composition leads to the highest 
simulated increase, and the Polish to the lowest. 
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Table 7.3 Growth rate of the number of disabled (aged 65+) from 2008 to 2040 
Males    Prevalence       
    DE  ES  NL  PL 
  DE  1.9  1.91  1.33  3.44 
Demography  ES  1.9  1.94  1.31  3.57 
  NL  3.32  3.35  2.32  6.06 
  PL  1.19  1.2  0.83  2.19 
Females    Prevalence       
    DE  ES  NL  PL 
  DE  1.45  1.72  1.29  2.67 
Demography  ES  1.42  1.68  1.24  2.66 
  NL  2.09  2.48  1.86  3.86 
  PL  0.97  1.16  0.87  1.8 
 
Finally, we also analyse the ratio of disabled (aged 65+) and the predicted number of total population. 
This indicator provides some insight on the burden of LTC need on the total population. Table 7.4 
shows these simulation results. Again, Poland is predicted to fare the worst, where around 10% of the 
total population is predicted to have ADL limitations by 2040. According to the simulations, this high 
ratio is basically due to the high age-specific prevalence rates, i.e. to factors other than demography. 
However, a demographic structure such as Germany has would make the situation even worse. 
From these decomposition exercises we can conclude that holding the demographic composition the 
same across the countries, the Polish system implies the highest disability ratio for the future, whereas 
the Dutch system the lowest. In terms of the predicted disability rate, the German system is estimated 
to be somewhat more efficient than the Spanish one. Again, these differences are due not only to the 
LTC systems, but also to the overall country specific characteristics, apart from demography. 
Table 7.4 2040 prevalence rate within the total population 
Males    Prevalence       
    DE  ES  NL  PL 
  DE  0.06  0.06  0.04  0.1 
Demography  ES  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.08 
  NL  0.05  0.05  0.03  0.08 
  PL  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.07 
Females    Prevalence       
    DE  ES  NL  PL 
  DE  0.08  0.1  0.07  0.15 
Demography  ES  0.07  0.08  0.06  0.12 
  NL  0.07  0.08  0.06  0.12 
  PL  0.07  0.08  0.06  0.12 
 
7.4  Accessibility 
The goal of accessibility implies that ideally everyone who has need for care should have access to it. 
The  accessibility  also  has  more  dimensions:  the  access  should  be  on  time,  without  geographical 
disparities, and without differences across income groups. In this section we analyse the utilisation 
rates  of  the  different  types  of  LTC  services.  These  can  be  considered  as  composite  indicators  of 
accessibility, as these cannot reveal the sources of variation in utilisation rates, e.g. if the differences 
are due to the insufficient number of providers, to large geographic disparities in accessibility, or to 
some  other  factors.  Nevertheless,  a  higher  ratio  of  utilisation  can  indicate  better  accessibility  on 102  ANIKÓ BÍRÓ 
 
average. The source of the data used here is again the data collected by the IHS as part of the ANCIEN 
first work package. 
The survey provides information on the number of people aged 65+ utilising the three types of LTC 
services,  and  also  on  the  number  of  people  aged  65+  who  are  considered  to  be  in  need  of  care 
(including lower levels of care). Figure 7.1 shows the ratio of users to those in need of care. We 
present these statistics only for those countries for which the user statistics for all three types of care 
are available. Overall, the utilisation rate (sum of the three service types) is the highest in Finland and 
Sweden, whereas the lowest in Hungary. The total utilisation rate is also relatively high in Denmark 
and Germany – the accessibility of formal home based services is among the highest ones in Denmark, 
and the accessibility of informal care is among the highest ones in Germany. Thus there is a large 
variation in the accessibility (and demand) for the different types of care. 
Figure 7.1 Ratio of care users and people in need of care, aged 65+ 
Source: IHS data, ANCIEN WP1. 
As the number of people in need might be measured with noise, we also relate the number of users to 
the total population aged 65+, using the Eurostat statistics. These results are shown in Figure 7.2. The 
general pattern across the countries is similar to the utilisation relative to people in need. This second 
set of indicators shows the highest overall utilisation rate in Belgium, and the lowest in Denmark and 
Germany. However, these differences can be due not only to differences in accessibility, but also to 
differences in the level of need. 
Kraus et al. (2010) construct an alternative indicator of accessibility, which is the sum of means testing 
and entitlements (where entitlement refers to the legal right to receive certain benefits). Entitlement 
implies that everyone who fulfils the eligibility criteria must be granted services, thus it can reduce the 
uncertainty about access to LTC. Accessibility is considered to be higher if there is no means testing in 
either institutional or home-based care and there are entitlements to both types of care. We rescale the 
accessibility indicator of Kraus et al. (2010) to the 0-4 scale. Score 0 corresponds to means-tested 
access in both institutional care and home based care, and no entitlement to either type of care. The 
other extreme is 4, which corresponds to no means testing and to entitlement to both types of care. 
Based on this alternative indicator, the accessibility of LTC services is relatively high in all of the 
analysed countries, being the lowest in England and in Romania. A limitation of this indicator is that it 
might not always reflect the actual availability of services - for example, people may be entitled to 
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Figure 7.2 Ratio of care users and population aged 65+  
Source: IHS data, ANCIEN WP1 and Eurostat.  
 
Figure 7.3 Accessibility indicator, based on means testing and entitlement 
Source: Kraus et al. (2010). 
 
7.5  Burden of long term care
39 
A good LTC system should ensure that the burden of LTC is manageable, now and in the future. One 
aspect of a manageable burden is financial: the financing of the system should be robust, and the total 
expenditures on LTC (public and private) should be affordable. For the future this could be captured 
e.g. by the predicted share of LTC expenditures in GDP. A second aspect of the total burden is the 
current and predicted burden of informal care giving. A third aspect is that a sufficient supply of care 
can be ensured also for the future. This means that the number of users should not expand too rapidly 
relative to the available supply of care. This depends on the development in supply of formal and 
informal care as well as the development in the demand for care. Thus this goal is closely related to 
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the  goal  of limiting the problems  with  ADL,  discussed in section 7.3, as the  demand for care is 
strongly influenced by the prevalence of ADL difficulties. 
In this section we analyse aspects of the burden of care with the help of simulations. The simulation 
results presented in this section build on the projections of Geerts, Willemé & Comas-Herrera (2012). 
We  start  by  discussing  the  projected  future  use  of  care  in  section  7.5.1.  This  is  followed  by  a 
discussion of the current and future financial burden in sections 7.5.2 and 7.5.3, respectively. Section 
7.5.4 discusses the burden of informal care giving. 
7.5.1  Use of care 
Geerts, Willemé & Comas-Herrera (2012) provide projections on the number of LTC users for the 
four  representative  countries,  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Poland  and  Spain.  They  base  their 
projections on a macro simulation model, and analyse different scenarios. In this model the first step is 
the projection of population by age, gender and disability level. This is based on the work of Bonneux 
et al. (2012). The second part of the model projects the number of users of different types of LTC. The 
details on the projection methodology and data sources are described by Geerts, Willemé & Comas-
Herrera (2012). They find that the number of care users is expected to increase in all four countries 
within the next 50 years, but the composition of the projected use of care differs across the countries, 
the residential care use increasing the most in the Netherlands, whereas the informal and formal home 
care use increasing the most in Spain. 
The simulation  exercise that  we  do  here is similar to the  exercise  of section 7.3. We predict the 
number of LTC users in the analysed four countries, where we use the demographic structure of one 
country, and the probabilities of care use of another country. LTC utilisation is predicted only for 
people aged 65 and above. Due to data limitations, for Poland only the number of users of residential 
care can be predicted. The aim of this exercise is again to decompose the effect of demography from 
all the other factors, where the other factors include the effect of the LTC systems. The population 
forecast by age, gender and disability level is based on the “delay scenario” of Bonneux et al. (2012), 
which assumes that disability incidence is delayed to older ages with the same amount of time as 
mortality is delayed. Here we present the predictions for year 2040. 
Table  7.5  shows  the  utilisation  rates  within  the  65+  population.  The  demographic  structures  of 
Germany, the Netherlands and Spain lead to similar predictions, whereas using the Polish demography 
the predicted rates of utilisation are considerably higher. This difference is rather due to the higher 
disability rates in Poland than to the Polish age composition. It can be also seen that the variation 
across the service types are mainly due to factors other than the different demographic structures. For 
example, the relatively high prevalence of residential care use in the Netherlands remains no matter 
which country's demographic structure we apply. 
Table 7.5 2040 utilisation rate within the 65+ population (row country: demography) 
Probability country               
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DE  0.053  0.168  0.046  0.053  0.149  0.049  0.115  0.045  0.078  0.007 
ES  0.051  0.17  0.049  0.054  0.149  0.047  0.114  0.048  0.075  0.007 
NL  0.045  0.161  0.034  0.046  0.127  0.047  0.101  0.037  0.072  0.006 
PL  0.078  0.203  0.094  0.086  0.237  0.058  0.156  0.072  0.119  0.013 
 
Next, we take a look at the predicted growth rates of the number of LTC users (Table 7.6). These 
indicators are the highest for the Netherlands, which can be explained by the age structure of the 
Dutch population. This is in line with the results presented in Table 7.3. The differences in the country OVERALL EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE  105 
 
specific utilisation rates make little difference in the predicted growth of users. Thus, while the ratio of 
users is only weakly dependent on the age, gender and disability composition of the population, and 
depends strongly on the rest of the factors (among others the LTC systems), the growth rate in LTC 
users is determined strongly by the demographic composition. 
Table 7.6 Growth rate of the number of users from 2010 to 2040 (row country: demography) 
Probability country             
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DE  1.69  1.51  1.71  1.62  1.62  1.65  1.62  1.41  1.94  1.59 
ES  1.79  1.86  1.75  1.8  1.77  1.87  1.77  1.71  1.92  1.73 
NL  2.03  1.92  2.08  2.03  2.02  2.07  2.06  1.79  2.39  1.99 
PL  2.06  1.87  2.21  2.08  1.95  2.1  1.82  1.59  2.59  1.99 
 
Finally,  similarly  as  in  section  7.3,  we  relate  the  number  of  users  to  the  predictions  on  the  total 
population (using again the EUROPOP2010 projections for the total population). These calculations 
are presented in Table 7.7. The ratio of LTC users within the total population is influenced both by the 
demographic composition and by the other factors, including the LTC institutions. Comparing these 
two influencing factors, the demographic structure has a somewhat weaker influencing role. In terms 
of residential care use Poland has the lowest projected rate, which is due to the low prevalence of 
residential care in the Polish LTC system. On the other hand, the relatively high ratio of informal care 
use in Germany is partly due to the German population structure, and partly due to the generally 
widespread use of informal care there. 
Table 7.7 2040 utilisation rate within the total population (row country: demography) 
Probability country             
  DE  ES  NL  PL 



























DE  0.017  0.055  0.015  0.017  0.048  0.016  0.038  0.014  0.025  0.002 
ES  0.014  0.047  0.014  0.015  0.042  0.013  0.032  0.014  0.021  0.002 
NL  0.012  0.043  0.009  0.012  0.034  0.013  0.027  0.01  0.019  0.002 
PL  0.02  0.05  0.023  0.021  0.059  0.014  0.039  0.018  0.03  0.003 
 
The simulations presented in this subsection show that future utilisation rates of LTC services are 
heavily influenced by factors other than the age, gender and disability specific population projections. 
Informal care use is predicted to be high using the German and Spanish probabilities of care use, no 
matter which country's population structure we apply. Nevertheless, applying the Polish population 
structure leads to the highest projections. The residential care use is predicted to be the highest using 
the  Dutch  utilisation  rates,  again  irrespective  of  the  population  structure.  The  growth  rate  of  the 
number of LTC users, however, is influenced strongly by the demographic structure. In this aspect the 
Netherlands is predicted to face the highest increase in utilisation. This indicates a potential shortage 
of caregivers in the future (“care-gap”). 
7.5.2  Current financial burden 
In this section we analyse the public sources spent on LTC, and the need for private financing. We 
focus here on the current statistics, and we also discuss here the funding structure of LTC services. We 106  ANIKÓ BÍRÓ 
 
again use data from the WP 1 of the ANCIEN project, as there are few other comparable data on 
expenditures on LTC.
40 For example, the Eurostat provides information on expenditures on nursing 
and  residential  care  facilities,  but  this  information  is  missing  for  many  countries,  out  of  the  four 
representative countries this is available only for Spain. The OECD provides statistics only on the 
expenditures on long-term nursing care. Instead of these statistics, we also use statistics on public LTC 
expenditures from the Ageing Working Group (AWG).
41  
We have information on the composition of LTC funding, and on the expenditures on LTC services. 
These statistics are reported in Table 7.8. The total (public plus private) expenditures as a share of 
GDP are relatively small in all countries. According to this indicator,  the Dutch and the Swedish 
systems are the most expensive. This can be due to a higher rate of utilisation of LTC services or to a 
less efficient provision of a similar amount of services. The classification provided by Kraus et al. 
(2010) shows that these two countries are characterised by generous LTC systems oriented towards 
formal  care.  On  the  other  hand,  this  indicator  is  lower  in  countries  where  informal  care  is  more 
widespread, as the opportunity costs of informal care provision are not captured by the indicator of 
aggregate  expenditures.  These  statistics  are  in  line  with  the  AWG  statistics  on  the  public  LTC 
expenditures. 
Table 7.8 Indicators of affordability 
  Total expend. 
on LTC, % GDP  
Public expend. on  
LTC, % GDP (AWG) 
Financial contributions on LTC (% total) 
      social insurance  taxes  private 
  %  %  %  %  % 
Austria  1-1.5  1.30  0  61-80  21-40 
Belgium  1.5-2  1.50  41-60  21-40  1-20 
Czech Rep.    0.20  61-80  21-40  1-20 
Denmark  1.5-2  1.70  1-20  81-100  1-20 
Estonia  0-0.5  0.10  41-60  21-40  1-20 
Finland  1.5-2  1.80  1-20  61-80  21-40 
France  1-1.5  1.40  41-60  21-40  21-40 
Germany  1-1.5  0.90  81-100  1-20  1-20 
Hungary  0.5-1  0.30  1-20  61-80  21-40 
Italy  1.5-2  1.70       
Latvia  0-0.5  0.40  21-40  21-40  1-20 
Netherlands  2-  2.10  61-80  1-20  1-20 
Poland    0.40      21-40 
Romania    0.00      21-40 
Slovakia  0-0.5  0.20  41-60  21-40  1-20 
Slovenia  1-1.5  1.10  41-60  21-40  21-40 
Spain  0.5-1  0.50    41-60  21-40 
Sweden  2-  3.50  1-20  81-100  1-20 
England  1.5-2  0.80  1-20  61-80  21-40 
Source: Data collected by IHS (ANCIEN WP 1) and AWG. 
 
                                                   
40 We are grateful to Markus Kraus and Monika Riedel at IHS (Vienna) for providing us the requested data. We 
also use data provided by the IHS in Sections 7.4 and 7.7. 
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As the second part of Table 7.8 shows, in all countries the major part of LTC expenditures is financed 
by public sources, either by taxes or by social contributions. Higher reliance on private sources might 
indicate  lower accessibility  of LTC, unless there  is  a proper compensation scheme for the poorer 
individuals. Thus the analysis of equity issues in chapter 5 complements the information inherent in 
the  financing  structure.  There  is  no  clear  pattern  across  the  countries  on  the  reliance  on  private 
funding, and the ratio of private sources is found to be uncorrelated with the ratio of total expenditures 
within GDP, based on the reported indicators. 
7.5.3  Predicted financial burden 
We measure the future financial burden by the predicted expenditures on residential and formal home 
care relative to GDP in 2040. If the expenditures are predicted to increase much faster than the GDP, 
then that can indicate future financial problems. We do not consider here the financing side of the 
systems, and simply assume that a LTC system with higher expenditures relative to GDP is financially 
less  affordable  in  the  future.  Table  7.9  and  Table  7.10  show  the  predicted  public  and  private 
expenditures. These projections are produced by multiplying the projected numbers of care users with 
average costs per user. The base year unit costs are based on data from the Ageing Working Group of 
the European Policy Committee and System of Health Account (SHA) database of the OECD. Details 
on the methodology are provided in chapter 6. As before, we disentangle the effect of demographic 
factors from the rest of the influencing factors. Thus we apply the population structure of the "row 
country", but use the usage probabilities and unit costs of care of the “column country”. Again, these 
simulations are based on the "delay" bio-demographic scenario of Bonneux et al. (2012), and it is 
assumed that the unit costs of care evolve in line with the GDP per hour worked, reflecting the highly 
labour intensive character of LTC services. Missing simulation results in the tables are due to the lack 
of appropriate data. 
Table 7.9 2040 public LTC expenditures as percentage of GDP (row country: demography) 
Usage and unit cost country       
  DE  ES  NL  PL 














DE  0.6  0.932  0.191  0.467  1.526  4.794  0.035 
ES  0.497  0.854  0.165  0.383  1.285  3.885  0.03 
NL  0.391  0.532  0.126  0.339  1.014  3.325  0.028 
PL  1.231  2.64  0.427  0.762  2.829  10.01  0.087 
 
Based on Table 7.9, the projected Dutch public expenditures on residential and formal home care are 
the highest among the four analysed countries. However, the simulated expenditures are considerably 
higher if the Polish demographic structure is applied to the usage rates and unit costs. The predicted 
public expenditures in the Netherlands are high because of the high utilisation of formal LTC services, 
but still these expenditures are predicted to be only around 4.3 percentage of the GDP due to the 
relatively favourable demographic structure of the country. 
The predicted private expenditures on residential and formal home care (Table 7.10) are lower than the 
public expenditures, but the pattern of the differences among the countries is similar to the public 
expenditures. The main difference is that the predicted total private expenditures relative to GDP are 
similar with using the German or the Dutch usage rates and unit costs. Again, applying the Polish 
demographic structure strongly increases the predicted expenditures. 
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Table 7.10 2040 private LTC expenditures as percentage of GDP (row country: demography) 
Usage and unit cost country     
  DE  ES  NL  PL 







care  Total  Residential 
care 
DE  0.146  0.508  0.05  0.23  0.741  0.005 
ES  0.121  0.526  0.044  0.213  0.614  0.005 
NL  0.095  0.29  0.033  0.188  0.501  0.004 
PL  0.301  1.441  0.112  0.423  1.444  0.013 
 
Although due to the lack of appropriate data we do not have predictions for the expenditures on formal 
home care in Poland, based on the available evidence we can still assume that those expenditures are 
of similarly small magnitude as the expenditures on residential care. Based on these considerations the 
Netherlands is estimated to face the highest expenditures on formal LTC within the next thirty years, 
followed by Germany, Spain, and Poland. The Polish demographic structure increases the predicted 
expenditures  to  a  high  extent,  but  this  demographic  effect  still  leaves  the  public  and  private 
expenditures small in Poland, mainly due to the small usage rates. 
7.5.4  Burden of informal caregiving 
The  analysis  of  predicted  expenditures  on  LTC  misses  the  costs  of  informal  care  giving.  If  the 
expenditures on formal care are relatively low, it does not necessarily imply that the total burden of 
care is indeed manageable. It might be the case that the burden of caregiving falls on the informal 
caregivers, and the increasing demand for care can still undermine the sustainability of the system. It is 
a difficult task to provide monetary estimates for the financial burden (opportunity cost) of informal 
caregiving. In this section we present some other indicators which provide information on the current 
burden of informal caregiving and on the future prospects of informal care systems. 
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) provides some crude measures on 
the hours spent on informal care. Using these measures, Bolin, Lindgren & Lundborg (2008) estimate 
the average  of  weekly hours of  informal caregiving in the countries covered by the  first wave  of 
SHARE. We repeat their results in Table 7.11. These statistics are conditional on caregiving, and 
indicate that caregiving in terms of weekly hours is the most intensive in the Mediterranean countries. 
Table 7.11 Informal care hours 
  Weekly hours of informal care given, if nonzero  Weekly hours of informal care  received, 
if nonzero (for users of home care)    Males  Females 
  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Austria  4.57  12.85  4.75  6.91     
Denmark  2.25  4.42  2.68  6.08     
France  3.02  6.15  3.74  5.12     
Germany  6.7  14.7  6.59  11.23  34.04  55.86 
Greece  4.88  9.52  10.2  13.9     
Italy  4.99  12.25  15.38  26.38     
Netherlands  3.76  15.84  4.8  6.5  17.24  34.38 
Spain  3.76  6.35  11.72  26.46     
Sweden  1.65  2.12  2.43  4.36     
Switzerland  2.27  5.19  2.5  4.94     
Source: Bolin, Lindgren and Lundborg (2008), Table 3 and AdHOC data from I. Carpenter. 
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The Aged in Home Care (AdHOC) project also collected information on the hours of informal care, 
but not from the supply side but from the demand side perspective. The information concerns persons 
who use formal home care. Iain Carpenter kindly provided us descriptive statistics on the average 
weekly hours of home care received in Germany and the Netherlands. We present these statistics in 
the second part of Table 7.11. The actual hours of care received vary strongly with the amount of ADL 
limitations and cognitive impairments the patients have. Conditional on receiving home care, the hours 
of care in Germany are about twice as much as in the Netherlands. Further information on the AdHOC 
project is provided by Carpenter et al. (2004). 
As we do not have a suitable indicator on the monetary value of informal care, we quantify the burden 
of informal caregiving by the projected demand for informal caregivers. Pickard & King (2012a) in 
Table 7-3 report the predicted necessary number of informal caregivers, assuming constant ratios of 
caregivers to care users. These predictions are not available for Poland. As caregivers are typically 
aged 50 and above, we relate the demand for caregivers to the predicted 50+ population in 2040, using 
the EUROPOP2010 predictions.
42 We report these numbers in Table 7.12. The relative demand for 
informal caregivers is much lower in the Netherlands than in Germany and Spain. This is in line with 
the heavy reliance of the Dutch LTC system on formal care. 
We also generate an alternative indicator of the demand for informal caregivers, in order to obtain a 
comparative indicator for Poland as well. Here we use the data on the number of informal caregivers 
in 2010, as reported by Pickard & King (2012b), Table 5-6. We assume that the ratio of informal 
caregivers relative to the disabled people aged 65 and above remains constant. Using the projections of 
Bonneux et al. (2012) (DELAY scenario) on disabilities, we can thus generate an estimate of the 
future number of caregivers needed. In the last column of Table 7.12 we present the ratio of the so 
predicted number of caregivers relative to the predicted 50+ population in 2040. Although it is a crude 
projection on the need for caregivers, the generated predicted ratios are relatively close to the ratios 
presented  in  the  second  column.  The  generated  relative  burden  of  informal  caregiving  is  slightly 
overestimated  for  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  and  underestimated  for  Spain,  compared  to  the 
estimations based on Pickard & King (2012a). 
Table 7.12 Predicted demand for informal caregivers in 2040 
  Number of 
caregivers needed
a 
Caregivers needed per 
50+ population
a 
Caregivers per 65+ 
disabled population
b 
Caregivers per 50+ 
population
b 
        constant ratio care 
giver/disabled 
    %  %  % 
DE  2,386,199  7.04  47.04  7.14 
NL  132,971  1.94  17.64  2.07 
PL  .  .  26.82  5.92 
ES  1,843,730  8.10  56.01  7.77 
Sources: 
a Pickard and King (2012a) and own calculations; 
b Own calculations, based on Pickard (2012b) and Bonneux 
et al. (2012). 
7.6  Support for informal caregivers 
In this section we provide some results on how much support the different LTC systems provide for 
the  informal  caregivers.  Part  of  the  LTC  services  are  provided  informally,  typically  by  family 
members. The extent of the prevalence of informal caregiving varies across the countries. In addition, 
the burden  on the  caregivers also  varies. Thus it can be considered as a goal  of LTC systems to 
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minimise the burden  on the  informal caregivers, e.g. through supporting the provision  of  care, or 
through helping with the combination of caregiving and labour market participation. 
Vilaplana Pietro (2011) analyses jointly the unmet needs in formal care, provision of informal care, 
and labour problems of the informal caregivers. The data used is the Eurobarometer EB67.3 survey. 
She takes into account the simultaneous determination of the three analysed variables, and provides 
evidence that unmet needs increase the probability of becoming a care giver, and also increase the 
likelihood of facing labour market problems. She also shows that these effects are not homogenous 
across the European countries. Occupation specific probabilities reveal that highly skilled workers are 
more likely to suffer labour market problems due to caregiving in all countries. 
Our aim here  is to provide some  indications  on the  labour market consequences of informal care 
giving. First, we present descriptive statistics on labour market probabilities due to care giving, based 
on the Eurobarometer EB67.3 data. The number of caregivers with labour force participation problems 
as  a  consequence  of  caregiving  tasks  is  divided  by  the  total  number  of  working  caregivers.  As 
Vilaplana Pietro (2011) discusses, the emergence of labour force participation problems because of 
caregiving responsibilities is on average 20 percentage points lower for male European caregivers than 
for female caregivers. The gender and country specific statistics are presented in Table 7.13. 
Table 7.13 Percentage of caregivers with labour force participation problems as a consequence of 
caregiving tasks relative to the number of working caregivers 
  Men  Women 
Austria  42.81  62.96 
Belgium  25.07  47.99 
Bulgaria  41.93  50.81 
Croatia  32.96  49.78 
Cyprus  31.72  54.69 
Czech Rep.  28.19  54.15 
Denmark  22.19  31.15 
Estonia  32.55  44.82 
Finland  31.84  53.53 
France  24.78  27.56 
Germany  36.15  51.95 
Greece  22.84  71.8 
Hungary  48.75  61.45 
Ireland  27.18  40.49 
Italy  37.98  50.95 
Latvia  18.16  36.36 
Lithuania  19.78  45.36 
Luxemb.  28.56  57.4 
Malta  32.56  75.89 
Netherlands  19.85  63.4 
Poland  32.36  64.96 
Portugal  20.49  34.43 
Romania  36.26  49.83 
Slovakia  34.24  52.51 
Slovenia  37.02  48.13 
Spain  38.28  63.98 
Sweden  17.89  28.72 
Turkey  47.45  96.21 
UK  36.68  56.98 
EU-27  29.54  49.68 
Source: Vilaplana Pietro (2011), Table A3. 
 
Table 7.13 shows that relatively low ratios of working caregivers have labour market problems in 
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labour market conditions (e.g. part-time working time), or to the restriction of informal caregiving to 
less severe cases. On the other hand, this ratio is comparatively high in Austria, Malta, Spain and 
Turkey. 
Chapter 3 of Colombo et al. (2011) also highlights the potential negative consequences of informal 
caregiving  in  the  sense  that  it  can  have  negative  labour  market  consequences,  and  can  lead  to 
worsening physical and mental health of the care giver. The authors propose flexible working hours, 
employment support programmes and practical help to carers as potential solutions for mitigating the 
burden on caregivers. They also point out that the accessibility of formal care is also an influential 
factor in the burden on informal caregivers. 
We  repeat  here  the  results  of  Colombo  et  al.  (2011)  related  to  mental  health  problem.  This 
complements the analysis on the labour market consequences of informal caregiving. The reported 
statistics are based on the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), and the Survey of Health, Ageing 
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). 
Table 7.14 Prevalence of mental health problems and composite indicator of support 
  Mental health problems  Ratio of carers/non-carers  Support to carers (0-5) 
  Carers  Non-carers     
  %  %     
Austria  40  30.2  1.33  3 
Belgium  50.3  37.4  1.35  4 
Bulgaria        0 
Czech R.  46.6  34.3  1.36  2 
Denmark  39.4  27.5  1.43  3 
Estonia        3 
Finland        3 
France  52.2  43.4  1.2  5 
Germany  42.9  33.3  1.29  3 
Greece  44.8  31.1  1.44   
Hungary        0 
Ireland  34.6  30  1.15   
Italy  48.9  48  1.02  0 
Lithuania        4 
Netherlands  40.2  31.4  1.28  3 
Poland  73.4  62.3  1.18  1 
Romania        4 
Slovakia        3 
Slovenia        5 
Spain  55.8  46  1.21  3 
Sweden  32.6  31.3  1.04  2 
Switzerland  28.3  29.1  0.97   
UK  23.1  18.8  1.23  2 (England) 
Sources: Colombo et al. (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932401254 and Kraus et al. (2010). 
Table 7.14 shows that the probability of having mental health problems is higher among the caregivers 
in  all  of  the  analysed  European  countries,  except  for  Italy,  Sweden  and  Switzerland,  where  the 
differences between the carers and non-carers are minor. This suggests that informal caregiving can 
indeed lead to mental health problems on the side of the caregivers. The differences in the prevalence 
rates are the highest in Denmark, Greece, the Czech Republic, Belgium and Austria, thus there are no 
clear geographical patterns in these differences. Colombo et al. (2011) also show that mental health 
problems are more likely to occur if the provision of informal care is more intensive. 112  ANIKÓ BÍRÓ 
 
Finally, Kraus et al. (2010) also provide an indicator of support, based on the sum of benefits for 
informal  care  recipients,  income  support  for  informal  caregivers  and  other  benefits  for  informal 
caregivers.  We  rescale  this  variable  to  the  0-5  scale,  with  a  higher  value  corresponding  to  more 
support to the caregivers. These statistics are reported in the last column of Table 7.14. According to 
this  indicator  the  support  is  the  strongest  in  France  and  Slovenia,  and  the  weakest  in  Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Italy. 
The indicators of labour market difficulties among men or women (Table 7.13) and of the support to 
caregivers (Table 7.14, last column) are consistent with each other in the sense that there is a negative 
correlation  between  these  (-0.43  for  men  and  -0.35  for  women).  There  is  no  such  consistent 
relationship between the support indicator of Kraus et al. (2010) and the indicator of mental health 
problem among the carers, suggesting that the more formal measures of support cannot capture the 
actual mental consequences of caregiving on the carers. 
7.7  Choice 
Regarding the choice of care, we can consider the performance of a LTC system to be better if the 
users are able to choose to a higher extent who will give the care, and where and how the care is 
organised. More flexibility in choice can allow the users to select services that correspond to their 
needs. Pursuing this aim, on the other hand, can contradict some other aims of the LTC systems, such 
as affordability or sustainability. 
The choice of care has several dimensions, including the option to stay in the own home if possible, 
the possibility to choose providers, including the option to hire family members as caregivers, choices 
on  transportation,  etc.  Due  to  limited  availability  of  comparable  data,  here  we  consider  only  two 
dimensions:  whether  recipients  can  choose  the  provider  freely,  and  whether  benefits  in  cash  are 
available. The source of these indicators is the data collected in the first work package of ANCIEN. 
The first dimension that we consider is the choice of provider; that is whether care recipients can 
choose the provider freely at institutional care and at formal home care. This information is provided 
in the first two columns of Table 7.15. As the table shows, in most of the countries there is free choice 
of provider. As for formal home care, the only exception is Finland. The limited choice of provider is 
somewhat more prevalent in institutional care: there is limited choice in Denmark, Finland, Italy and 
Spain. 
The second dimension that we have information on is the availability of benefits in cash. In particular, 
we know from the same data collection whether in a given country there are benefits in cash available, 
and if yes, then whether those are available both for institutional care and formal home care. We scale 
this indicator on the 0-2 scale, 0 corresponding to no cash benefits, 1 to cash benefits in one of the 
service types, and 2 to cash benefits in both service types. Receiving the benefits in cash rather than in 
kind  allows  the  LTC  user  to  choose  freely  among  the  available  services,  thus  the  choice  options 
become wider. If an assessment is required then that can indicate that the allocation of the benefits 
might be more efficient in the sense that there is no undue provision of LTC benefits. We know from 
the same data collection that except for Estonia and France, if there are benefits in cash available then 
an  assessment  is  required  for  that.
43  It  can  be  also  seen  that  this  source  for  higher  choice  is  not 
available in Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Romania and Sweden. 
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Table 7.15 Indicators of freedom of choice 
  Can care recipients choose the provider freely?  Availability of benefits in cash (0-2) 
  Institutional care  Formal home care   
Austria  Yes  Yes  2 
Belgium  Yes  Yes  2 
Bulgaria  Yes  Yes  0 
Czech Republic  Yes  Yes  1 
Denmark  No  Yes  0 
Estonia  Yes  Yes  2 
Finland  No  No  2 
France  Yes  Yes  1 
Germany  Yes  Yes  1 
Hungary  Yes  Yes  0 
Italy  No  Yes  2 
Latvia  Yes  Yes  1 
Lithuania  Yes  Yes  1 
Netherlands  Yes  Yes  1 
Poland  Yes  Yes  1 
Romania  Yes  Yes  0 
Slovakia  Yes  Yes  1 
Slovenia  Yes  Yes  2 
Spain  No  Yes  2 
Sweden  Yes  Yes  0 
England  Yes  Yes  2 
Source: Data collected by IHS (ANCIEN WP 1). 
7.8  Conclusions and overall evaluation 
In this chapter we analysed the performance of LTC systems in Europe, building on the results of the 
ANCIEN project. We provided indicators on several dimensions of performance. In many cases the 
analysis  was restricted by the availability  of  data: it is  difficult to  quantify all the  dimensions  of 
performance, and even if quantitative indicators are available then those are not always comparable 
across  countries.  As  a  summary,  we  select  a  representative  set  of  performance  dimensions,  and 
evaluate the LTC systems of the four representative countries along these selected dimensions. This 
can provide an overall overview on the relative performance of the various types of LTC systems in 
Europe.  Due  to  the  complex  nature  of  the  LTC  systems,  such  an  overall  evaluation  exercise  is 
necessarily based on a set of simplifying assumptions. An important simplification is that we have to 
make assumptions on the weights of the different performance dimensions in the overall evaluation. 
Therefore  the  overall  numerical  evaluation  of  the  performance  of  the  LTC  systems  should  be 
considered  only  as  indicative.  Even  though  we  did  our  best  in  quantifying  the  dimensions  of 
performance, more emphasis should be put on the main differences between the countries, rather than 
on the exact values of the performance indicators. 
When selecting the performance dimensions we follow two basic aims. First, these dimensions should 
clearly reflect the performance of the LTC systems. Thus we exclude the ability dimension here, as 
that  is  strongly  influenced  by  other  factors  than  the  LTC  system  itself.  Second,  the  selected 
dimensions should be sufficiently independent from each other, but cover the main aspects of the LTC 
systems. For  example, accessibility  is  omitted since  that is closely related to the  equity and total 
burden of care. The support given to informal caregivers is also not considered here, as the cost of 
such support is not captured by the available indicators. Based on these considerations, we summarise 
the performance of LTC systems along the following five dimensions: the quality of life of (potential) 
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selected dimensions capture the quality of care, where the first is an outcome at the level of the final 
user, whereas the second is rather an outcome at systems’ level. The efficiency of a system can be 
considered to be higher if the quality of care relative to the total burden is higher. 
As our final aim is to give an overall evaluation of the performance of the LTC systems, the indicators 
of the selected five dimensions have to be comparable. It is not possible to directly aggregate the 
indicators  of  different  performance  categories.  Therefore  apart  from  reporting  again  the  indicator 
values, we also standardise them. The standardised values have mean of zero and standard deviation of 
one.  In  addition,  we  also  ensure  that  higher  values  always  imply  better  performance,  thus  after 
standardisation we also reverse the sign of the total burden indicator. 
The evaluation of the LTC systems according to the quality of life of (potential) LTC users is based on 
the analysis of chapter 4. In the upper part of Table 7.16 we show the three results that we use in this 
evaluation  exercise:  the  average  marginal  effects  (AME)  of  living  in  a  certain  country  on  the 
probability of receiving help, the AME of living in a certain country on the probability of the help 
meeting the needs all the time, and the estimated coefficients for the unobserved system properties. 
Then we generate a standardised score for the representative four countries in the following way: we 
standardise the three indicators, take the average, and then rescale this average so that it has standard 
deviation of one (and mean of zero).
44 As quality indicator we select the quality score based on the 
quality  evaluations reported  in the Eurobarometer  data, taking the average of the  country specific 
mean evaluation of home care and nursing home quality. The equity of care in the representative 
countries is ranked based on the analysis presented in chapter 5. Again, the equity of LTC is in itself 
multidimensional. We quantify the equity of care by attaching values to the categories provided in 
chapter 5: 1 - low equity, 2 - medium low, 3 - medium, 4 - medium high, 5 - high or very high. Then 
we take the average of the so generated indicators of equity in revenue raising and resource allocation, 
these numbers are reported in the upper part of Table 7.16. The standardised score is generated by 
taking the average of these two generated indicators of equity and standardising the so obtained score. 
The  evaluation  of LTC systems according to the total burden of caregiving  is also based  on two 
indicators. First, we use the simulation results provided in section 7.5.3, considering both the public 
and private expenditures on formal LTC in 2040. Second, we also consider the ratio of the projected 
number of caregivers based on the current supply and future need. We arrive at the standardised score 
of total burden in a similar way as for the quality of life indicator: we standardise these indicators, then 
reverse the sign and calculate the average of the so obtained score, finally we rescale these values so 
that the standard deviation equals one - this number serves as the standardised indicator of total burden 
of  care giving, with  higher value corresponding to better performance. Finally, as an indicator of 
choice we simply add up the available information on the freedom of choice of providers and on the 
availability of benefits in cash. A country ranks the highest if the providers both in home care and 
institutional care can be chosen freely, and if benefits in cash are available for both service types. This 
gives a choice score of 3 for all four representative countries, thus we cannot differentiate the four 
representative countries according to this dimension. The equal value across the countries implies a 
standard deviation  of  zero, thus these  indicators cannot be standardised. Due to the  equal  values, 
omitting this category from the final ranking does not influence the results. 
Table  7.16  shows  the  original  and  standardised  scores  of  the  representative  countries.  As  for  the 
standardised scores, a higher number reflects better performance according to the specified indicators. 
In the last part of the table we present the average scores for the representative countries. We take a 
simple average of the standardised scores. According to this analysis the performance of the Dutch 
system  is  estimated to be the best, followed by the  German and Polish systems, and the Spanish 
system is estimated to fare the worst. The table also reveals some trade-offs. For example, the quality 
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of life and the quality of care are high among the Dutch LTC users without strong dependence on 
informal  care  and  private  financing.  However,  the  Dutch  system  is  expensive  in  terms  of  public 
financing, and uses a lot of formal care. On the other hand, Germany seems to have a more affordable 
system in terms of expenditures on formal care with relatively high quality of life among the LTC 
users, but this system relies strongly on the services provided by informal caregivers. 
If the burden of informal caregiving is omitted from the overall evaluation then Germany performs 
relatively better, and Spain performs better than Poland. Thus our results are sensitive to the inclusion 
of the aspect of the burdens of informal care giving. 
Table 7.16 Evaluation of LTC systems based on the representative indicators 
  Quality of life  Quality 
of care 
(1-4) 
Equity (1-5)  Total burden  Choice 
(0-4) 














Informal   
  (% 50+)   
DE  0  0  -0.275  2.699  3.5  3.5  2.186  7.14  3 
NL  -0.096  0.068  -0.206  2.855  5  5  4.84  2.07  3 
PL  -0.374  -0.057  0.27  2.33  1  1.25  0.1  5.92  3 
ES  -0.311  -0.124  -0.207  2.772  2  1.5  0.805  7.77  3 
Standardised 
values (higher 
score - better 
performance) 
               








Mean score. burden of 
informal caregiving 
excluded 
   
DE  0.494  0.151  0.374  -1.044  -0.006  0.23       
NL  0.851  0.825  1.229  0.106  0.753  0.385       
PL  0.078  -1.442  -0.98  1.324  -0.255  -0.361       
ES  -1.423  0.466  -0.624  -0.382  -0.491  -0.255       
 
An alternative way to evaluate the relative performance of LTC systems is based on multi-criteria 
decision methods.
45 These methods differ from the simple “additive” approach used above in that they 
are  based  on  dominance  relationships  between  subjects  (LTC  systems  of  countries)  and  for  each 
relevant  dimension  (performance  indicator).  Biggiero  &  Laise  (2003)  provide  an  example  of  an 
algorithm based on an “outranking” method along these lines, and it is their method we have used 
here. It can be briefly summarised as follows (the reader is referred to the original article for a detailed 
discussion):  A country “dominates” another country  in a  dimension  when  it scores  higher  on the 
corresponding indicator, in which case it is assigned a “1” (otherwise “0”). The individual dominance 
indicators per dimension (0/1) are combined into one dominance value defined as a weighted sum 
using weights assigned to the dimensions. Overall dominance of one country over another is achieved 
when the composite dominance value exceeds a chosen threshold. When this threshold is chosen to be 
0.5 (50%), this amounts to choosing a winner in a pair-wise comparison by simple “majority rule”: the 
accumulated “votes” in favour of a country, weighted by their importance, determine the outcome. 
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The final result of this algorithm is a full set of bilateral dominance indicators, gathered in a square 
“outranking matrix”.  
Applying this method to the scores in Table 7.16 results in the outranking matrix presented in Table 
7.17. The entries in this matrix are zero or one, indicating whether (1) or not (0) the “row country” 
outranks the “column country”. 
Table 7.17 Outranking matrix computed for representative countries: a value 1 indicates that the row 
country outranks the column country 
  DE  NL  PL  ES 
DE    0  1  0 
NL  1    1  1 
PL  0  0    0 
ES  0  0  0   
 
The matrix in Table 7.17 was obtained using the scores in Table 7.16, equal weights for the four 
performance indicators and a threshold value of 0.5. The results are comparable with, but not identical 
to, the ranking obtained from the simple average scores in Table 7.16: the Netherlands outranks the 
other three countries, Germany outranks Poland, while Spain is outranked only by the Netherlands. 
This results in the following final ranking: (1) the Netherlands, (2) Germany, and (3) Poland and 
Spain. It is interesting to note that Spain and Poland end in a “draw”: neither country dominates the 
other. This indeterminacy is a consequence of the multi-criteria character of the method, which allows 
a country to dominate another in some  dimensions, but to be  dominated by that same country in 
others. In terms of the performance indicators, Spain outperforms Poland in terms of quality of care 
and equity, but is dominated by Poland in terms of quality of life and total burden. 
The  indeterminacy  of  the  multi-criteria  decision  method  is,  in  our  opinion,  not  a  drawback:  it 
recognises the fact that with multiple dimensions, it is possible to have conflicting dominance (or 
outperformance) relationships between subjects. 
We finish our analysis with some cautionary remarks. Although our overall evaluations are based on a 
rich set of available indicators, it is important to keep in mind the limitations of the comparisons. We 
had to face a series of measurement problems, especially in terms of the quality of LTC services, and 
the support provided to the informal caregivers. We do not know the correct weights for the different 
dimensions of performance, since we do not know the preferences. Moreover, even if the numerical 
results  are  reliable  those  do  not  imply  that  for  example  the  Dutch  system,  which  has  a  good 
performance, would have a similarly good performance when implemented in another country. 
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8.  Review and conclusions 
8.1  The concept of performance  
Performance of LTC systems is a multi-dimensional concept. We distinguished five important goals of 
LTC systems, one ultimate goal at the level of final users of LTC and society, three intermediate goals 
at the level of the LTC systems and one desirable systems’ characteristic (see chapter 2): 
1.  Quality of life of LTC users and an appropriate balance between LTC and other societal needs 
2.  Quality of care 
3.  A  manageable total burden  of  care (consisting of the financial burden  of formal care and the 
burden of informal care) 
4.  Equity 
5.  Choice of settings and providers 
An important notion is that although these goals represent different dimensions, there are clear trade-
offs among them. One very important trade-off is that improving the quality or equity is likely to make 
the total burden of care higher, unless there are efficiency gains to be made. 
8.2  Overview of the analysis 
In  order  to  compare  the  performance  of  national  systems  we  need  internationally  comparable 
information on the results for the five goals. For the first goal we need to know about the quality of 
life of LTC users or potential LTC users.
46 This information is based on an analysis of the experience 
of LTC users, using the SHARE database. This analysis yields indicators for the LTC-related quality 
of life of elderly persons with limitations in 13 countries. These indicators were used to construct 
scores for the quality of life-goal (see chapter 4 of this report). For the second goal, quality of care, we 
use information from ANCIEN work package 5 and external sources. Chapter 7 gives an overview of 
the available information on quality of care, accessibility of care and the total burden of care. The third 
goal, a manageable total burden of care, has two dimensions: the financial burden of formal care and 
the burden of informal care giving. To assess the financial burden we use results from ANCIEN work 
package 1 and ANCIEN projections of future LTC expenditures. These projections are described in 
chapter 6. Information about the burden of informal caregiving can be found in the results of ANCIEN 
work packages 3 and 6 and from external sources such as Colombo et al. (2011). Scores for the fourth 
goal are based on an analysis of equity in the four representative countries (Germany, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Poland) that is described in chapter 5 of this report. Information about the fifth goal, choice, 
is based on results of ANCIEN work package 1. 
In summary, for many of these goals the information we use, is based on analyses within the ANCIEN 
project. Some of the underlying analyses are included in this report, while others are described in 
previous ANCIEN WPs. 
Chapter 7 of this report describes the overall evaluation of the performance of LTC systems. It gives 
an  overview  of  the  available  information  for  the  ANCIEN  countries,  not  just  for  the  five  goals 
described above, but also for most of the other criteria in the performance framework: support for 
informal caregivers, accessibility of care and improving functional ability. This chapter also includes a 
discussion of data problems. It is, generally speaking, difficult to collect internationally comparable 
information. This turned out to be especially difficult for the quality of care, since countries tend to 
formulate  different  national  indicators.  This  implies  that  nationally  collected  information  is 
incomparable. Furthermore, chapter 7 describes the methods for combining the information on the 
different scores. Combining the scores on four dimensions (choice is excluded here) in one final score 
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necessitates the use of weights for the different goals. Such weights would ideally be based on large 
international surveys to determine the relative preferences in different countries. Unfortunately such 
information  is  not  available.  We  made  the  simplifying  assumption  to  use  equal  weights  for  all 
dimensions. In addition, a multi- criteria decision method was used as an alternative way of combining 
the information on the dimensions (see chapter 7). 
8.3  Performance in the four representative countries 
The  information  about  the  performance  of  the  LTC  systems  is  more  complete  for  Germany,  the 
Netherlands, Spain and Poland, than for the other countries included in the ANCIEN project. This is 
because  modelling  of  long-term  care  needs  and  long-term  care  use  was  restricted  to  these  four 
countries.
47 Even though we would have liked to have better and more complete information even for 
these  countries,  we  could  carry  out  a  more  or  less  complete  evaluation.  The  results  on  four  key 
performance dimensions are summarised in Figure 8.1.  
Figure 8.1 Standardised performance scores of LTC systems on 4 dimensions 
 
The Dutch system has the highest scores on all dimensions except the total burden of care, where it 
has the second best score after Poland. The Dutch score on total burden is based on a relatively very 
high  future  expenditure  on  formal  care  combined  with  a  low  burden  of  informal  caregiving  (see 
chapter 7).
48 In the performance of the Dutch system we see to some extent the trade-off in action 
between the total burden of care and the other dimensions: equity and quality can be relatively high 
because the Netherlands spends a lot on publicly financed formal care. The high reliance on formal 
care, combined with the ageing of the large post-war baby boom generation in the Netherlands, leads 
to high  expenditure projections compared to other countries. However, the total burden  of care is 
lower than in Germany and Spain because of the relatively low use of informal care.
49 Over the four 
dimensions taken together, the Dutch system seems to score relatively well.  
The German system has somewhat lower scores than the Dutch on all four dimensions. For quality of 
life and equity the German system ends up in the second place after the Dutch system. Here we should 
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keep in mind that these dimensions themselves are multidimensional. For example, on the important 
aspect of older persons receiving help with their limitations, Germany has the best score, whereas the 
Netherlands  scores  better  on  the  help  meeting  the  needs  all  the  time  and  Poland  scores  best  on 
unobserved properties of the LTC system that affect the quality of life. These underlying results are 
described in detail in chapter 4. The German system is somewhat less equitable than the Dutch mainly 
because of the large role of informal care and the exclusion of people with lower care needs from the 
publicly financed system (see chapter 5). Remarkably, the German system has the least favourable 
score of the four systems on the total burden of care. The financial burden in Germany is a lot lower 
than in the Netherlands, but still considerably higher than in Spain and Poland, while the burden of 
informal caregiving in Germany is comparable to the high burden in Spain. Even though Germany 
carries the highest burden of LTC according to our scores, it does not have the best results on quality 
and equity. One of the reasons is that the high burden consists for a considerable part of the burden of 
informal care giving, and this is a less equitable way of organising the LTC system. 
The Polish system excels in having a low total burden of care. Naturally, considering the relation 
among the dimensions, this is likely to have a negative impact on other dimensions of performance. In 
Poland, we see a clear trade-off between the burden of care and the other dimensions. The Polish 
system  scores  lowest  on  quality  of  care  and  equity  and  best  on  the  burden  of  care.  Concerning 
indicators of quality of life for LTC users it ends up in the third place, because of the good unobserved 
properties of the Polish LTC system. The probability of receiving help with limitations is rather low in 
Poland, while at the same time the level of disability is high compared to other countries. 
The Spanish system has few extreme scores. It scores lowest on indicators for quality of life of LTC 
users, but we have to keep in mind that results may have changed since the data collection for the 
second wave of SHARE because of the partial introduction of a new LTC system in Spain. Recently, 
the  economic and  financial crisis  led to  large budget cuts on publicly financed LTC. Concerning 
quality of care the Spanish system takes the second place. For equity and the total burden of care the 
Spanish system ends up in the third place.  
If we just take a simple average over the four key dimensions, we see that the Netherlands scores first, 
despite the high total burden of care. It is followed by Germany in the second place, Poland in the 
third place and Spain in the fourth place.  
Naturally, we cannot conclude from these overall scores that every country would be better off by 
implementing  the  highest  scoring  system.  This  is  not  just  because  the  weights  are  unknown  and 
preferences differ among countries, but also because a system as a whole is unlikely to be transferable 
to other countries. Its functioning will depend in part on a shared history and culture in a country and 
specific institutions. It is more reasonable not to attempt to copy other national systems, but to be 
inspired by them, especially concerning aspects where they score well. The lessons learned from other 
systems  can  be  used,  for  example,  to  fine-tune  aspects  of  a  national  system  that  are  seen  as 
unsatisfactory within the country itself. 
Suppose for example that the Netherlands is worried about the high projected formal care use and the 
high projected public expenditure. The Netherlands could try to learn from the German system, as 
Germany is comparable to the Netherlands in many respects and still public expenditure on LTC is 
much lower. Our analysis shows that the probability of receiving help for elderly with limitations is 
even higher in Germany than in the Netherlands. So, how is this possible? First, the analysis in this 
project  has taught us that Germany  knows  much stricter thresholds for being  eligible  for publicly 
financed help than the Netherlands, in terms of the severity of limitations. Secondly, private funding is 
much higher in Germany and the role of informal care is much larger for personal care. So Dutch 
policy makers could consider whether they also would like to introduce some form of thresholds or 
more private funding and how that would work out in the Netherlands. Some of the questions could be 
whether  the  role  of  informal  care  could  be  increased,  to  what  extent  and  what  drawbacks  and 
advantages this might have. 
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8.4  Policy considerations 
A number of lessons emerge from our research. The first lesson is that differences in the projected 
level of LTC use among countries are to a large extent determined by different patterns of care use and 
-to a smaller extent- by differences in disability levels. Demography plays a limited role. Among the 
four  representative  countries,  we  see  that  the  prevalence  of  disability  among  elderly  persons  is 
especially high in Poland (39% in 2040) and relatively low in the Netherlands (17% in 2040) (see 
chapter  7). This  difference  has  little  to  do  with  the  composition  of  the  populations  over  age  and 
gender. If Poland would have the most favourable demographic composition in 2040, that of Spain, 
the disability rate in Poland would still be 37% (instead of 39%) according to the simulations. If the 
Dutch population was as disabled as the Polish is according to SHARE, care use in the Netherlands 
would be at least 50% higher in 2040. The Netherlands on the other hand, has the most intensive care 
use pattern for formal care. The differences with Poland are especially large. Residential care use in 
Poland in 2040 would be almost 10 times as high if the Polish population would follow the Dutch care 
use pattern (11.9% of the elderly population instead of 1.3%). If the Dutch population with its Dutch 
demography and disability would follow the Polish care use pattern, residential care use would almost 
vanish in the Netherlands (from 7.2% to 0.6% in 2040). In the case of Poland and the Netherlands the 
impact of the care use pattern is much larger even than the impact of the considerable differences in 
disability level. The results show that differences in LTC use among countries can only be explained 
to a very limited extent by demography. The impact of the disability level is much larger, but still 
modest compared to the large impact of the care use pattern.  
A second lesson is that whereas demography is not much of a determinant of the level of care use, 
demographic developments are indeed important determinants of the growth in the future need for 
LTC.  In  countries  where  ageing  plays  an  important  role,  the  demand  for  LTC  will  increase 
considerably in any case, even when future elderly are going to be healthier than the current elderly. 
This is simply the effect of the way the population is divided over different age categories, while the 
probability of becoming disabled is age-dependent. Using Poland and the Netherlands again as an 
example, we see that the number of elderly disabled women in Poland is projected to increase by 
180%  in  2040.  However,  if  the  Polish  prevalence  rates  would  be  combined  with  the  Dutch 
demography with its large baby boom, the increase would be 386% (more than twice as much). The 
other way round, if the lower Dutch prevalence rates would be combined with the Polish demography, 
the  increase  in  disabled  elderly  women  would  be  87%  (instead  of  180%).  Both  demography  and 
prevalence rates have an important impact on the growth of disability. 
Thirdly, where organisation of LTC is concerned, many roads lead to Rome. Countries have organised 
their LTC systems in vastly different ways, even countries that are quite comparable in economic 
development.
50 Some of the ways to organise LTC are more equitable but more expensive in terms of 
public  expenditure.  Others  are  both  less  expensive  and  less  equitable.  Very  different  ways  of 
organisation can lead to the same results for aspects of performance such as the probability of older 
persons with limitations receiving help.  
A very important difference among countries can be found in the role of informal care. This role 
ranges  from  almost  being  the  only  source  of  LTC  (as  in  Poland)  to  being  relatively  unimportant 
though still playing an  important role  in the absolute sense  (as in the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Sweden). Another important difference is the role of private funding. The underlying difference is in 
the division of responsibility among the state on the one hand and the individual or the family on the 
other hand. In the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden a large part of the responsibility is borne by the 
state. This means high public spending, low private spending and a relatively high use of formal care. 
In many other countries the individual or family has more responsibility. This leads to more informal 
care and more private funding. In some countries the state responsibility is restricted to being a safety 
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net for those with severe limitations who have no informal caregivers and insufficient private means. 
The English LTC system is an example of this. Choices on this continuum have a large effect not only 
on public expenditure but also on the fairness of the system. With informal care and private funding, 
risk sharing is limited, so the funding of the system is less equitable. Family members have to supply 
informal  care  (or  pay  for  private  care)  because  they  have  someone  near  them  who  needs  it, 
independent of their capacity to contribute to funding of care. And for elderly persons with limitations, 
their chances of receiving help depend to a lesser extent on their needs and to a larger extent on the 
coincidence of having access to informal carers or not or being able to pay for private care. 
Thus more publicly oriented LTC systems tend to be more equitable, but there is a price to be paid. 
Because such systems depend more on public funding, the financial burden is generally higher and 
may increase a lot when ageing plays an important role. This is what will happen in the Netherlands if 
the care use pattern stays the same. Not only does the Netherlands have a publicly oriented system, we 
also see that the use of expensive residential care is relatively high and -more importantly- there was a 
large post war baby boom in the Netherlands that is going to need LTC in the not too distant future. 
The price for equity given this pattern of ageing is that future financial affordability is likely going to 
be a problem. However, we should not conclude that countries with a large dependence on informal 
care are safe from future problems with the sustainability of their LTC system (see below). 
A fourth lesson from WP6 of the ANCIEN project is that both formal care oriented and informal care 
oriented systems will find it a challenge to ensure a sufficient supply of long-term care in the future 
with ageing populations. The projections for the four representative countries have shown that the 
supply of informal care will not increase as fast as the potential use of informal care.
51 In Spain an 
especially large gap between the necessary and available number of informal caregivers would open 
up by 2060 (see Table 8.1). The relatively slow projected increase in the supply of informal care in the 
four countries is mostly due to the projected trends in intergenerational care. These trends are driven 
by  underlying  demographic  trends  in  the  numbers  of  persons  aged  50  to  64.  The  projections  of 
informal care supply in WP6 take into account developments in age, gender and marital status of 
caregivers. Possibly other developments in society will have an additional negative effect on informal 
care supply, much of which is still provided by women. A larger labour market participation of women 
and children living further from their parents may increase the care gap. 
Table 8.1 Development of informal care gap (% changes over time) 
Country  Period  Supply to meet demand (at constant ratio 
caregivers to care-users) 
Supply at constant probabilities of 
providing care 
    %  % 
Germany  2010-2040  50.7  29.5 
  2010-2060  50.9  25.3 
Netherlands  2010-2040  79.5  51.5 
  2010-2060  65.6  39.4 
Spain   2010-2040  76.9  56.0 
  2010-2060  140.2  40.1 
Source: Pickard & King (2012b), Table 7.3. 
WP6 also produced projections for the formal care gap. These are summarised in Table 8.2, where the 
assumption is used that a constant fraction of the workforce will be employed in providing personal 
and nursing care for older persons with limitations. Under this assumption, the supply of formal care 
workers will decrease in every country, while the supply that would be necessary to meet demand will 
increase by more than 90% to almost 150% depending on the country. We have to keep in mind that 
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there is no inherent reason for the fraction of the workforce employed in personal and nursing care to 
remain constant. It may well be possible to increase the share of LTC workers in the total workforce, 
but the projected necessary increases are considerable and will certainly take efforts. 
Table 8.2 Development of formal care gap (% changes over time, 2010-2050) 
Country  Supply to meet demand (at constant 
ratio of care workers to care-users) 
Supply at constant fraction of 
workforce 
Germany  94.4  -19.3 
Netherlands  145.8  -3.4 
Spain  129.8  -15.1 
Poland  129.5  -19.9 
Source: Geerts & Willemé (2012). 
A final lesson to be learned from the analysis in this WP is that it is rather difficult to compare LTC 
systems. One important reason is a lack of internationally comparable data. If countries consider it 
important to learn from each other’s systems, collection of comparable data would have to get more 
attention. This is especially the case for data on the quality of care. Another difficulty with comparing 
systems  is  that  these  systems  are  clearly  multidimensional  and  the  weights  for  the  different 
performance dimensions are unknown. Research into these weights, especially internationally oriented 
research, would be very useful. 
Overall, we can conclude that information about other national systems can provide inspiration for 
adapting a country’s own system. Using the performance framework, policy makers can identify the 
weak points of their own system and in the next step, select some countries where the LTC system 
scores well on those dimensions. They can see how those countries manage to score better on those 
particular aspects and this may inspire them to improve their own system. Sometimes other countries 
have  found  unexpected  ‘solutions’  for  certain  problems.  But  policy  makers  would  still  have  to 
consider carefully how well the solutions found in other countries, would work in their own country 
and which trade-offs are involved. 
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general principles for coping with the role of evolving technology, considering the cultural, economic, 
regulatory and organisational conditions. WP 5 addresses quality assurance. Together with WP 1, WP 5 
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accessibility and affordability. 
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description of systems, and of quality assurance and an analysis of systems performance.  
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